

82D CONGRESS }
1st Session }

SENATE

{REPORT
{No. 117

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 1



SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON OF TEXAS

FEBRUARY 21 (legislative day, JANUARY 29), 1951.—Ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1951

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

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II



SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON OF TEXAS

FEBRUARY 21 (Reprinted and JANUARY 29, 1951.—Ordered to be printed)

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UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT

FEBRUARY 21 (legislative day, JANUARY 29), 1951,—Ordered to be printed

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, from the Committee on Armed Services,
submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 1]

The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the bill (S. 1) to provide for the common defense by establishing a universal military training program, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with committee amendments in the nature of a substitute and recommend that the bill, as amended, do pass.

I. PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of the bill is, first, to raise immediately the manpower necessary to build and maintain an armed force of the size determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be our minimum security requirement, and, secondly, to provide for the maintenance of an adequate force of trained Reserves for the future security of the United States.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BILL

Shortly after the Korean fighting began, the Senate Armed Services Committee of the Eighty-first Congress initiated a series of hearings on S. 4062, a bill intended to inaugurate a system of universal training consistent with the recommendations of the Compton Commission. As a result of these hearings, the committee reached substantial agreement on a modification of S. 4062 which would have instituted a system of universal training on a stand-by basis, to become operative at such future time as the size of the Armed Forces on active duty and the character of the world situation would permit such a program to be undertaken.

The President requested that the Armed Services Committee suspend action on the bill at that time because it was improbable that a final decision could be reached before the expiration of the Eighty-

first Congress. In complying with this request, the committee instructed its Preparedness Subcommittee to assume the responsibility for further study of the subject of universal training, and be prepared to report to the full committee early in the Eighty-second Congress.

Numerous conferences and studies were held during the recess period in an effort to lay the groundwork for a military manpower bill which would have the most thorough and up-to-date coordination among all interested branches of the Government. These studies extended to persons outside the Government as well.

Early in the Eighty-second Congress, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, for himself, for the other members of the committee, and for Senator Malone, introduced by request a bill which was designated as S. 1. This bill was substantially the same as the bill on which the Armed Services Committee had begun hearings at the time of Korean crisis, and referred to above as S. 4062.

On January 10 the Preparedness Subcommittee began the first of what developed into a series of 37 sessions, or over 100 hours, of hearings devoted to an examination of the subject of the relationship of our national manpower potential to our national security. The committee feels that it is pertinent to observe that the treatment of the problem was thorough, impartial, and objective.

The initial sessions of the hearings did not concern any formal legislative proposal, but were devoted to a survey of the over-all manpower picture and an examination of the details of our manpower resources. The administration's formal legislative proposal was presented through the Department of Defense at the beginning of the second week of the hearings. This was introduced by the chairman of the subcommittee, for himself and other members of the full committee, by request, and it took the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute for S. 1. This was in accordance with an agreement reached between Chairman Russell, and the national commander of the American Legion, and others.

It is this bill, with modifications aimed to bring it into harmony with the aims of the original version of S. 1, and other changes recommended by the committee, to which this report addresses itself.

It should be noted at this point in the report that all members of the Armed Services Committee are ex officio members of the Preparedness Subcommittee. The efforts of the subcommittee, throughout the development of this bill, were aided immeasurably by the advice and cooperation of the subcommittee's ex officio members, all of whom from time to time sat with the subcommittee and assisted in the examination of witnesses and the formulation of decisions.

It should also be noted at this point in the report that the views of those at whose request the original version of S. 1 was introduced in the Eighty-second Congress have been given detailed consideration by the subcommittee, and that the subcommittee is informed that the bill as reported meets the basic objectives which they were seeking.

III. NEED FOR THE BILL

Since 1939, 10 nations have fallen under the boot of international communism. Three of those nations plus nine other territorial acquisitions have been absorbed into the Soviet Union proper. Over 300,000 square miles of territory have been added to the Soviet Union in that brief span of 11 years.

Eighteen months ago it was announced that an atomic explosion had taken place in Communist Russia.

Nine months ago North Korean Communists invaded South Korea and thereby precipitated a struggle into which an unprepared America has committed nearly all of its available combat troops.

Four months ago the Communist hordes of Red China were unleashed without warning upon American forces in Korea.

The grim fact is that the United States is now engaged in a struggle for survival. The dimensions of that struggle cannot be measured. We do not know how long it will continue; we do not know how or where a decision will be ultimately reached; we do not know what will be required of us.

We do know that the balance of manpower is against us.

The passage of time has tipped the manpower scales against us.

In 1945 there were 193,000,000 people in the Soviet sphere.

In 1945 there were 1,820,000,000 people in the western sphere.

In 1950 there were 795,000,000 people in the Soviet sphere.

In 1950 there were only 725,000,000 people in the western sphere.

Action must be taken.

Of these things we can be sure: Our strength is not adequate for the present, nor has our strength, in past years, been adequate at the moment of initial need. With this knowledge, it behooves a responsible Nation to meet immediately the clear necessities of the present and to prepare for the future by correcting the acknowledged errors of past experience.

On January 1, 1951, there was within the continental United States only one fully equipped, ready division of Army troops. This is testimony to the inadequacy of our strength.

No nation aspiring to preserve its security or to protect its freedoms can long sustain such a clearly critical deficit in its strength. There is no validity to the suggestion that this deficit could be corrected by withdrawing our troops from their tasks abroad. The effect of such withdrawals would be only to increase the deficit and magnify our ultimate task.

We must remember this: Whatever we might abandon would only be added strength for our enemy. The stronger our enemy, the greater our danger. We cannot, must not, knowingly contribute to our own peril.

To avoid increasing our national jeopardy, it is imperative that we now take those necessary steps to make our strength equal to the peril of the hour. The first, and most essential step, is to bring our Armed Forces to the strength which minimum security requires.

The Congress, recognizing the basic necessity for this step, acted last year to remove statutory ceilings upon the size of the Armed Forces. In doing this, Congress relied on the Joint Chiefs of Staff—our top military strategists—to exercise their grave responsibility of determining the security requirements of the Nation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined that our minimum security needs, at the moment, require an armed force of approximately 3.5 million men.

If we accept that determination, we shall be accepting the best strategic judgment of the men whose life work has been—and is now—the planning of the defense of the Republic. If we reject that determination and deny the minimum security requirements of the Nation,

we would be assuming a dreadful responsibility of depriving the Nation of an adequate defense.

We recognize that it is not a coveted responsibility—to say that any of our citizens, especially our young men, must sacrifice a portion of their freedom, comfort, or ambition to defend this Nation. It must be recognized, however, that if we should withdraw from this responsibility now, we would place in jeopardy the freedoms of all of our citizens, and all the freedoms enjoyed in the world today. Unpleasant though the choices may be, we face the decision of asking temporary sacrifice from some of our citizens now, or of inviting the permanent extinction of freedom for all of our citizens.

That is our immediate choice.

There is another choice we must make about our future.

Our present danger, as pointed out, cannot be defined by the measurements of time, effort, or even of geography. Secretary of Defense Marshall said, January 17, 1951, in a letter to the committee:

We are confronted with a world situation of such gravity and such unpredictability that we must be prepared for effective action, whether the challenge comes with the speed of sound or is delayed for a lifetime.

How can we meet such an indefinable challenge? We could, perhaps, await a moment when the shape of the challenge becomes evident and distinct. That moment, however, would likely be too late. The ultimate challenge will not materialize slowly; it will come in a blinding flash. We would have light with which to see that challenge, but we would not have the power with which to respond to it.

The more prudent course is to pursue the teachings of history—that weakness attracts aggression as the rod attracts the lightning. Two global wars have been thrust upon us because we were weak, and our weakness sanctioned the aggression which ultimately embroiled us in war and bloodshed.

The course of courage is to make ourselves strong, confident that strength may save us from war—and if not from war, certainly from extinction.

The course of strength requires sacrifice. It requires us to mobilize our young men, to ask of them a period of active military duty, and a longer period of Reserve duty. It requires us to maintain, at all times, a reservoir of manpower strength which will have meaning in the eyes of our enemies, and substance in the plans of our strategists.

This is the course least fraught with danger for our institutions and concepts of freedom. No democracy can long survive the burden of a large standing armed force. Likewise, no nation can permanently endure the waste of frenzied periods of mobilization and demobilization. Just as frequent periods of destructive illnesses ultimately wither the healthiest body, so would frequent periods of hasty mobilization ultimately wither our national strength.

Maintaining an adequate Reserve—properly trained to give it meaning in terms of effectiveness—is the best insurance freedom can have. This bill is expressly designed for the purpose of adding to the arsenal of American strength a meaningful reserve of trained, seasoned men, capable of instantly bearing arms.

We believe the program in this bill can be the cornerstone of American security.

IV. THE NATION'S MANPOWER POOL

Our basic problem in manpower is this: we must, with fewer men, do more than our enemy does, with abundant men.

America's manpower pool is shallow; our enemy's pool is deep. From this fact, there is no relief. We must stand or fall, succeed or fail, with what we have.

Our success or failure will depend upon how efficiently we utilize the manpower that is available. We must appropriate our strength wisely between two supreme tasks: First, the maintenance of superior industrial production, and, second, the maintenance of adequate military forces, both under arms and in reserve.

This is a delicate task. To undertake the task intelligently, we must understand what strength is available in our manpower pool.

THE CIVILIAN MANPOWER FORCE TODAY

In December 1950 the Nation had a labor force of 64.5 million, which included 45.5 million men, 19 million women, and 2.2 million in the Armed Forces.

Of that total labor force, 54.1 million were employed in nonagricultural occupations—an all-time high. Unemployed numbered 2.2 million, which is considered unusually small.

This means, as Secretary of Labor Tobin emphasized, that we do not now have a reserve force of manpower.

In measuring our potential, certain facts are pertinent. There are now 30.5 million children under age 10, compared with 21.2 million under 10 in 1940. Thus, because of the duties and responsibilities at home, a smaller number of women under 35 will be available for expansion of our civilian labor force.

Likewise, the number of youths in the age group 10 through 19 has declined by 2.1 million. This means a decrease in the availability of young workers, under military service age, for civilian occupations.

Expansion of the civilian labor force may depend upon recruiting women over 35, and those retired from the labor force. This would add probably 5,000,000 under conditions of all-out mobilization. Increasing the workweek to 48 hours would add the equivalent of 1.5 million.

THE MILITARY MANPOWER POOL

At the present time, the ages of liability for induction for military service are 19 through 25.

The breakdown of status within this age bracket is as follows:

Status of selective service registrants, age 19 through 25

The following tabulation shows the classification status of registrants in the 19-26 age group as of October 31, 1950. It is the same as shown on chart A, page 1228, of the hearings, and was presented by the Department of Defense based on statistics furnished by the Selective Service System. A detailed analysis of the manpower situation appears in the hearings, beginning on page 86, in a series of charts beginning on page 1228, and another series beginning on page 688.

In class I-A.....	1, 632, 249
In service.....	460, 502
Deferred as students and for occupations.....	763, 062
In class III-A, for dependencies.....	1, 184, 893
In class IV-F, rejected.....	799, 513
In ROTC, Reserves, and National Guard.....	182, 915
Veterans.....	2, 862, 960
Other statutory deferments.....	71, 062
Total, 19 through 25.....	7, 957, 156

Brief analysis of foregoing classifications

In considering this analysis, it should be borne in mind that by far the greater proportion of the strength of our Armed Forces is now being raised by voluntary enlistments. It is intended that this emphasis on voluntary enlistment shall be continued, so that the number of men in the manpower pool who are inducted into service shall remain as small as possible.

Class I-A.—The tabulation lists 1,632,000 men now classified as I-A. This is misleading, because not all men now classified I-A are actually available. Of this total, only 50 percent, or 816,000, are estimated as available for induction. The other 50 percent will be subsequently reclassified as unavailable through occupational deferments, dependency deferments, certain statutory deferments, and because of physical unfitness.

Occupational deferments.—The tabulation lists 763,000 deferred by reason of occupation, including 570,000 students. Of the nonstudent deferments, 129,341 are farm deferments, 63,713 industrial deferments.

It is noted that occupational deferments for farm and industrial workers total 193,954, only 2.4 percent of the manpower pool. This low rate is not likely to continue as defense production expands. The committee was advised that "occupational deferments will have to be raised considerably in view of the new program if war plants are to be staffed quickly with the skilled workers they will need."

Dependency deferments.—The tabulation shows 1,184,893 deferred because of dependencies. If dependency deferments were totally removed, a maximum of about 630,000 of these men would initially be available for induction. The remainder, approximating 554,000, would be unavailable because of occupational, physical, or other reasons.

The 630,000 men are divided into two classes: 290,000 are married men without children; 340,000 are married men with children. The number actually to be secured from this pool of 290,000 is drastically affected by the fact that inductions are for the Army only; hence these men cannot all be taken at once, and the number of availables decreases rapidly if not inducted.

The committee was informed that if these 630,000 men were inducted in preference to an equal number of individuals who are without dependents, military payroll costs would be increased by more than \$456,000,000 annually to cover the costs of dependency allotments.

Cost for 290,000 without children at \$540 per year.....	\$156, 600, 000
Cost for 340,000 with children:	
Assume 170,000 have only 2 dependents at \$744 per year.....	126, 480, 000
Assume 170,000 have 3 or more dependents at \$1,020 per year.....	173, 400, 000
Total.....	\$456, 480, 000

This is the amount by which military payroll cost would be increased if all available husbands and fathers were inducted in preference to an equal number of younger men—presumably 18-year-olds—who are without dependents.

Class IV-F, rejects.—The tabulation shows 799,513 men as IV-F, rejected for physical or mental reasons. This is 10 percent of the total manpower pool, but probably the number will increase as those now shown as class I-A are actually examined and given a final classification. The World War II rejection rate was 21.8 percent. Generally, physical standards are now at World War II levels; mental standards are slightly higher, partially because the services wished to avoid the task of educating illiterates.

The Department of Defense's reluctance to utilize more fully men now classified IV-F is based on several factors:

1. The Department has considered the heavy future pension burden on the country of taking lower standards.
2. The low profile, mental or physical, must be so fitted into the military unit that he will not hamper its movement.
3. Care must be taken that too many of the low profiles are not frozen within the zone of the interior (continental United States), making it impossible to rotate men from combat areas.
4. The services are "very loath to lower mental standards" because of the fact that the bulk of disciplinary problems come from that group.

On the other hand, the argument for utilizing IV-F's more fully was expressed by Dr. Karl Compton, of Massachusetts Institute of Technology:

Within the group which is not eligible for military service on present standards, there are many who are as well qualified to perform certain essential military duties as are those of higher standards of fitness . . . The Seabees did a remarkable job but were generally outside the selective service standards . . . I feel that a decided improvement in manpower utilization is . . . one of the directions in which a major increase in the strength of our Armed Forces might be achieved.

Veterans.—The tabulation shows 2,863,000 men deferred as veterans of prior military service. They are reaching age 26, and disappearing from the pool, at the rate of 60,000 per month. Of the 2,863,000 it is estimated that 245,000 had less than 12 months of service. These individuals are now liable for induction unless they join one of the Reserve components. From this 245,000, about 160,000 would be available for induction or call to active duty, and of this number, only about 40,000 would be single men without dependents.

Status of women

No compulsory military service for women is contemplated. However, the services indicated that more women could be used to replace men if the present ceiling of 2 percent on women in the Armed Forces were lifted. The Air Force indicated they could use up to 10 percent women; the Navy and Marines could use 7 percent women "in time of war."

Men 26 and older

The Selective Service System estimates that within the 26-to-30 age bracket there are 20,000 bachelors and 40,000 husbands without children who are not veterans, and who would be qualified for military service. To secure the services of this comparatively small number it

would be necessary to register many million men, above present age limits, to secure these relatively few individuals. Also, the older the man, the more deeply his roots are sunk in community life, and the more likely his civilian activities would be of greater value than military service.

Summary

Within the present ages of military service eligibility, 19 through 25, there are 7,957,157 men. Of this number, 1,632,000 are class I-A. From the I-A's, however, only 50 percent will be available—a total of 816,000. The armed services will need to enlist or induct approximately 862,000 to reach and maintain the projected military strength of 3.5 million which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider necessary as a minimum fighting force.

Thus, a numerical deficit exists of 46,000 between the need and the men now available.

The problem, however, is greater than merely securing 46,000 additional men. If all I-A's were enlisted or inducted, without expanding our pool of manpower, we would be confronted with the untenable situation of having no manpower available to sustain the size of our Armed Forces or to meet emergencies.

Between October 31, 1950, and June 30, 1951, an estimated 457,000 young men reach the age 19 and will be available for enlistment or induction under present practices. These 457,000 added to the 816,000 available already provides a net of class I-A availables of 1,273,000 young men. Subtracting enlistments and inductions (862,000) from availables (1,273,000) leaves a pool of 411,000 class I-A availables as of June 30, 1951.

During the next fiscal year (1952), 641,000 enlistments and inductions would be necessary. This would leave at the end of the fiscal year a pool of 469,000 young men, assuming that college deferments were reduced by 200,000, and assuming also that there will be no battle casualties hereafter.

Using the same calculations, at the end of fiscal 1953 the pool would be depleted to 127,000 young men and at the end of fiscal 1954 to 181,000 young men.

In considering these figures, it must be kept in mind that if we are to get the men we need when we need them we must have a "safety margin"—a reservoir of men numbering five to six times the average monthly calls.

The reason for this "safety margin" becomes at once apparent when we realize that the individuals who make up these totals are human beings. They move about the country, they become older, they are faced with many real personal problems, they require a reasonable time to arrange their affairs, they become ill or are injured. For example, out of the surplus remaining on June 30, 1951, nearly 2,000 attained age 19 on that day, and the same number on the preceding day; and it takes the Selective Service System about 90 days to process an individual registrant, from the date he becomes liable for induction.

There are approximately 3,700 local selective-service boards in the United States. Each board receives its proportionate share of a national call. Thus, when a call is issued for 80,000 young men during 1 month, this might mean that a particular local board must

deliver 50 inductees. If the board had only 50 men classified I-A, it would be impossible to meet the call for 50 inductees because of the varying length of time which the men would require to clear up their personal affairs.

Trying to get by with a minimum safety margin jeopardizes the functioning of selective service, and seriously jeopardizes the armed services. When men are most needed, they may be unavailable.

As a result of the factors enumerated, in part, in the preceding paragraphs, the Director of Selective Service has found that there must at all times be in the selective-service pool a safety factor equal to 6 times the estimated monthly rate of induction, a total of between 500,000 and 600,000. If this safety margin is not available, the local boards are required to become progressively more arbitrary in effecting the induction process.

Thus, so long as our present pool of manpower is confined to present standards within the 19-through-25 bracket, we will have no assurance that we can, through selective service, even supported as it is by the present highly successful enlistment programs, meet our military manpower requirements as they arise.

V. EXPANDING THE MILITARY MANPOWER POOL

Obviously, we can gamble on "getting by" for a few more months without making additional manpower eligible for military service. But the gamble is dangerous. Under present circumstances, it could be fatal.

First, if the gamble failed—as it is very likely to do—we would not be able to meet the demands of the military for the manpower that is necessary to our defense.

Second, the gamble is predicated upon one unlikely assumption: that there will be no more casualties in Korea. The weekly casualty lists are testimony to the insecurity of this assumption.

Third, the gamble is ultimately doomed. Our available pool of manpower will be in a progressive decline through the months and years immediately ahead. Eventually, if not now, the manpower pool must somehow be increased.

This bill proposes a considered, prudent course, free of any unnecessary gamble. To expand our pool of eligible manpower, this bill proposes that:

THE DEFERMENT OF NONVETERAN HUSBANDS BE REMOVED

The bill would eliminate the President's authority to defer a married man who is not a veteran and whose only dependent is his wife. This would add, at the most, an estimated 290,000 men to the induction pool, from the 19-through-25 age brackets. This is not a recurring item.

THE PERIOD OF INDUCTION AND OF RESERVE SERVICE ON ACTIVE DUTY TO BE 26 MONTHS

The bill would extend the period of induction by 5 months, for a total of 26 months, inclusive of leave. This has the immediate equivalent effect of adding to the induction pool a number equaling approxi-

mately 25 percent of those inducted or ordered to active duty. It will have no long-term effect, however, because it is to be hoped that in the future the induction period can be reduced, instead of staying constant at 26 months.

The committee considers that it is well to point out in this general connection the specific manner in which present leave practices relate to the period of induction. Under the present law, a man accrues leave at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ days per month. Consequently, in serving 26 months he would become entitled to slightly over 2 months of leave, exclusive of week-end passes and sick leave, since week-end passes and sick leave are not charged against an individual's annual leave. Emergency furloughs, however, are chargeable against this annual leave, and reduce that leave whenever they are taken.

Under present procedures a man cannot use his accumulated leave to actually shorten his induction period. However, the Department of Defense has agreed to attempt to solve this problem. The object of such a solution would be to provide, under uniform administrative military leave regulations, for the maximum feasible accumulation of leave, in order to provide the earliest possible return to civilian life.

CERTAIN ENLISTMENTS TO BE EXTENDED

The act of July 27, 1950, authorizes the President to extend all expiring enlistments for a period of 12 months. This authority expires on July 9, 1951. Thus, enlistments expiring prior to July 9, 1951, may be extended for 1 year. This bill proposes to move the expiration date to July 1, 1953. This would be equivalent to adding 147,000 men to the armed services during the fiscal years 1953 and 1954 and would reduce the necessary number of inductions by that amount, but would have no long-term effect.

Even with the above additions, it will be seen that the surplus of men in the manpower pool is not comforting, and falls off rapidly. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, moreover, that the calculations are estimates, and are based upon the assumption that the strength of the Armed Forces will be maintained at slightly below 3.5 million men. Any worsening of the international situation which would require an increase of the Armed Forces to a figure greater than 3.5 million would adversely affect the surplus of men in the manpower pool.

It is therefore necessary to provide a further source of manpower, but one which is to be used only when and as needed. Such an amendment, aimed at expanding the manpower pools, is discussed in the next section of this report.

PROVISION TO BE MADE FOR INDUCTING 18-YEAR-OLDS

The committee believes that it is now necessary to make 18-year-old men eligible for military service, and for induction for universal military training when periods of service are no longer required.

The committee believes, however, that men of this age should actually be inducted for service only when and as they are needed.

This bill therefore provides that 18-year-olds shall be made eligible for induction, but that they shall not be taken for service by a local

board until all men in the 19-through-25 age bracket found by the local board to be available have been inducted. In other words, the 18-year-olds would be taken after—and only after—the I-A's in the 19-25 age bracket had been inducted, after the IV-F's in that bracket capable of limited service had been inducted, and after the childless husbands in that bracket had been inducted.

American tradition and American experience are studded with the deeds of 18-year-olds in all our past wars. In our Colonial period, the minimum age limit reached 16. In the War of the Revolution, 16 was the minimum conscription age. George Washington advocated registration for all men between 18 and 50 for service in the militia; this became law in 1782 and the militia was used in the War of 1812. It is estimated that 305,000 18-year-olds served on the Union side in the War Between the States. In the Confederacy, men between 17 and 50 were conscripted.

During World War I, 75,000 18-year-olds saw service. During World War II, the draft law was extended to 18-year-olds in November 1942, and a total of a million and three-quarters were inducted. Sixteen thousand 18-year-old Americans fought in the Battle of the Bulge.

From our experience, we have learned that 18-year-old men make excellent soldiers—they have stamina, resourcefulness, and adaptability. Furthermore, there is no basic dividing line on physical development or emotional maturity between men 18 years old and those 19 years old.

It is important to consider that the calling of the young man who is 18 years old imposes a minimum impact upon his life, and the life of his community. While the median age of high-school graduates is slightly over 18, the median age of college entrants is under 18. This apparent inconsistency is due to the fact that the younger high-school graduates go on to college in larger numbers. There is no arbitrary age which fits every individual case, either for the boy who continues his studies or the boy who goes to work; but age 18 appears to actually be better as far as the interruption of studies or work careers is concerned. The average age of high-school graduation is 17½. Inducting young men a short time thereafter imposes the least disruption on both their schooling and their working careers.

During the committee hearings, Secretary of Labor Tobin pointed out:

Since we require a training program, 18 would be best from the youngster's point of view. The boy graduating from high school at 17½ and not subject to draft until 19, is likely to find his employment opportunities are limited to casual or blind-alley jobs.

Of the impact upon education, President Bronk, of Johns Hopkins University, testified:

I believe that 18 is the most satisfactory period for the man and for the Nation. I think that service after completion of university training or after the development of a skill would affect our economy and disrupt the normal development of family life.

The committee feels that lowering the induction age to 18 is entirely justifiable, on the basis of our national experience and ordinary com-

mon sense and justice. However, we strongly feel that the drafting of 18-year-olds should not relieve any men in the 19-through-25 group from military duty. That is the reason we have specified that the 18-year-old will be taken by the local board only after the supply of older men is exhausted.

The fact that 18-year-olds are to be taken after older groups applies only to individual local selective-service boards. Thus, some local boards may be calling 18-year-olds, while other boards are still filling calls with older men. It would be unworkable to require that all men, 19 through 25, be taken on a Nation-wide basis before 18-year-olds anywhere could be inducted. This might produce a situation in which one or two States would be supplying the total national draft quotas from older men, while the remaining States would be unable to contribute to the national quotas.

It must be kept in mind that the only dependable alternative to the lowered induction age would be to induct veterans within the 19-through-25 age bracket. This is the only group, presently ineligible, which contains sufficient numbers to contribute materially to the relief of our military manpower shortage. Calling men from the veterans group would mean calling again some men who themselves were drafted during World War II at age 18; it might mean calling some such men who had served 4 years or longer, often in combat; it might mean calling men who had spent time in prison camps. Faced with this choice, the committee believes that justice makes it highly preferable, if not imperative, that the 18-year-olds be asked to stand ready to give now what the veterans have already given in service to their country.

The bill requires that men inducted at age 18 shall not be sent into combat or overseas with less than 4 months' training, the period which the military deems adequate and essential for proper basic training and seasoning.

If it should become necessary to reinforce the 19-26 age group by induction of 18-year-olds, the bill provides that the available older persons among this group, in the jurisdiction of a particular local board, must be inducted first. A local board could not induct a man 18 years and 6 months old before it exhausts the supply of available 18-year-olds above the age of 18 years and 9 months. The older go first; the younger go later.

Another factor dealing with the induction of 18-year-olds is related to the program for universal training, which will begin at such time as it is no longer necessary to induct persons for service.

A great deal of testimony is available on the question of whether 18 is the best age for the individual to undertake his period of military training. The Compton Commission explored this question in great detail, and concluded that it was. The Preparedness Subcommittee also explored this question in great detail, taking advantage of the advice and experience of many prominent educators. The opinions expressed during this independent examination of the question by the subcommittee overwhelmingly supported the views of the Compton Commission. The committee, therefore, recommends that the induction age which shall govern the selection of trainees for their initial basic training when the military-training program takes effect should be 18 years.

The committee considered the possibility of setting the age of induction at the age of 18½ rather than at 18. After studying the problem it was determined by the committee that the placing of the age of induction at 18½ would be unwise.

The reasons are as follows:

(1) The requirement in this bill that the induction of young men below the age of 19 for service shall be closely geared to relative ages, makes it unnecessary that the 18½-year provision be written into the bill.

(2) If a young man wishes to meet the requirements of school enrollment or employment opportunity to his best advantage, he may wish to avail himself of an opportunity to volunteer for induction at the age of 18, rather than 6 months later.

(3) Such a provision would make the universal-military-training program extremely difficult because it would so greatly shorten the period in which individuals would be liable to begin their training, and greatly increase the requirement for facilities. Also, all trainees would be delayed at least 6 months in completing their training.

(4) In case of a serious emergency, it might well be imperative to have the services of many who are below 18½ on very short notice—and such an emergency would find them completely untrained.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST LOWERED INDUCTION AGE

The arguments listed below concern themselves with the age issue which emerged during the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings.

Included are not only the contentions advanced by the witnesses who appeared, but also those presented by individuals and organizations who requested that their material be inserted in the record. There may be arguments other than those presented, but this study summarizes only those which appear in the record.

Not all arguments presented as opposing the Department of Defense proposals are directly in conflict with those proposals. Any time a variation of the proposals was presented, it was placed in the opposing column.

It will be noted that some witnesses are listed as both "For" and "Against" the same measure. This is due to the fact that occasionally a witness would either point out arguments on the other side or would present evidence which could be interpreted as being a variation of the Department's proposals. All such arguments have been included for the purpose of securing a more balanced picture. Also, it should be carefully noted that not all of these extracts are in their full context. Every effort was made by the staff to present an accurate summary, and the committee hopes that no inaccuracies have crept in due to the need for condensing the wealth of material into the briefest possible space. Not all of the material is in the nature of direct quotes. Frequently remarks from different parts of the record have been combined into one statement. Occasionally, in answer to a long question, a witness would say "Yes" or "No," or "I agree." In these instances the content of the question has been attributed to the witness. Care has been taken to see that no witness is quoted out of context to secure a meaning other than the one intended.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS ON UMTS LOWERED
INDUCTION AGE

TESTIMONY FAVORING

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

1. *Hon. George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense*

(a) We would be operating too closely to the danger line if we had to satisfy our present military manpower ceiling of 3.5 million men with no changes in the present selective-service law, other than a 27-month period of service and a 1-year extension of enlistments.

(b) Because it is the best way to meet our immediate need for an enlarged combat force and, at the same time, provide an enduring base for our military strength, I know of no other that will give us so much protection at a cost in men and money that is within the capacity of our economy to bear. . . . It makes it possible to get the trained manpower and to build the balance of a military structure at a minimum of cost. It is at once the most effective, the most economical, and the most democratic way to safeguard our Nation.

(c) It would . . . be possible to call up husbands and fathers among the nonveteran group between the ages of 19 and 26, but the social damage . . . would be . . . greater than that . . . in calling 18-year-olds . . .

(d) . . . broadening the liability . . . to take in 18-year-olds . . . will make it easier for us to build our military strength to the required levels with minimum disruption of the industrial, agricultural, scientific and educational resources . . .

(e) Men of 18, 19, 20, make our finest soldiers. . . this physical superiority often determines the issue in heavy and prolonged fighting. . . Experience in both World Wars has shown that men of 18 are among our bravest and best fighters. . . .

(f) . . . no youth under the age of 19 could be sent overseas with less than 4 months of training. . . it is our strong fear that . . . a specific prohibition against sending men out of the United States before their nineteenth birthday would cripple the services in meeting a sudden . . . action.

2. *General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower*

(a) Every single generation of Americans, tragic as it may be, has had to go to war, and mostly we have sent them to war without one blankety-blank item of training. It has been a crime. There are more Americans occupying graves overseas because they were not trained than I think for almost any other reason; not trained to take care of themselves, not trained to know what to do in combat, so when it comes to this one crisis that comes to every generation, we suddenly say, "Oh, let's don't train the boy for that. Let's decide whether or not he ought to be trained." It is the most important thing that ever happened to him. We have got to train him . . . he deserves it, entirely aside from the Government's, the country's, requirement.

(b) I firmly believe in the principle of universal military service at this critical stage in our affairs. . . . As a soldier it matters little to me at what specific age you take the men. The young man is a good soldier.

(c) As a college president, we studied this problem . . . and came to the conclusion that 18 was the least harmful to the man in terms of interruption of educational process or in his industrial employment in case he is going no further in school.

(d) (On the question of the mental deferments) . . . you do finally strike a level below which you are just wasting your time. . . .

(e) The National Guard needs trained men. The source for National Guard men should be after the man has had his training and not before he goes into it.

(f) (Speaking of alien troops.) Remember this, none of this we are talking about should be as a substitution for meeting our own duties, performing our own obligations . . . When Rome tried to solve its problems by going out and hiring mercenaries outside, it fell.

(g) I do not believe it is disturbing (for a 17-year-old to register) as long as they know what is going to happen to them.

(h) . . . in Africa, I conducted a Gallup poll and found that instead of beer, they wanted Coca-Cola. . . .

3. *General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

(a) . . . if a full mobilization is called for, we must have an effective military manpower program worked out in advance. . . . We are face to face with a long-

range struggle—a struggle in which the enemy will use all means . . . to bring about our capitulation. This long-range struggle is a struggle for survival of our Nation. . . .

(b) (Speaking of the 3,462,000 goal of the armed services.) I think you are going to have to maintain at least that strength for some time to come. . . .

(c) . . . it would interfere much less with their education and their getting established in their lifetime careers, if they could start their service sometime around 18 years old . . . a man 18 years old is less apt to have family obligations. . . .

(d) . . . the man who goes to school after his service is going to get more out of it than he would otherwise.

(e) . . . all the youngsters around 18 to 20 years old are very fine soldiers. They can stand more hardships than an older man. . . .

(f) . . . they (18-year-olds) are subject to no more temptations or no more apt to be diverted from a straight life than they would out of service . . . a man's character is very largely molded long before he is 18. If he has been brought up in the proper environment in the home he is pretty well set . . . before he is 18. . . . I do not think . . . that 18-year-olds would be any more susceptible to being tempted than a 19- or 20-year-old . . . when you take him into service, you do not take him away from the church. We have chaplains. Everybody in the service is not in there just to corrupt him. . . . When a man becomes 18 and goes into service, that does not mean that he would have stayed at home otherwise.

(g) (Overseas duty for 18-year-olds) . . . any time you have to line a unit up and take out any considerable percentage of it and put in new men . . . you have spoiled your teamwork . . . spoiled the value of your unit training . . . and you lower the efficiency of the unit. . . . it may result in greater losses and possible set-backs. . . .

(h) A man who cannot meet the mental qualifications becomes a liability . . . in the service . . . Somebody has to look after him . . . if you try to take him into combat he does not last long. . . .

4. *Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director, Selective Service*

(a) . . . I believe it to be the best act we can hope for at the present time, and I have tried to point out that it is not only for now, but it is an act looking forward to a future, and not an emergency shot in the arm for the present.

(b) . . . the tax upon the time of the citizen for service with the Armed Forces should occur at the earliest practicable time. This is to the advantage of the Government and for the citizen as well. The youth has more of the qualities required for service in the Armed Forces than any other age. The responsibilities of family are generally nonexistent, skills have not been acquired, nor has professional or scientific competence been achieved.

(c) (I recommend) That the present pool of single nonveterans, nonfathers, 19-25, be augmented by the extension of liability to those who have reached the eighteenth year. If necessary to go beyond that, the following priority should govern: Nonfathers, nonveterans, 18-25, inclusive.

(d) (The Defense Department) made all assumptions favorably and I think they are dangerous.

(e) (If the number in the Army were increased beyond the limits that are contemplated at present, it would necessitate increasing that term to live on income) because you have borrowed this year by increasing for 1 year every contract, which is an emergency measure.

(f) (As a safety margin) I would like to have six times the number of people they are going to call in every month. (That would be 480,000.)

(g) . . . if you ever go, as we went during the war at times when I had calls for 300,000 and 400,000, then I have got to get a million in the pool . . . one of the things I watch is the fall of my I-A's, and I have lost about a half-million out of that pool since July. . . . You can see what would happen if in my I-A I have got two or three hundred thousand postponed students that I should defer (until) next June. . . . My pool suddenly collapses.

(h) You are forced inevitably to take 18-year-olds, or to take veterans, because the nonfathers who are not veterans are so small that they will not make more than 1 month's call. . . .

(i) There are 2,700,000 veterans under 26. They are disappearing at the rate of 60,000 a month. The next year and the year after, the veteran problem is not going to be much of a problem because it is disappearing.

(j) . . . whenever you reach the 3,462,000, the figures show, assuming a safety factor of 400,000 that you actually have a deficit of 126,000, . . . and when you add the additional safety factor of 80,000 that you require, you are 206,000 short.

(k) The qualities required for service under varied conditions are found to a greater extent in the late teens and the early and middle twenties than any other age. . . . Acceptability decreases with age and with accelerated rapidity once the late twenties have been passed.

(l) The numbers with dependents tend to increase as age increases.

(m) Occupations and professions possessed by individuals are important in any analysis of manpower. They are found infrequently among the late teens and early twenties. They are found in ever-increasing numbers as the age increases.

(n) . . . graduation age from high school, on the average, is 17 years and 6 months—therefore this is a normal break period. . . .

(o) Temporary or short-lived programs for the training of manpower cannot be applied with fairness and justice. It is impossible to institute a plan which would permit of deferments for the purpose of education unless there is assurance that the plan will be continued long enough for those receiving deferments also to meet their service obligations, otherwise a deferment becomes a means of evading service. . . .

(p) . . . the numbers that are being inducted from the 18-year-olds would indicate that the great majority would certainly come in the next year or two from those who were in the last several months of it . . . the application of our present regulations (would permit you to take boys 18 years and 11 months, get all of them, and then take 18 years and 10 months, etc.) . . . I am going to plead guilty to 3 or 4 months' variation but not quite 9.

(q) . . . I would be very careful of restrictions on the policeman who was in front of my door on what he could do and what he could not do to protect me. . . . Any government which allows its citizens to do voluntarily that which they will not compel the rest of the citizens to do, had better not talk too much about being fair and just.

5. *Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations*

(a) . . . unless international conditions improve we may well have to set a new target as we approach this target (of 3,462,000).

(b) We concur in the principles and the details of the plan as it has been presented here. . . . I . . . share responsibility for recommending to you a long-range plan for the mobilization of the manpower of the country in a manner which will meet the needs of all the fighting services in time of peace, in a limited emergency, and in a full-out general war. . . . The plan . . . is . . . soundly conceived and will provide for building forces needed now and will eventually provide the services with badly needed reserves of trained people.

(c) I have been in contact with 17- and 18-year-old sailors for a considerable number of years. . . . There is no sharp cut-off point in the characteristics of the 18- and the 19-year-olds. . . . I would challenge most people to tell which ones are which.

(d) It would indeed be unfortunate if when we ordered the fleet to sea at the outbreak of hostilities, we had to weed out of it every man who was under 19.

6. *Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army*

(a) I am thoroughly in accord with the legislation which is under consideration before your committee and with the principles that are involved in that legislation.

(b) I do not regard it (3,462,000) as an ultimate figure if the world situation stays in its current state or worsens.

(c) We are now making use of men who are not fully physically fit . . . and are prepared to extend that even further.

(d) We are very loath to lower mental standards because . . . (men with lowered) standards are a pain in the neck all along the line and instead of being an asset are a hindrance because somebody has always to be taking care of them.

(e) . . . the soundest all-around solution is to initiate the selection of 18-year-olds now . . . an additional factor is that it would interfere with his schooling and his ultimate future less if he were taken at this particular time rather than to take him later on after he had married and had acquired a family.

(f) The youngsters of 18 and 19 years of age . . . make excellent soldiers.

(g) I do not believe (that there is any more likelihood of average boy 18 or 19 years old becoming addicted to the use of intoxicating beverages if he is in the

Army than if he remains at home or college). . . . the corner poolroom is . . . far more dangerous than any Army post I have ever lived on.

(h) . . . If, . . . just before a unit sailed, we had to take out all men who were 18 years old, we would wreck the teamwork of our small units. . . .

7. *Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force*

(a) . . . the Air Force strongly endorses and supports the program presented to you by the Department of Defense. . . . It will provide us, as well as the other services, with a dependable, enduring, and flexible system, which will insure a continuing capability of meeting our manpower requirements—both in the active Air Force and in our Reserve components.

(b) . . . all of our increased number of combat units will be attained through the ordering to duty of Air National Guard and Air Reserve units . . . this will not be enough. . . . It will be necessary to order to duty approximately 60,000 personnel from the Volunteer Reserve. . . .

(c) (The Reserves) are composed to a great degree of men who have been in the last war.

(d) (Many of) our Reserve units are fighter units, and they reach an age very rapidly where a man is too old to utilize his skill . . . the age limit of some of our Reserve units, especially those of the National Guard, is getting almost to the limit of where we can be really effective.

8. *Hon. Anna M. Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary of Defense*

(a) General: (The present program or other programs to expand the Armed Forces) would be more costly, . . . more disruptive of family, . . . educational, . . . industrial life, and would fail to supply equally dependable safeguards for the United States in the years to come.

(b) Need:

(1) The figure of 3,462,205 must be met by June 1951 or as early as possible.

(2) It is going to take everything we have, including the 18-year-olds, to give us what we need to get a 4,000,000 Armed Force strength . . .

(3) (If we have to go to 4.5 million) you take 2.5 million veterans. . . . (If you took the 18-year-olds and the 19-year-olds, giving us 4,000,000, we would have to take half a million from the veteran group . . .)

(4) We are not figuring in this at all letting any reserve go sooner than the full legal date.

(5) The maximum probable estimate of those who might be subject to service and training through the rehabilitation program is about 20,000 . . .

(6) . . . in these 100,000 or 150,000 (physically unfit), . . . (many) are so physically handicapped that community living of any kind, travel of any kind, the hours required in a Federal service of any kind, would be dangerous to their life.

(7) . . . our physical standards today are down to World War II.

(8) . . . in the National Guard and Reserve units, we do not know how many, on physical examination, . . . on acquired dependency, or on an acquired occupational deferment, might fall out. . . .

(9) In 1952 we make no allowance at all for (casualties.)

(10) . . . one-third of the men discharged with less than 12 months of service were given medical discharges . . . many men discharged with a limited period of service were found to be mentally, morally, or psychologically unsuited for military service. . . . Very few veterans with less than 6 months of service would qualify for military service under current standards . . . a maximum of 160,000 veterans under 26 years of age with less than 12 months of service would be available for induction. . . . Of these . . . about 40,000 would be single men without dependents (and) three-fourths would be fathers and men with dependents other than children.

(11) A low industrial deferment rate will not be satisfactory when impact of contracts hits industry . . . because . . . of more technical equipment we will have to defer more skilled men. . . .

(12) . . . we are certain that as we require more in farm production it will mean they will need more industrial equipment, more parts, and also deferments for more skilled men who can operate the machines.

(13) . . . If we are to have a long-term production and a long-term sustaining economy, . . . we must give more deferments to students.

(14) (This is) the height of optimism . . . makes allowances for enlistments and reenlistments at same rate that we were getting men when we had no Korea . . . makes allowances for men to enlist with permission of parents.

(c) Social and economic advantages of taking 18-year-olds:

(1) (The proposed program will permit) a larger number of deferments than otherwise possible in the present selective service pool of men between 19 and 26, and thus would give industry and agriculture continued access to engineers, technicians, and skilled laborers. . . . It (will help) maintain a stable educational system and our preeminence in scientific and technical knowledge.

(2) The need of industry and agriculture for engineers and technicians would be met by our ability to maintain a larger number of occupational deferments in the 19- to 26-year group.

(3) By taking these 18-year-old men it would reduce the draft call for your upper classmen in colleges . . . assisting to keep the small colleges open and letting men finish their education . . . student deferments are as high as 570,000 or 600,000. . . . If we do not take 18-year-old ones we must ask General Hershey to squeeze that deferment down 200,000.

(4) It is . . . apparent that a draft of husbands and fathers would be much more destructive in its family and community consequences than the calling of 18-year-olds. . . .

(5) . . . the domestic, financial, and emotional shock to the young man of 18 is far less acute to all concerned than uprooting of an older family man. The same . . . is true of the impact on business, science, education, and life of the community generally.

(6) . . . this is without translating into dollars and cents the great loss to our industries and farms and to the purchasing power of families that would be involved in calling up married men.

(7) . . . the total (cost of calling up) 630,000 young men in both married groups (is) . . . \$979,000,000 for a year. . . . (The cost for) an equivalent number of 18-year-olds . . . would come to \$466,000,000 a year . . . the difference . . . would be \$513,000,000 . . . one would be more costly in dollars and cents besides being more costly in social values.

(8) . . . the time when it is best to take a young man, if you must take him out of his educational, his civilian, his working life and his community life, is at the age of 18.

(9) . . . if a boy is in high school . . . and has not finished, he can finish his high school . . . if he is (in) college, he can finish that year of college. . . .

(10) . . . educators . . . have come to the conclusion . . . that 18 years of age is the best time of a man's life to take him.

(11) 18-year-olds would be less likely to possess essential skills in industries and farming.

(12) If we say that we are going to take the boy at 18½, he has a 6-month period during which he does not want to go to school. It will be difficult for him to get a job . . . 18 is the age when boys have the least family ties as far as wives and children are concerned. . . . Social and emotional impact at 18 is much less than at older ages. . . . We have followed the thinking of the best educators and psychologists, psychiatrists.

(d) History of 18-year-olds:

(1) During the colonial period, military duty was required between ages of 16 and 50.

(2) During the Revolutionary War . . . many men under 19 ably served their country. In 1782 the Congress provided for national defense by requiring that all who are or shall be of age of 18 years, should be enrolled in the militia.

(3) During the War of 1812, men under 19 fought in both the Regular Army and the militia.

(4) In the Mexican War, many soldiers were under 19.

(5) In the Civil War, about 305,000 18-year-olds saw service with the Union forces . . . Confederate forces were raised by . . . draft of men between ages of 18 and 35. . . . In 1864, the lower and upper age limits were 17 and 50.

(6) The Spanish-American War included many men who were under 19 years of age.

(7) World War I. In 1918 the President signed an act for liability for military service of "all male citizens and aliens between the ages of 18 and 45 . . ."

(8) World War II. Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, the registration age was reduced to 18 years. . . . The maximum number of 18-year-olds on active duty at any one time was about 643,000.

(e) 18-year-olds in other nations:

The following countries conscript men at 18 or below:

Chinese Communists, age 16; Chinese Nationalists, age 18; Egypt, age 18; Greece, age 18; Iran, age 18; the Netherlands, age 18, New Zealand, age 18; United Kingdom, age 18.

(f) Call of 18-year-olds:

(1) During 4 months of training, no man will be allowed to leave the continental United States.

(2) The (Armed Forces) feel that they will be able to absorb about 450,000 18-year-olds for service and training in the first year. . . . This would leave many thousands of 18-year-olds who could not be called up in the first year.

(3) We have agreed with General Hershey that the first men who would be called up would be those 18 years and 11 months. . . . We would not go down below 18 years. . . . We at no time feel that in that phasing-in we would take in a man less than 18 years and 6 months. . . .

9. *John G. Adams, Assistant General Counsel, Defense Department*

(a) The figure of 3.4 million plus will show an actual deficit of men in fiscal 1951, unless we make administrative changes or unless we ask you to make changes in the existing law, or unless the age limit is lowered.

(b) The figure 3.2 millions at the end of this fiscal year will leave us 100,000 men net in the pool available for induction. If the figure went up to 3.3 million, we would be even; 3.4 million, we would be a hundred-thousand short. Each hundred thousand men above 3.2 millions will reduce the availables at the end of the year.

(c) . . . On June 30, the total Armed Forces will be 3,325,000. We have available 1.2 million, and take in 862,000, and have a surplus of 411,000. . . . General Hershey considers a figure of 400,000 to be a logical and adequate safety margin which he should have available as class I-A availables, while inductions are scaled at rate of 80,000 a month. . . . At the end of this fiscal year, there will be 411,000 or a total of 11,000 over and above the Selective Service System's safety margin. If you go to the approved force in being of 3,462,000, you will be short 126,000 men.

(d) During 1952 fiscal year, adding to the pool the young men who come of age 19, adding also the 200,000 college students, there would be a total of 699,000 young men available for induction. . . . Will induct 641,000 under present plans. There was a 411,000 surplus, based upon our present planning, not taking into consideration the 126,000 lost, so not considering that we meet the force of 3,462,000, as now planned, there would be a surplus of 469,000 on board.

(e) When those 1,632,249 present I-A's are called, a substantial proportion of them appear with new deferment authority. Many have married and entered school, many have or had physical reason. . . . Of all the I-A's called, and distinguished from all of the group, approximately 50 percent are rejected or are reclassified. . . . Selective Service System estimate is that 50 percent will be available for induction under existing standards, or 816,000 young men is final end.

(f) Out of the 3,000,000 between the age of 19 and 23, you will get 816,000; out of 1,052,000 18's you will get 684,000. . . . Induction practices during World War II indicate we would get 61.4 percent of those young men (i.e., 18-year-olds), based upon class IV-F rejects for physical and mental reasons of 21.8 percent. . . .

(g) Subsequent to October 31, between then and June 1, or July 1, there will be a total of 354,000 individuals in organized, unorganized, units of the Reserve, and the National Guard, including Army, Navy, and Air Force, called to duty. . . .

(h) Present induction practices, particularly physical, are identical with World War II.

(i) General Hershey feels he needs a 4-month-lead-time over and above the monthly calls he gets. . . . the minimum he could have was 4 to 5 months and he feels that 400,000 (5 months) was the best minimum. . . . During World War II they felt they should have as high as 6 to 8 months. . . . There are 3,700 local boards throughout the country. . . . 400,000 gives less than 100 persons per local board.

(j) Indication has been made that additional request for 50,000 above the 3.2 million is going to be made by the military services to replace battle casualties.

(k) Based upon the present law, 21 months for the young men who are inducted at the beginning of fiscal year 1952, under present law 103,000 are ready for separation from the service, having served 21 months. . . .

(l) During the fiscal year subsequent to today, we will have terminating not only the enlistments which should terminate but those enlistments which were extended, meaning there is double the number of enlistments terminating under present law during fiscal year 1952. . . . Those enlistments which terminate amount to 730,000 young men, over half of your regular force.

(m) Of the 1,500,000 who are enlistments, 314,000 are the career-soldier type who will offer to reenlist, but 418,000 are made up of men whose enlistments ordinarily terminate.

(n) 872,000 people, by statute, are authorized to leave the military service next year whom we do not expect to reenlist. 872,000, plus 314,000 entitled to go, and we expect 872,000 to go—the 21-month inductees, term expired; National Guard men who have served 21 months; and men whose enlistment expire.

10. *Hon. Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor*

(a) A number of far-reaching changes in the size and composition of the United States population have occurred in the past decade. These changes have affected unfavorably the availability of manpower for building up the Armed Forces and expanding the labor force.

(b) . . . additions to the population of military and working age during the next several years will be substantially smaller than in the corresponding period of the past decade, since the age group 10–19 decreased by over 2 million as a result of the low birth rates in the 1930's . . . our phenomenal population growth over the decade has brought less than commensurate gains to the age groups upon which the Armed Forces and the civilian labor force make their immediate major demands.

(c) . . . we are not going to have as many young men arriving at the age of 18 until 1959 as we did successively during the period of 1940 to 1945 . . . two-fifths of the men employed in critical occupations are between the ages of 19 and 35; this group, however, constitutes only about 4 percent of all men in that group . . . the indiscriminate withdrawal of skilled and professional workers into the Armed Forces could create havoc with our defense production program. . . .

(d) . . . you would probably have 1 in 50 with a critical skill under the age of 26, and most of those would be close to 26 . . . there would be none at the age of 18. . . . In age groups 18 to 26 it is about 2 percent of the total.

(e) In the 18-to-19-year-old group I do not think in the whole country, you would have one that would appear on the critical list.

(f) . . . if we got into serious trouble, your occupational deferments will be greatly increased especially if we were to go above the 26-year-old level.

(g) (Chart) There were approximately 200 apprentices in critical occupations under 19 years of age, as of October 1950.

(h) . . . a program which inducts young men for training and service at age 18, at the point when they have had an opportunity to complete secondary school but before they have established themselves in a civilian occupation, would clearly have a smaller impact on the civilian economy than the current 19–26-year-old draft. . . . Under the present selective service law, the typical young man who graduates from high school at age 18 but is not subject to the draft until age 19 is likely to find that his employment opportunities are limited to casual or blind-alley jobs, since few employers would be inclined to initiate extended training of young men for such short periods of employment. Dependency problems are also minimized since only a very small proportion of men—about 1 percent—are married before 18.

11. *Edward J. Overby, Assistant to the Secretary, Department of Agriculture*

(a) This Department concurs in the policy of the proposed program for universal military training and service and the change in age limits. . . . I think it is true also for the young man who is helping his father on a farm (i. e., that 18 is best age).

(b) . . . even though a farm-reared boy in the 18- or 19-year group may already possess substantial farm skill, the men in the higher age groups liable for military service possess even greater farm skills. . . . The proposal for broadening the age group liable for service will provide a larger pool from which to draw men for the armed services. By the enlargement of the available pool in this manner, it should be possible to obtain a given size military force with less adverse effect on farm production. This is extremely important from the viewpoint of agriculture in this period immediately ahead when expansion of the Armed Forces and expansion of agricultural production are both required.

12. *Dr. Charles A. Thomas, chairman, Scientific Manpower Advisory Committee, National Security Resources Board*

(a) a. (The committee) endorses the basic principle of 4 months of basic training and 23 more months of military service for all 18-year-olds. . . .

(b) . . . the industrial potential of this country is being weakened on a day-by-day basis as reservists occupying critical scientific and engineering positions are drawn to active military duty.

B. SENATORS

13. *Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., United States Senator from Massachusetts*

. . . I do not think 3,400,000 is too high. Any study I can make of what the demands are going to be leads me to the conclusion that 3.4 million is not going to be at all too high . . . if the world is in a dangerous situation—every young man who has not had military training has a right to demand that the Government give it to him, and he has a right to object very strongly if the Government does not give it to him.

C. NEWSPAPERS

14. *Editorial from New York Times, January 12, 1951, on UMTS*

"Eighteen years is the right age to call up youth. . . . Possibly there are some risks in the program, but we live in a period when risks are unavoidable. The greatest risk of all lies in weakness and inaction."

D. PROFESSIONAL, LABOR, AND FARM GROUPS

15. *J. T. Sanders, legislative counsel, the National Grange*

(a) . . . farm boys during this time really do become skilled earlier in their lives in mechanical operations than industrial boys . . . an indiscriminate and undifferentiating draft of the 18-year-old boys could do a lot more damage in taking skilled and necessary boys from the farm than it would do in industry.

(b) Senator CHAPMAN. You are for the remainder of the bill?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

16. *Paul H. Robbins, executive director, National Society of Professional Engineers*

. . . there are approximately 65,000 engineers and scientists within the present draft age limits. If any substantial part of this group are taken into the armed services it will obviously mean an even more intense strain on our production potential.

17. *Clarence E. Davies, secretary, American Society of Mechanical Engineers; director, Program of the Engineering Manpower*

Avoid induction of engineering manpower into armed services for nontechnical assignments.

18. *Lewis Sanders, consulting engineer, New York*

(a) The question of calling 18-year-olds into the Armed Forces resolves into whether to take the same man when he is 18 or 19. There seems to be no dispute over the necessity of taking the man at age 19. An analysis of our manpower inventory shows conclusively the necessity of calling men at 18.

(b) . . . at 18 is the optimum point for interrupting his educational career or of letting him perform his military service before he has established himself in industry. . . . S. 1 contains ample safeguards against interrupting a man's education in the middle of a scholastic year.

(c) . . . the 18-year-old is a prime fighting man.

(d) . . . the 18-year-old will not be subject to any greater demoralizing influences by reason of being called into military service.

19. *James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer, CIO*

. . . we believe that lowering the induction age would prove least disruptive to our way of life and at the same time serve as a great source of strength to our Armed Forces.

E. VETERANS' ORGANIZATIONS

20. *Erle Cocke, Jr., national commander, the American Legion*

As national commander, I speak for the 3,000,000 members of the American Legion and, in this instance, for an additional million members of the American Legion Auxiliary. . . . If you do not take 18-year-olds, you will in effect be ordering the redraft of World War II veterans, many of whom already have served their country when they were themselves 18. I do not believe that the American people want that to happen, gentlemen . . . it would seem unfair and unnecessary to exempt the present crop of 18-year-olds from service while reaching out for those who served previously—at that age—and under conditions of total war.

21. *Omar B. Ketchum, Legislative Director, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States*

(a) My organization . . . indicated that all male persons in the age group from 18 to 35, inclusive . . . who have not had previous military service . . . should be subject to military service.

(b) . . . our organization believes 18-year-olds can accept the responsibilities of soldiers and adequately serve our country either inside or outside of the United States.

22. *Francis M. Sullivan, National Legislative Director, Disabled American Veterans*

The Disabled American Veterans, in the . . . belief that the keystone to national security lies in military preparedness, endorses the principle of universal military service . . . any system of compulsory military service and training should be directed toward the age group, or groups, whose service and training will cause the least impact on the Nation's social and economic structure.

23. *Harold Russell, National Commander, AMVETS*

(a) AMVETS now feel that the present proposal to dovetail both UMT and universal military service is, by every yardstick, the most intelligent and economical answer to America's present military danger . . .

(b) . . . the age of 18 is the logical time to interrupt the normal life of the American citizen for military service. It is logical (a) because it comes at the conclusion of high-school training; (b) because it creates the least disruption of the individual's life; the least disruption of our national economy; the least interference with the educational pattern of America.

(c) The most colossal fraud that the Congress of the United States can foist on the young men of America at this time would be to deprive them of military training and then, at some late date, in the face of an urgent emergency, hastily call them to the colors and send them into combat with hasty or inadequate training.

24. *Michael Straight, the American Veterans' Committee*

(a) We . . . believe that this Nation requires immediately at least 4.5 million men in our Armed Forces who will join together with those of our allies to defend the free world. . . . We believe that the present official Defense Department goal of 3.5 million men is insufficient. . . .

(b) . . . we feel that Congress must authorize now the drafting of all able-bodied American men between the ages of 18 and 26. . . .

(c) Youths of 18 are at the height of their stamina and endurance, and if properly trained make the best fighting men.

(d) . . . 18-year-olds should not be sent overseas without a minimum of 4 months' training.

(e) Eighteen seems to be the most convenient age.

(f) AVC represents thousands of veterans who have found that it is more practical to start and finish a college training program in consecutive years, rather than have a lapse of several years in the middle of that training program.

(g) . . . any effort to call up a large alien army of mercenaries is a will-o'-the-wisp in the sense that the manpower does not exist, cannot be brought from the other side of the iron curtain, and is not present in Europe today to serve as any adequate substitute for a continuous flow of able-bodied young Americans. . . .

25. *Maj. Gen. Milton G. Baker, commander in chief, the Military Order of the World Wars*

National military service more accurately describes the type of program that is needed in this present dire emergency. We must buttress our economy, our people, and our defenses.

26. *Col. Edwin S. Bettelheim, Military Order of World Wars*

. . . we are in favor unanimously of this bill.

27. *Annapolis Chapter, Military Order of the World Wars*

The Annapolis Chapter of the Military Order of World Wars has taken a strong stand in favor of universal military training and urges you to assist in every possible way to insure the enactment of such legislation in the present Congress.

28. *Bernard Weitzer, national legislative director, Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America*

(a) The present bill, in my opinion, is the most practicable plan for meeting the manpower needs of our Armed Forces with the minimum disturbance of our

social and economic fabric and our needs for the products of our industry and our farms.

(b) I would prefer the 18-year-old (to a nonveteran parent or father or husband . . .). I think that when a man has set up a home and a family, that the disturbance to our social fabric would be greater. . . .

29. *Frank E. McClerman, national commander, Regular Veterans Association*

(a) The Regular Veterans Association . . . has advocated enforced universal military training starting at age 18.

(b) . . . it is more desirable to put 18-year-old boys in uniform now, in order to provide them with proper training than it is to procrastinate and be found unprepared, as we have been in other wars when it was necessary to put them in uniform without the proper training.

(c) The educators of our country have given us phony reasons that this should not be so. They claim that it retards the boy's normal education. We maintain that the normal education should be retarded at this time rather than have the possibility of all education being stopped in the future.

F. NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

30. *Brig. Gen. E. A. Evans, executive director of the Reserve Officers' Association*

(a) It is our strong belief today that a universal military service and training bill is essential to the well-being of this Nation.

(b) Commenting on the lowering of the draft age to 18, it is our judgment that this should be done.

31. *Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, president of the National Guard Association of the United States*

For 33 years the National Guard of the several States . . . has urged that there be established in this country, a system of universal military training and service.

32. *Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord, National Guard Association of the United States*

By the time he gets his basic training, especially if you follow my thought that it should be in the United States, he could not be sent overseas until he was 19 years of age.

G. EDUCATIONAL GROUPS

33. *Karl T. Compton, chairman of the corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

(a) . . . the comments which I have heard from my academic and other associates since Secretary Marshall and Assistant Secretary Rosenberg submitted the outline of the Department of Defense's plan to you last week have been unanimously favorable.

(b) (Quoting from editorial, Boston Herald, January 12, 1951) . . . " . . . But we are now in a state of emergency verging upon war. And for the particular set of circumstances which we face the Secretary seems to have produced as painless a solution as we can hope to get . . . Secretary Marshall's program is not ideal, but we do not live in a world whose problems always permit of ideal solution . . ."

(c) I think a little more maturity is a good thing, but I think the record is also clear that those men make good soldiers, and the record is also clear that men, on the whole, who have come back from service in World War II have come back in good shape.

(d) I would not stop at 18½, as some have suggested. The important thing seems to me to be the stage in the young man's career—the break between high school and job or college—not the matter of a few months more or less in age.

(e) . . . It certainly seems to me better to go below the 19-year age level than to disrupt young families and careers. . . .

(f) . . . We would hope that the early stages of training would be done in this country, would be carried out in places where there would be some community interest, civilian community interest, in the welfare of the group of those young men. . . .

(g) . . . I think the moral surroundings of the group of 18-year-old boys is likely to be rather better than the moral surroundings of the group that are twice that age brought together under the same circumstances, because I think there is a lot of idealism in these young men.

(h) . . . there is far more liquor per capita drunk outside the military than drunk inside it . . . for one thing, . . . there is no liquor sold on the post, . . . if a boy wants liquor he can get it much more easily at home than he can when he is in the Army.

(i) I know there was a report (on liquor consumption) and also on venereal disease in the Fort Knox experiment. . . . I remember that the report was exceedingly favorable, almost too favorable to be believed, but it was very good.

34. *Leonard Carmichael, president, Tufts College and Tufts Medical and Dental Schools; member of the American Council on Education*

(a) . . . it is my personal opinion that age 18, all things concerned, is the proper age at the present time.

(b) . . . the issue was never clearly presented to the great assembly of 650 college presidents . . . had there been time and had it been possible to present all the facts that have been presented here today . . . that assembly would have overwhelmingly voted in favor of 18.

(c) . . . the drafting of a sufficient number of 18-year-old young men to make possible the continued postponement, until graduation, of the induction of all present college and university students now in good standing, would be in the national interest . . . they would be of more value to the Armed Forces because of the engineering and other skills which they would then have.

35. *James P. Baxter III, president, Williams College; chairman of the committee on manpower of the Association of American Colleges*

(a) . . . the need for an Army of 3.5 million can be met within the 19 to 26 age pool, but there are certain things about meeting it that way that scare the educators very seriously . . . in the first place it cleans the 19-to-26-year-old pool out of most of the students now deferred.

(b) (The) question of the date at which they will have finished their military service is of very great importance in the minds of the educators that I have talked with . . . 18 years . . . is a natural break between a man's secondary education on the one hand, and either obtaining a job or going to college.

(c) . . . when you pull these Reserves and National Guard in a recall of a Reserve group, you are pulling out people who . . . not only have done a lot of service for the country but are people who have just completed their education, . . . are getting a start in business, they are mostly married, many with small children, and you get, in proportion to those you call, a lot of hardship cases and a lot of dependency cases where you are not going to get any of those with the 18-year-olds or the 19-year-olds.

(d) I did not meet a single fellow that would not prefer to complete a senior's education even if it meant a delay on the 18-year-olds.

(e) . . . if you have not done a job by your children before they are 18, you cannot count on doing an awful lot in 1 year more.

(f) (In) the War Between the States . . . there were more 18-year-olds in the armies of the North and of the South . . . than of any other age group, unless it was the 17-year-olds.

(g) (The) tremendous record of boys of 17 and 18 who have done well in military service and who have gone through it without moral damage and with a lot of maturity was very striking to the educators when they came back after the war.

(h) . . . the GI's, were, in my opinion, the best people we ever taught in American colleges. More mature, more earnest, more ready to make the most of their opportunities. . . .

36. *Harold W. Dodds, president, Princeton University*

(a) The proposal to call young men at 18, or upon completion of high school, is correct timing. Both for the young men who want to go on to college and for those who want to enter trade or industry directly, the break comes when it is least costly to them and when the experience may be best capitalized in later life. . . . The longer the service is postponed the more disruption it will be to the individuals themselves, to higher education and to our economy in general.

(b) I think the young man is morally able to withstand temptation at 18 as he is at 19.

37. *Detlev W. Bronk, president, Johns Hopkins University; president, National Academy of Science; president-elect of American Association for Advancement of Science*

(a) I am in favor of this program because I believe that 18 is the most satisfactory period for the man and for the Nation . . . to interrupt university training and training for the trades is unsatisfactory. . . . I think that service after com-

pletion of university training or after the development of a skill would affect our economy and disrupt the normal development of family life.

(b) I am in favor of the program because it will . . . relieve the demands upon selective service which would thus permit men already well advanced in their training to complete their training, so that the Nation can effectively cash in on the foundations which they have already laid.

38. *Leonard Smith, Georgetown College, Georgetown, Ky.*

. . . I am in favor of lowering the age for induction to 18 years with the provision however that only in case of emergency would 18-year-olds be used in foreign service. . . .

39. *George R. Harrison, dean of science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

I favor the concept that all young men should be obligated to render for a certain period some form of "time tax" toward national security. . . . The time should be taken between graduation from high school and subsequent activities, since in most cases this is the least disruptive time in the career of the individual.

40. *H. E. Jenkins, president, Tyler Junior College*

. . . every young man who attains the age of 18 will receive his military training as required by national defense. He may meet this obligation in either of the following ways: (1) (a) Enlistment in any of the Regular Military Establishments or (b) appointment to the National Military Academies. (2) In addition to these plans it is proposed that new plans be inaugurated to meet the new situation which confronts the Nation.

41. *Eugene B. Chaffee, president, the American Association of Junior Colleges*

The National Defense Act of 1951 should provide for the following features: "Every able-bodied male citizen on reaching the age of 18, if he is not still in high school (and in that case the age should not be later than 20), should begin a program of military training which when completed will be not less than 12 months as a minimum of continuous training, or its equivalent.

42. *William G. Saltonstall, principal, Phillips Exeter Academy, New Hampshire*

We can find this manpower either by drafting young married men and veterans, or we can find it by drafting 18-year-olds. Neither alternative is pleasant, but I believe the latter is preferable.

43. *W. R. White, president, Baylor University*

(a) The general concepts and specifications in the proposal before you seem to be sound and appropriate in the light of our present emergency.

(b) I think if it is necessary to have the 18-year-olds to safeguard our country's future, that should be done. . . .

44. *W. W. Kemmerer, University of Houston*

Place all 18- and 19-year-old men in universal military training with no exemptions and no deferments. . . .

45. *E. H. Hopkins, vice president, Washington State College*

. . . Congress should adopt a National Service Act for all men between the ages of 18 and 28, inclusive, with the additional provision that the upper age limit could be raised when and if conditions require it. . . . Upon reaching 18, or upon completion of the twelfth grade (whichever was later), but in no event later than age 19, a period of military training and service would be required, in one way or another, of all able-bodied and mentally fit young men. To this, there should be no exceptions. . . .

46. *Lloyd M. Clark, Saltsburg, Pa.*

The "Kiski plan." Induct all youths 18 years old into active service to start on June 1, 1951.

47. *F. G. Macomber, Miami University*

. . . all men should be subject to military training upon reaching their eighteenth birthday. . . .

48. *Association of American Universities, resolution on mobilization of manpower*

That male citizens be prepared for their critical roles by a system of universal training and service to be undertaken at the age of 18, or upon completion of the twelfth grade, whichever is later (with the proviso that it be not later than the age of 19 and that those who have completed the twelfth grade may volunteer at the age of 17 for induction with their parents' consent).

49. *Report on manpower, Association of Colleges and Universities of the State of New York*

Time is of the essence . . . we propose . . . that provision be made for such training at the earliest possible moment after a young man reaches age 18 . . . we propose that provision be made for basic military training immediately a young man reaches the military age . . . that induction for his subsequent period of service normally commence with the breaking-off or completion of his schooling at either the high school or post high school level.

50. *Association of American Junior Colleges*

Every able-bodied male citizen on reaching the age of 18, if he is not still in high school (and in that case the age should not be later than 20), should begin a program of military training which when completed will be not less than 12 months as a minimum of continuous training, or its equivalent.

51. *The Georgia Association of Junior Colleges*

The American Association of Junior Colleges has presented a "Suggested plan for national defense." . . . The copy attached is a part of this testimony, which has generally been approved by those who hold membership in the Georgia association.

H. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

52. *Dunlap C. Clark, United States Chamber of Commerce*

Eighteen-year-old males should be drafted to serve 27 months in the Armed Forces.

53. *Donald W. Wyatt*

The 18-year-old represents Secretary Marshall's greatest weapon. The age group is the one group which can be called with the least harm to the Nation and to them.

54. *Julius Ochs Adler, Co-Chairman, National Emergency Committee of the Military Training Camps Association of the United States*

(a) Experienced instructors and trainers of 17- and 18-year-old young men are confident that these men have more endurance and are capable of quicker reactions than older men. If drafted at the eighteenth birthday, their education and future careers, whether on the farm or in industries or in the professions, will be least interrupted.

(b) Few have contracted family obligations. Most of them will have completed high school or be near to doing so and thus have reached a point at which formal education can be interrupted without undue hardship.

55. *Arthur L. Williston, Citizens' Committee for Universal Military Training*

(a) 18 is . . . the time when they have finished, by and large, their high school.

(b) . . . the moral and even spiritual effects of this training on boys of 18 will be more beneficial and more lasting than on the boys at an older age when they might be more sophisticated.

(c) . . . a provision of the utmost importance in the bill lies in the fact that, starting with the 18-year-olds and a total period of 27 months, it becomes possible to build up after the universal service a formidable reserve, and in time before these young men are too old to be effective. . . . It is this reservoir of highly trained young men which, through the years, will furnish the greatest protection.

56. *Tracy S. Voorhees, Committee on the Present Danger*

(a) The Committee on the Present Danger endorses the bill because we believe it provides a flexible, democratic, and equitable means of meeting our Nation's requirements for military manpower.

(b) . . . service should begin at age 18 or end of high-school year after reaching 18.

(c) I believe that you are going to have to take both 18-year-olds and fathers for the next couple of years in order to meet the need. . . . I would favor taking the 18's before the others . . . in a study which was made in England of young soldiers who were married, who were separated from their wives, separation of a year resulted in approximately 25 percent divorce rate.

57. *Dr. Vannevar Bush, Committee on the Present Danger*

. . . we should call all young men at 18 without exception.

58. *Dr. William C. Menninger, Committee on the Present Danger*

Because there is a natural break in the life program of the youth as he finishes high school, it would seem practical that this training and service should begin at age 18. . . .

59. *Mrs. William L. Slagle, Dayton, Ohio*

Of course they will make the best combat troops. They are filled with the good old high school football spirit which would cause them to be willing to sacrifice life and limb for the glory of the school.

60. *Joseph C. Grew*

. . . universal military service and training are today of far more urgency even than they were then. . . . In the interests of our national security we simply cannot afford further to delay this essential legislation.

61. *Rocco B. Bunino, vice president, National Licensed Beverage Association*

. . . all of the States, with two exceptions, have made it unlawful to sell intoxicating beverages to persons under 21 years of age. . . . Enforcement requires mainly identification, such as draft cards, service identification cards, both of which show the date of birth.

62. *A. Ray Warnock, National Interfraternity Conference*

. . . the executive committee of the National Interfraternity Conference, representing 59 men's social fraternities and their 2,975 undergraduate chapters; resolve, that a program of UMT should be enacted by the Congress of the United States to train all physically able young men on graduation from high school or at equivalent ages of 17 to 19 years in basic military science . . .

I. YOUTH GROUPS

63. *Lewis A. Rivlin, student, Swarthmore College, Students for Democratic Action*

(a) On December 29, 1950, the national board of SDA, in view of the national emergency, caused by the Communist offensive in Korea, made the following formal recommendation for the utilization of manpower during the emergency. Selective service in the Armed Forces for men upon completion of high school or upon reaching the age of 18.

(b) If the choice is made in favor of selection of the 18-year-old the drain on the long-run effectiveness of the country will be less as relates to the colleges, and the country's needed talents.

(c) . . . it will be to the interests of the 18-year-old and the college student as well.

TESTIMONY AGAINST

A. EDUCATIONAL GROUPS

1. *Ralph W. McDonald, National Education Association of the United States*

(a) Under the most optimistic view that can realistically be taken, the proposals made by the Defense Department before this subcommittee would greatly reduce the contribution of higher education to the life of America at a time when it is most urgently needed.

(b) We urge that the age of 19 years be retained as the threshold of induction into the Armed Forces. On this point the opinions of educators are conclusive: 81.25 percent of the college and university faculty opinions received hold that the induction of students should not be before the end of the school year during which they reach age 19.

(c) The accumulated pool of availables above 19 years of age should be used to achieve the necessary force-in-being of 3,460,502 during the tide-over period necessary to reach the point when the induction of 19-year-olds will yield exactly the same intake into the Armed Forces as would the induction of 18-year-olds.

(d) To reject for educational reasons a person who has completed satisfactorily the eighth grade in our schools is absurd. To reject for physical deficiency a young man who plays on a varsity football team is likewise ridiculous.

(e) . . . educators oppose the induction of 18-year-olds (because) the taking of 18-year-olds would, over the years, liquidate a substantial portion of the higher education of men in the United States.

(f) . . . The number of young men who attended college even with veterans' benefits has been substantially less than the number who would have attended if they had had the opportunity to go to college under normal conditions.

(g) The inducting of young men at the end of the school year during which they become age 19 would permit the majority to complete 2 years of college work. . . . If these same boys could secure only 1 year of college before they would be called, tremendous numbers of them would never go to college at all. . . . At least one-third of these 18-year-old potential college students would never go back to college even with the most generous program of veterans' benefits. . . .

(h) . . . Approximately a third of (the boys being graduated from high schools) are 17 years of age. . . . It is from that 17-year-age group that the greater proportion of the college students come. . . . The majority of the persons who go to college are already in college at age 18. . . . The truth of the matter is that if your committee were seeking the age at which you could establish the best gap in terms of college attendance, it would be to take the 17-year-olds. But then you would run into a very serious impact with the high schools, because while those who go to college graduate at age 17 or early 18, in the main, the average at the high school, at the time of the high school graduates, is a little bit older . . . if you were to take 17-year-olds you would strike right at the heart of the high schools even more than you do by taking the 18-year-olds.

(i) Not all or nearly all of (the 18-year-olds) have completed high school. There are about 30,000 in elementary and junior high schools below tenth grade; . . . estimated to be 220,000 in the senior high schools, . . . approximately 300,000 in the colleges. . . . Obviously the 18-year-old young man is not marking time between high school and college waiting to be called. The majority of those who are destined to go to college are already there and are well along with their college programs.

(j) . . . if the choice is between taking the juniors and seniors in college and establishing a continuing policy of cutting off the 18-year-olds from college, . . . it would be better to take the juniors and seniors without hesitation, because that is only one class of juniors and one class of seniors, whereas we are going into every class of 18-year-olds from now on. . . .

2. *Edgar Fuller, executive secretary, National Council of Chief State School Officers*

(a) . . . we conclude: that an Armed Force of 3,462,500 can be raised by July 1, 1951, without other than comparatively minor changes; . . . that it is therefore unnecessary to induct boys less than 19 years of age to meet the President's goal for defense of the country.

(b) We believe all the groups mentioned, and perhaps others, should be utilized before 18-year-olds are drafted.

(c) We oppose the draft of 18-year-old boys because many of them are too immature.

(d) . . . accelerated high school and college programs can provide 2 years or more of college work for the college bound group before age 19.

(e) . . . demoralization of the high school which will result from drafting at 18 is far more important to the Nation and its future strength than whatever damage may result to college students, serious as this may be.

3. *Resolution adopted by the faculty of Appalachian State Teachers College*

. . . retain the minimum draft age at 19 for regular military service, providing that if military training for boys under 19 becomes necessary, such training be coordinated with high school and college work.

4. *Paul E. Elicker, executive secretary, National Association of Secondary School Principals*

(a) Approximately 250,000 or 25 percent of total 18-age group of male youth, are in the elementary and secondary schools. . . . A large number of the 18-year-olds are living with families and parents. . . . It is . . . evident that the drafting of the 19-year-old group of 95,000 in our schools is less damaging to our schools and to fewer boys themselves than drafting of 250,000 18-year-olds.

(b) . . . Youngest group to graduate from high schools are those planning to go to college. Many in this group . . . enter college for 1 or . . . 2 years. This too, is highly desirable because those who once enter college are most likely to return and continue.

(c) . . . The older group, who do not generally go on to college but enter industry or military service (for them) the opportunity to complete their high-school education is highly advantageous to them and the country. If (they) . . . are compelled to leave school before graduation, they will not return to high school to complete their secondary-school education.

(d) 21.2 percent of the decrease in high school enrollment (from 1941 to 1946) was caused by the loss of boys in their last year in school. The primary reasons

for this decrease in . . . enrollment was the 18-year induction age pattern and the 17-year age enlistment, and the influences of the war on our youth.

B. CHURCH GROUPS

5. *Rev. Ezra Ellis, chairman, Public Affairs Committee of the Minneapolis Church Federation and Minister of Wesley Methodist Church, Minneapolis, Minn.*

(a) . . . the Minneapolis Grange reaffirms its long-standing policy opposing UMT and UMS. Selective Service will furnish ample men for armed services and now is not the time to rush legislation of no immediate consequence for which our Nation will later suffer.

(b) Boys of 18 years of age are immature. If taken into UMST their minds will be regimented. . . . They will be allowed the freedom to seek their own recreation in strange places under no discipline, with gambling, prostitution, and drinking sources of unusual temptation.

(c) . . . why take these boys if the Defense Department statistics indicate that they will not be needed? . . .

(d) . . . why do we need to draft the 18-year-olds when Italy starts with the 21-year-old; Belgium and Spain start with 20-year-olds; Russia, France, and Norway start with the 19-year-old; and Canada relies entirely on volunteers.

C. YOUTH GROUPS

6. *Robert W. Lyon, Young People's General Assembly for Peace, Metropolitan Community Church, Chicago, Ill.*

We appear to oppose the proposed draft of 18-year-olds and the permanent conscription which is written into your bill. . . . The draft is part of a general program designed to militarize our country and its people. The 18-year-old does not want a future in a uniform and at war.

7. *George Harper, Administrative Secretary of the National Conference of Methodist Youth, Nashville, Tenn.*

(a) "The National Conference of Methodist Youth is opposed to Universal Military Training or conscription in peacetime. Compulsory military training and service are a threat to the principles of democracy and to civilian control over government and other areas of national life."

(b) Put immature 18-year-old boys in service overseas where the normal restraints of home and friends are gone and the resulting moral hazards are obvious.

D. TEMPERANCE AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

8. *J. Raymond Schmidt, the International Order of Good Templars*

(a) . . . the measure cannot be looked upon as doing otherwise than establishing compulsory peacetime military service in democratic America.

(b) There will be complete military dictatorship for young men between the ages of 18 and 21. . . . If the young men who have attained 21 do not like the laws passed by Congress they can go to the polls and express their disapproval with their ballots.

(c) The military authorities should voluntarily ban all alcoholic beverages from training camps and military establishments and forbid the sale of said beverages anywhere to men wearing military and naval uniforms.

9. *John H. Eberly, Brethren Service Commission*

We believe we are voicing the sentiment of millions of Americans as well as our own organization in protesting what appears a planned and willing movement toward war while preventative measures are thus rendered unpopular . . . the drafting of 18-year-olds and thus eliminating all other educational experiences in their lives.

10. *Gilbert F. White, the Friends Committee on National Legislation*

(a) Universal military training is an unprecedented and undemocratic program which would be established under the bill on a permanent basis.

(b) The drafting of 18-year-olds would work serious injury. . . . An 18-year-old draft would (a) set Army service as the immediate object of most high-school students, (b) throw such students into the coarseness of Army life while many of them are too young to understand or resist it, (c) prevent some students from continuing with college work, and (d) make it difficult to select suitable students to continue with professional work.

E. INDIVIDUALS

11. *Mrs. William L. Slagle, Dayton, Ohio*

I am very much opposed to the conscription of 18-year-olds and the sending of them all over the world. . . . Our country is not in such dire straits that we need to conscript our babies for a global crusade comparable to the Children's Crusade of the Middle Ages.

12. *William H. Neblett, USAFR, retired, Los Angeles, Calif.*

(a) Universal military service and training for the 18-year-olds, or any other ages, proposed by amendments to the Selective Service Act of 1948, S. 1, is conscription of the true Prussian type—and that is why I oppose this bill S. 1.

(b) . . . I would say that 85 percent of the manpower in the Pentagon was wasted completely, devoted to nothing but comments, making speeches, public relations.

(c) I am just as much opposed to the 19-year-olds being taken in as the 18-year-olds—neither the 18- or 19-year-old can take it. . . . They are not sufficiently developed, either emotionally or physically, to stand the rigor and hardships of battle. I found that out in my experience in the First World War.

13. *Hamilton A. Long, veteran of World War I and II*

America does not need to raise a mass army and should not do so.

14. *Charles W. Elliott, Chicago, Ill.*

I fail to see how Mrs. Rosenberg can reconcile her statement that the services will not corrupt nor debase men to the fact that lectures and movies on venereal disease as well as the issuance of preventatives and the location of prophylactic stations is part of GI indoctrination.

15. *Mrs. Thalia D. Thomas, Landover Hills, Md.*

I do not believe that most of the so-called expert advisers in Government know much more about what they are doing than the 18-year-olds whom they will soon be sending to war.

F. MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

16. *Elmer W. Henderson, Director, American Council on Human Rights, Washington, D. C.*

. . . it is likewise important to consider whether armed services are using men to their maximum efficiency. . . . It is a fact that the armed services cannot achieve this goal under a system of segregation based on race.

17. *Dr. Ruth Bleier, Chairman, Maryland Committee for Peace*

The drafting of 18-year-olds must be defeated as a measure that is, in the real sense, an un-American act. It violates the long tradition of freedom from compulsory military training which for so long has made our country a haven for the millions fleeing a Europe ridden by militarism.

18. *Frederick J. Libby, Executive Secretary, National Council for Prevention of War*

I urge . . . that you report out to the Senate no permanent conscription law, no drafting of 18-year-olds, no build-up of the Armed Forces to 3 or 4 million men—or 6 million.

19. *Sidney Aberman, executive secretary, War Resisters League*

(Our reasons against enacting a universal military training and service law) are not based primarily on the harmful effects such a wholly unprecedented system of permanent conscription will unquestionably have on our educational processes, our moral standards, our tradition of individual liberty, and other important aspects of democratic life. . . . Adoption of permanent conscription will distract further attention away from these methods that can avail against Communist growth.

20. *Mrs. Alexander Stewart, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*

(a) We believe the present amendments to Senate bill 1 should be opposed because they provide both permanent universal military training and service.

(b) (It would seriously interfere) with the educational career or homemaking plans of young men . . . and would seriously (affect) our economy for as the years pass we would find our economy more and more geared to a war economy rather than a peace economy.

(c) The 18-year-old is not usually emotionally stable enough to withstand the effect of the kind of life he finds when put in occupation armies in Europe or the Far East. . . .

21. *John M. Swomley, Jr., director, National Council Against Conscription*

(a) . . . we have taken the position that at the present we must oppose any attempt by amendment to the present law to lower the draft age to 18 or to make the draft universal in its application . . . or to extend the life of the act for more than a year or two at a time.

(b) . . . a draft of 18-year-old boys does not, except in the first few years, add additional numbers to the Army.

(c) For most boys this is the period when they enter college or begin work.

(d) An 18-year-old boy is in most cases an immature person. . . . The Army recognizes the immaturity of 18-year-old boys by not using them as officers. Even 19-year-old boys are seldom used as noncommissioned officers even after 6 months or a year. . . .

(e) The Army has also discovered there is a higher prevalence of neurosis among younger persons in the Army.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON LOWERED INDUCTION AGE

IN FAVOR OF 18 YEARS

1. There is a compelling need to take 18-year-olds at this time.

(a) An expanded manpower pool is necessary in order to meet a sudden emergency in which the size of our Armed Forces might have to go up suddenly. This act looks to the future.

(b) Enough men must be in the manpower pool available to furnish a 6-month safety margin for selective service.

(c) Eight hundred seventy-two thousand men are authorized by statute to leave the service next year. Many are not expected to reenlist.

(d) Reservists with critical skills are being called up today. This is dangerous to our economy.

2. Other sources of manpower are inadequate:

(a) Mental standards of those now subject to selective service cannot be lowered too far, since men of low mentality are of little use to the services.

(b) We are already using World War II physical standards. Not many men can be found in the physically unfit now deferred.

(c) We can add only 20,000 men to the selective-service pool by rehabilitation programs, if we had such programs.

(d) Most of the veterans with less than 12 months of service are unfit for further military duty.

(e) The nonfather, nonveteran group is so small that it would furnish only a few months' supply of men for the pool.

(f) The age group from 10-19 has decreased by over 2,000,000 men over the last decade even though our population has risen. Not until 1959 will as many reach 18 as in the years 1940-45.

(g) Foreign troops alone will not solve our problem.

(h) We have the choice of taking either the 18-year-olds or all veterans up to 26 years of age.

(i) Many of our Reserves, especially in the Air Force, are too old to be effective much longer.

(j) Voluntary enlistments from outside the selective service pool may go down.

3. Industrial and farm deferments will go up when the impact of war contracts hits the present 19-26 age group.

4. The induction of 18-year-olds may enable us to release many Reserves who saw service in World War II.

5. More men per capita can be secured from the 18-year-old group than from any other.

6. Preservice training for Russians starts at the age of 10.

7. Men of 18 make the best soldiers. They have great physical superiority. Historically they have a fine record in all of our wars.

8. The 18-year-old will serve sooner or later anyway, hence it is better from his viewpoint to take him at that age:

(a) It is unfair to the 18-year-old not to give him "survival" training.

(b) Educationally, it is better to go at 18.

(1) It is the natural break between high school and college.

(2) They will be permitted to finish their school year.

(3) If men are taken at 18 rather than later, more of them will return to college since they will be discharged from active duty at an earlier age.

(4) The more mature a young man is when he enters college, the better student he will make.

- (c) It is economically better to take a young man at the age of 18.
 - (1) This period is a natural break between high school and a career.
 - (2) The year from 18 to 19 will be largely wasted unless the young man is taken at age 18 due to the fact that few would care to start a career or begin further schooling knowing that they would be taken a year later anyway.
- (d) Socially the age of 18 is the best for a young man because few of them are married and have dependents.
- (e) It is emotionally better to take a man at 18.
- 9. From the viewpoint of society it is better to take a young man at 18 rather than take other groups.
 - (a) It is far better socially to take an 18-year-old than to take older men with families. The loss of purchasing power of these families would disrupt the families and the national economy.
 - (b) It is better to take 18-year-olds than to take present students from college.
 - (c) It is better to take 18-year-olds than to take men from special skills and trades.
 - (d) It is better to take 18-year-olds than to take veterans.
- 10. It will cost the Government \$513,000,000 more per year to take men with dependents than to take a like number of 18-year-olds.
- 11. It is not morally harmful to the 18-year-old to take him at that age.
- 12. It might well lead to military disaster to require that all 18-year-olds be taken from their units before going overseas.

OPPOSED TO TAKING 18-YEAR-OLDS

- 1. There is no need to take 18-year-olds at this time.
 - (a) We can use more mental rejectees in our Armed Forces.
 - (b) We can lower our physical standards.
 - (c) We can get 630,000 husbands and fathers.
 - (d) We can use 160,000 veterans with less than 12 months of service.
 - (e) There is a great waste of personnel in the supporting units of our armed services.
 - (f) After a short period of time the 19-year age group will yield exactly the same number of men as the 18-year-old group.
 - (g) It is better to take present juniors and seniors in college than to take 18-year-olds.
- 2. It is morally dangerous for 18-year-olds to be subjected to service life, due to the fact that they are too immature and lack emotional and physical development.
- 3. Young men of 18 and 19, due to immaturity, make very poor soldiers.
- 4. Few nations draft men as young as 18.
- 5. Educationally the drafting of 18-year-olds is undesirable:
 - (a) The higher education of our young men will be ruined since less will attend college after getting out of the service. Even with veterans' benefits one-third never return to college.
 - (b) High schools will be demoralized by the enlistment of 17-year-olds who are attempting to join the service of their choice.
 - (c) One-third of all high-school graduates are 17. This group goes to college and thus the age of 18 for induction does not hit them between high school and college but rather in their first or second college year.
- 6. The drafting of 18-year-olds will not help to alleviate the manpower shortage to a great extent due to the fact that many young men of 18 do not finish high school until they are almost 19 and they are thus deferred. Also, one-third of the young men of this age are already in college and are deferred until the end of their college year.
- 7. The draft of 18-year-olds is a step toward militarism.
- 8. The draft of 18-year-olds is a part of an arms race which will lead to war.
- 9. It is undemocratic to draft these young men who do not have the right to vote.

VI. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT ISSUES

THE NECESSITY FOR A 26-MONTH TERM OF SERVICE

The committee believes that a 26-month term of training and service is necessary at the present time, but not as a fixed long-term policy.

One factor is of particular importance in considering this problem; that is, the selective-service program is primarily a program to build and maintain the Army.

The Air Force and the Navy are built upon 4-year enlistments. The Army, at present, is made up of 21-month inductees and 3-year enlistees. By comparison, this situation tends to reduce the Army's efficiency, even under normal circumstances.

There is an immediate emergency, however, which makes a 26-month term of service particularly advisable. Our Ground Forces have suffered heavily in Korea. Casualties totaling more than two full divisions have been suffered. These losses are extremely costly, because they represent the finest, best-trained troops of the Army.

If the Army is to continue to fulfill its mission, it must be assured a supply of effective seasoned troops. It cannot fulfill its mission if the bulk of its troops never have sufficient service to attain peak efficiency.

Under the present 21-month term, an inductee is entitled to 1¼ months of leave. This results in a 19¼-month period of active training and service, exclusive of leave. The period of effective service is further reduced by time spent in processing, traveling to training camp, basic training, schooling, processing and traveling to and from overseas areas, and in hospitals. This amounts to 8½ or 9 months. Thus, the period of effective overseas service is reduced to approximately 11 months. Under a 26-month training and service program, the period of effective service is correspondingly increased.

This means that under a 26-month program, the services will benefit from a substantially longer period of peak efficiency from the inductees or reservists ordered to active duty than is the case under the present 21-month program.

The committee believes it especially important to realize that this longer term of service has the effect of reducing the number of men in transit to and from overseas stations. This means an even greater saving in personnel, because more men are thus available for longer service overseas and fewer men are committed to the costly task of maintaining the pipeline for shipping men to and from overseas duty.

The additional length of time permits the Armed Forces to give inductees and reservists a more effective training course, because the longer time will permit more emphasis upon technical and advanced training. Such training makes men more useful, both as members of an active organization, and eventually of the Reserve. Also, the longer period permits development of better trained potential cadres, whose service would be invaluable for the training of large forces in times of sudden emergency.

It is of particular importance to note that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, testified that the armed services gain nearly 50 percent in practical military utility by having the longer period of service.

Also it is pertinent in this discussion again to point out that the increasing of the induction period substantially relieves the pressure on the manpower pool because it reduces the numerical rate of turn-over which is made necessary by a shorter period of induction.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST

The arguments listed below concern themselves with the length of service issue which emerged during the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings.

Included are not only the contentions advanced by the witnesses who appeared, but also those presented by individuals and organizations who requested that their material be inserted in the record. There may be arguments other than those presented, but this study summarizes only those which appear in the record.

Not all arguments presented as opposing the Department of Defense proposals are directly in conflict with those proposals. Any time a variation of the proposals was presented, it was placed in the opposing column.

It will be noted that some witnesses are listed as both "for" and "against" the same measure. This is due to the fact that occasionally a witness would either point out arguments on the other side or would present evidence which could be interpreted as being a variation of the Department's proposals. All such arguments have been included for the purpose of securing a more balanced picture. Also, it should be carefully noted that not all of these extracts are in their full context. Every effort was made by the staff to present an accurate summary, and the committee hopes that no inaccuracies have crept in due to the need for condensing the wealth of material into the briefest possible space.

Not all of the material is in the nature of direct quotes. Frequently remarks from different parts of the record have been combined into one statement. Occasionally, in answer to a long question, a witness would say "Yes" or "No," or "I agree." In these instances the content of the question has been attributed to the witness. Care has been taken to see that no witness is quoted out of context to secure a meaning other than the one intended.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS ON LENGTH OF SERVICE

TESTIMONY FAVORING 27 MONTHS OR MORE

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

1. *The Honorable George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense*

(a) Twenty-seven months is the shortest period of service that is consistent with national security in this period when so much of our effort and our personnel must be devoted to the training of men entering military duty for the first time. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, has estimated that we would gain nearly 50 percent in practical utility by the extra 6 months of service we recommend.

(b). It takes so long and requires such an outlay in both funds and training personnel to impart the basic military skills required in our highly mechanized military forces that the release of men in less than 27 months at this crucial stage of world history represents a major element of military weakness.

2. *General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower*

(a) . . . the 27 months must have been put in in the hope of getting 2 years complete service out of a man. They have calculated that on the size of their

force, the number of reenlistments probably they can expect, and also the time needed in this modern age for the proper training of a soldier so he can take care of himself in an emergency and do his duty.

(b) . . . a good lengthy term of service in terms of 27 months is essential, both for the efficiency of the training, the usefulness you get out of a man, and also in the size of your unit.

3. *General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

(a) It is obvious we will have to extend the term of service in order to meet our requirements. . . . Any amount over 21 months' that you extend his term of service aids materially in this problem. Twenty-seven months would appear to be a logical term. Allowing 2 months' furlough to which he is entitled by law, and 1 month to cover induction and discharge, a man would render approximately 2 years' service. When you add 6 months to his present term of service, his military usefulness is increased almost 50 percent.

(b) I have grave doubts that you can maintain your Armed Forces at the figure we think is necessary . . . by 21 months, because out of the 21 months a man is in his unit possibly not more than 14 months . . . if you keep these people 21 months only, you are not going to be able to furnish more than, let us say, 1,200,000 continually by selective service.

(c) . . . you are going to have a hard time maintaining the required strength by additional voluntary enlistments. This is our biggest danger in 21 months.

(d) . . . on a 21-month basis you require a much heavier training establishment and overhead than you do for 27. You have got to have more training camps and more training cadres.

(e) (None) are going to miss out on that training in the next year and a half, because you take in the same number for 27 months as 21 months.

(f) If you try to tie this to the next year or year and a half, the 21-month man might be as good as the 27-month man. In our opinion the situation is not going to get any better in the next year or year and a half. It may get worse. . . .

(g) With 21 months' service, you are limited in assigning men to certain technical jobs. . . . You just cannot train them and get any service out of them in 21 months.

(h) After you have used up this reserve between the ages of 19 and 26, you are going to be getting in selective service mostly those that become of the draft age. . . . If we keep them 2 years, you can get about 1,600,000. . . . I mean 2 years' actual duty. . . . That is why we suggest 27 months. That still leaves about 1,900,000 to obtain by voluntary enlistments. . . . I am not too sure you can (get 1,900,000) because a lot of them were getting their first enlistments before going to school. You will get those in your selective service. . . . So your 1,900,000 will have to be made up mostly by reenlistments. . . . Anything you do to cut down the total number is going to very seriously endanger your ability to maintain your armed strength around three million four, or three million five.

4. *Maj. Gen. Louis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service*

(a) (I believe) that the period of service should be increased to at least 27 months. I am doubtful that this will be long enough to maintain the required strength with the numbers available from the annual manpower income. It will require rigid reductions in rejections and limited withdrawal for all other reasons. . . . I am supporting 27 because it is nearer 30 than any other number that I have heard.

(b) 622,000 in 27 months provide the same service as 800,000 in 21 months.

5. *Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations*

(a) From the point of view of my naval responsibilities, I regard the 27-month period of service as being too low to meet the needs of the Navy, except for a small proportion of our people. We have always felt that 4 years was about the minimum. . . .

(b) . . . we must do everything possible to increase the combat readiness of the forces in being, which, I think, will impress the potential aggressor. . . .

(c) In calculating the figure of 3.4 million there have been used factors derived from the assumption that it would be 27 months . . . if you change the plan as to length of service, you automatically raise the numbers of people in the total strength, because it does include the training establishment. . . . If you have a shorter period, you must plan on a larger structure. . . .

(d) . . . our experience leads us to believe that you have 15 months in a combat unit (if you have them 21 months).

6. *Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army.*

(a) The shorter term of service, the less time you have for men actually on duty with our units in field, the greater rotation, and therefore greater wastage of manpower in the so-called pipeline . . . in the course of movement overseas and movement back home again . . . in the longer period of service we can have the experience of these men, which they take time to gain, for a much longer period of time on active duty . . . that gives us a more effective Army in the field.

(b) (In) 21 months you can hardly expect to secure more than 12 months of actual service. . . . That is a very ineffective way to run any business.

(c) I would have preferred to see it at 30 months. . . . the longer the period of service, the more effective soldier.

(d) The point . . . made about the necessity of the immediate present being the determining factor, I agree with, and that is the reason I say that the period of service must be 27 months and not a shorter period . . . in the current situation . . . it is infinitely better to have a 27-month period than to have a 21-month period.

7. *Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force*

(a) (Twenty-seven months) is the minimum period I think the Air Force could get adequately trained men. . . .

(b) We prefer not to depend upon enlistments entirely because that source is very unpredictable.

(c) It takes 8 to 12 months in our higher specialties to train him. . . . If we were to have (the 21 month program) in the Air Force, we would have to take a different group and give it a different type of training, because in the 21 month bracket we could not afford to give them the longer type of training . . . about the time that they began to find out what it was all about, they would have to go out. . . . The only ones that we could afford to train would be the people who are in for 4 years. Now, if we had only 21-month people, we'd have to train them only in the lower skills. . . . (They) would then go into the reserves, and instead of building the reserves, as we ought to have them built, we would find that the great majority there were only the lower skilled individuals, and the higher skills would have to be in only the regular Air Force.

8. *Brig. Gen., H. C. Parks, United States Air Force*

(a) . . . nine months is an awfully small return for 12 months of extensive technical training . . . we could not justify giving that type of training to a 21-month-term-of-service individual.

(b) We would much rather have a smaller reserve force of highly trained individuals than a large force of inadequately trained reserves.

9. *Hon. Anna M. Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary of Defense*

(a) . . . the reason that the Department of Defense is anxious to get men for a 27-month period is because their usefulness in these last few months becomes far greater to us . . . we are asking for 27 months during this emergency period, where we are trying to build up our force. We need trained men, and we need men to be in service instead of to use them as trainees. . . .

(b) . . . for the immediate objective, for our immediate effectiveness . . . (we) prefer to have less trained men, better trained, than more trained men less well trained on the 21 versus the 27 months.

(c) The added 6 months between 21 and 27, during which time we feel the men are increasing in their effectiveness, gives our force 50 percent additional effectiveness.

(d) (Condensed) With the 21 months' service, we have 4 months' training out of 21, giving him 17 months. If he leaves the continental United States for the European theater, it would take 1 month in transit. If he leaves for the East, it would take from 6 to 8 weeks. In the East, we'll say it brings it down to 15 months. We then have to figure on the return. The same length of time is taken, so we get either 13 or 14 months. A man who has 21 months is entitled to leave of almost 2 months. We are training many men as specialists, and that is another average 4 months, so it really brings down the service that we get to either 10 months or 9 months from a 21-month man.

(e) Our enlistments represent what we call the hard core of the services. As such they cannot provide the entire quota of technicians because they have a basic mission and they must be equally balanced in training and administration to carry on that mission . . . many times these enlistees may not have all the necessary educational qualifications to take on the more technical service . . . the expansion requires more technicians and therefore it would be disproportionate if we train all our Regulars only.

(f) . . . the difference of the use of men at the figure we have set to you for 27 months would mean close on to three-quarters of a billion dollars saving in our defense budget.

(g) The difference between 21 and 27 months periods of service: I have here information that in the civilian population . . . the age group between 19 and 9 months and 20 and 3 months—which would be the last 6 months (Senator Russell) asked for—five and three-quarters of the civilian men get married, and half of 1 percent during that time acquire children. We figure that with lack of opportunity, being out of the country, it is safe to count that about half or 2½ percent would be married during that time. . . . The fact that a man acquires a child in those last 6 months causes no additional cost to us because we are already paying for the dependent, and the cost is the same.

10. (Summary) *L. S. Garlock, Assistant Comptroller, Department of Defense*

On a 27-month term of service you will take 58,000 men per month, or a total for the year of 696,000, which will cost you \$5,427,000,000. On 21 months' service you will be forced to increase the intake from 58,000 per month to 77,600 per month, or a total of 931,000 men, because instead of getting 21 months' service you only get 15 months' service. That will cost you \$3,200 a man, roughly \$20,000 a month difference, in the sum of \$6,176,000,000. Five billion four hundred and twenty-seven million dollars from \$6,176,000,000 gives you a net saving of \$749,000,000 because of the 6 months' additional service you get out of the men. That \$749,000,000 that you would save is further reduced by \$40,000,000 in pay increases which accumulate in that 21-to-27-month bracket, giving you a net saving of \$709,000,000. By determining the length of service to be 21 months instead of 27 months, we are going to have to be prepared to pay \$709,000,000 for it.

11. *John G. Adams, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Defense*

(a) Assuming the extension of enlistments in the fiscal year 1952, in fiscal 1953 the pool would be 211,000. Assuming now the changes on the 24, 27, and 30 months, in addition to the extension of enlistments, if we change to 24 months, the figure 211,000 would become 221,000. Changing to 27 months, the pool becomes 343,000, and changing it to 30 months, the pool becomes 602,000.

(b) . . . we find that if there are no changes in the act at any time between now and fiscal year 1954 there would be remaining in the selective service pool, assuming 3.5 remains constant, a total of 181,000 young men . . . if enlistments have been extended during fiscal 1952-53 there would be in pool 244,000 young men. Assuming that in addition to extending enlistments, the length of service under selective service and reserves on duty was changed from 21 to 24 months, the total remaining in . . . pool would become 399,000. If . . . period were changed from 21 to 27 months, the numbers on board becomes 415,000 . . . if period is changed from 21 to 30 months, there remains in the pool at end of fiscal year 1954 a total of 455,000 young men . . . based on 27 months as suggested by the Department of Defense, the figure is 415,000 in 1954, 343,000 in 1953, and 682,000 in 1952. (That is without any allowance for your safety factor.)

12. *Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Department of Army*

(a) Mrs. Rosenberg, presenting a chart prepared January 11, 1951, indicated the length of service in Egypt as 3 years, and in the U. S. S. R. as 3 years.

(b) Mrs. Rosenberg, presenting a chart prepared January 11, 1951, by the Department of Army, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, indicated the length of service in foreign countries: Bulgaria, 2 years; Greece, 2 years; Hungary, 2 years; Iran, 2 years; Poland, 2 years; Spain, 2 years; Turkey, 2 years; United Kingdom, 2 years; and Yugoslavia, 2 years.

13. *Hon. Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor*

(In answer to question.) I approve of the 27-month suggestion that was recommended by the Department of Defense.

14. *Edward J. Overby, Assistant to the Secretary, Department of Agriculture*

This Department concurs in the proposed program for universal military training and service.

15. *Dr. Charles A. Thomas, Chairman, Scientific Manpower Advisory Committee, National Security Resources Board*

(We) endorse the basic principles of 4 months of basic training and 23 more months of military service for all 18-year-olds. . . .

B. PROFESSIONAL, LABOR AND FARM GROUPS

16. *Lewis Sanders, consulting engineer, New York City*

It will take approximately 2 years of service to make a man into an effective reservist. To function effectively on the field of battle and with the maximum chance of survival, a man must be trained until his reactions in battle are instinctive. . . .

17. *James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer, Congress of Industrial Organizations*

. . . we do not oppose this provision because of the urgency with which our top military leaders have insisted that the additional period is necessary to adequately train men for the various armed services.

C. EDUCATIONAL GROUPS

18. *Harold Dodds, president, Princeton University*

(a) Two years of service . . . 27 months, would mean, with terminal leave and discharge and that sort of thing, that a boy would virtually lose from the college standpoint 2 years.

(b) No other proposal that I have seen or been able to dream up myself provides the element of long-term durability with a minimum of possible violence to higher education and the lives of young men generally.

19. *James P. Baxter III, president of Williams College, chairman of the Committee on Manpower of the Association of American Colleges*

If this bill is adopted, there will be an opportunity for education after a man has had 2 years training. . . . Suppose that he goes through with 2 years and 3 months, he will still have an opportunity to start in a lot of professional careers.

20. *W. R. White, president, Baylor University*

The general concepts and specifications in the proposal before you seem to be sound and appropriate in the light of our present emergency.

21. *E. H. Hopkins, vice president, Washington State College*

Increasing the months of required service to a minimum of 24 months would reduce the number of replacements required during the next few years.

22. *Association of American Universities resolution on mobilization of manpower December 4, 1950*

Approves extending the period of service to 27 months, with the proviso that the President may raise this term by 3 months or lower it to the extent necessary to bring military manpower demand and resources into effective balance.

D. RESERVE OFFICERS

23. *Brig. Gen. E. A. Evans, executive director of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States*

. . . we are in favor of the present bill which calls for 27 months of service. . . . the principal reason for preferring the 27-month figure is because of the fact that according to the figures submitted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the number of young men required to maintain the 3½ million strength operates to leave a surplus of some 300,000 young men, which we believe very strongly and most sincerely should be utilized at the present time in the civilian component forces of all the services.

E. VETERANS' ORGANIZATIONS

24. *Erle Cocke, Jr., national commander, the American Legion*

It is far more probable, in our judgment, that the present tension will continue for a considerable length of time, and in view of that prospect we feel that 27 months of continuous service is a reasonable and necessary plan. We are advised by officials of the National Guard and Organized Reserves that a 27-month period of service would enable those organizations to build up and maintain authorized strength. . . . They would have difficulty doing this if the service were left at 21 months.

25. *Omar B. Ketchum, legislative director, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States*

We support the recommendation of the Department of Defense that the period of service be increased from the present 21 months to 27 months.

26. *Harold Russell, national commander, AMVETS*

AMVETS feel that the proposed 27 months of service is both just and wise for this reason: In any prolonged period of military activity, the cost of efficient and economical utilization of military manpower becomes of paramount importance under those circumstances.

27. *Col. Edwin S. Bettelheim, Military Order of World Wars*

We are in favor unanimously of this bill.

28. *Maj. Gen. Milton G. Baker, the Military Order of the World Wars*

National military service more accurately describes the type of program that is needed in this present dire emergency.

29. *Bernard Weitzer, National Legislative Director, Jewish War Veterans of The United States of America.*

The present bill, in my opinion, is the most practicable plan for meeting the manpower needs of our Armed Forces with the minimum disturbance of our social and economic fabric and our needs for the products of our industry and our farms.

F. MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

30. *Tracy S. Voorhees, Committee on the Present Danger.*

The 27 months of service and training authorized in the bill—after deduction for customary terminal leave—in reality means about 25 months of total actual military service. As such it need represent for students a break of only two academic years.

31. *Dunlap C. Clark, United States Chamber of Commerce.*

Eighteen-year-old males should be drafted to serve 27 months in the Armed Forces.

32. *Arthur L. Williston, Citizens Committee for Universal Military Training*

I . . . unqualifiedly endorse the 27-month period of training and service. . . . In the present 21 months' requirement, the service after training is too short to be either efficient or economical.

33. *Julius Ochs Adler, Cochairman, National Emergency Committee of the Military Training Camps Association of the United States*

. . . many universities have already formulated . . . a more compact curriculum by reducing college terms from 4 to 3 years; the total time loss for securing a college degree caused by 27 months of training and service would not exceed 15 months. . . . Four years is the present undergraduate course, with vacations from 3½ months to 4 months each year. The man who goes to work is very lucky to get 2 weeks vacation, so they will not be giving up anything in the way of vacations if they go from 4 years to 3 years.

G. YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

34. *Lewis A. Rivlin, student, Swarthmore College, Students for Democratic Action*

It would seem . . . there is need to expand the length of service beyond 21 months. If the length of service is somewhere around 27 months, at the end of that period the 18-year-olds will go out of the services and be ready to start in with their higher educations or their work in farming or industry, thus not being too much of a danger to the continued flow of abilities and talent.

TESTIMONY OPPOSED TO 27 MONTHS OR MORE

A. EDUCATIONAL GROUPS

1. *Ralph W. McDonald, National Education Association of the United States*

(a) A 27-month period of service would inevitably mean the loss of 2½ or 3 years of potential college study for every young man inducted, with the consequent further diminution of his chance to return at all.

(b) A 24-month service period would give many students a better chance to hold their loss to a minimum of 2 years of study.

(c) . . . the committee should give consideration either to a period of service which would mean a 2-year interruption or to a period of service that would mean a 3-year interruption . . . the 27-month period is probably as disadvantageous to the continuity of education as any specific number of months that could be

chosen. A 27-month service period would cut off 3 years of schooling almost as effectively as would a 30-month period of service.

2. *John Scott Everton, president, Kalamazoo College*

... consider the possibilities of lowering the period of service to not more than 24 months so that a student may continue his college training after an interruption of not more than 2 years.

B. FARM GROUPS

3. *J. T. Sanders, legislative counsel, the National Grange*

We should oppose any plan to extend the period of individual service.

C. OTHERS

4. *John J. Swomley, director, National Council Against Conscription*

We oppose any attempt to extend the length of service.

D. PROFESSIONAL GROUPS

5. *Dr. Rudolph H. Friedrich, American Dental Association*

On behalf of its many members who hold Reserve commissions, the association protests such extension to 27 months until it is clearly and unalterably demonstrated by changing conditions to the people of this country that additional service of such length is necessary.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON LENGTH OF SERVICE

FOR 27 MONTHS

1. A 27-month period of service will greatly increase our combat readiness since we will have the services of well-trained men for a longer period of time. This will greatly impress any potential aggressor.

(a) We gain 50 percent in practical military utility by having a 27-month period of service rather than a 21-month period. This results in an average increase of 6 months of service for each man over the present "actual service" period of from 8 to 14 months.

(b) The longer the term of service, the less wastage we have of men in the pipeline overseas and back.

(c) A much bigger training establishment is needed for the shorter period of service; thus many trained men are unavailable for combat due to their duties as training forces.

2. A longer period of service is necessary due to the fact that it takes so long to train men in the basic military skills in our highly mechanized forces.

3. The monetary and personnel costs of training are so high that it is wasteful to train men for a period of service less than 27 months.

4. It is doubtful that we can maintain our Armed Forces at the necessary strength of 3.5 million by a 21-month period of service.

5. A saving of \$709,000,000 in our defense budget would result if we had 27 months' service rather than 21 months due to the fact that a much larger training establishment is required to maintain a given strength for 21 months than in a 27-month period.

6. If we have a shorter period of service, we will have to have a larger total force in order to furnish training personnel and in order to keep our combat forces at the needed strength.

7. A 21-month period of service will not increase the reserves any more than will a 27-month period since in the long run all young men will participate in the program anyway.

8. A 21-month period of service limits the Armed Forces to training men for certain low technical jobs which require less training than others.

(a) We cannot wisely limit this high type of technical training only to the Regular forces since the Regular forces must be balanced. In addition to this, many of the Regular forces are not qualified for highly technical training and there are not enough of those who are qualified to meet the needs of a larger armed force.

(b) A 21-month period of service would result in the building of an unbalanced reserve of low-skilled individuals.

AGAINST 27 MONTHS

1. It is unfair to extend the term of service for reservists with prior service in World War II.

2. A student's education should not be interrupted for more than 2 years. A 27-month period of service will mean that 2½ to 3 years are lost.

THE NECESSITY FOR AN INTERIM PROGRAM FOR 75,000 STUDENTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY AND RESEARCH

The committee believes it is necessary for purposes of assuring our continued industrial and technical superiority in the face of any contingency to provide that an ample number of young men be permitted to complete their studies of subjects essential to the national security and welfare.

Under the present law, any person pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college, university, or similar institution of learning may have his induction postponed by his local board until the end of the current academic year or until he ceases satisfactorily to pursue such course of instruction. In addition, the President may provide for the deferment from training and service of any category or categories of students for such periods of time as he may deem appropriate.

This bill continues the basic policy contained in the present law, but provides an authority for deferment until the end of the academic year, instead of postponement, for students who receive their induction notices during the academic year. This applies to persons in the 18-to-19 age group as well as to those over 19. Under this bill, high-school students are deferred until they reach age 19, or graduate, or cease to pursue their course of instruction satisfactorily.

This bill, as stated, makes no change in the President's general authority to defer such categories of students as he deems the national interest dictates. It adds, however, a new provision which, until June 30, 1954, authorizes that 75,000 men annually may be removed from active training and service to permit them to engage in study or research in medicine, dentistry, osteopathy, the sciences, engineering, the humanities, or other fields. These men will be required to complete their basic military training before entering into their study or research program, except that, depending on the date of enactment of the bill into law, some change in this policy may be necessary for the first year. After completion of their studies, they would still have to discharge the obligation for completing their military service. This obligation would continue for a period of 10 years.

The 75,000 men would be selected upon the basis of competitive standards determined by a civilian commission of 5 persons, to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. If necessary, this commission could allocate the fields of study or research for these 75,000 who were selected, and, in addition, would have the power to authorize the payment of the tuition and other school expenses of such of the 75,000 persons as the commission may deem appropriate. This will enable a man selected as one of the 75,000 to pursue his education even though he is unable to pay his expenses himself.

The committee feels it is important to emphasize that this group of 75,000 students annually would by no means constitute the full

male enrollment in the Nation's colleges and universities. Estimates made by the Office of Education indicate that with this program in operation there might be, for the 1951-52 school year, 25,000 veterans, 26,000 IV-F's, and 90,000 ROTC's enrolled as freshmen, in addition to the 75,000 selected students. This would mean a total first-year class of at least 216,000 males, exclusive of those deferred under existing authority, and not counting women students, or those young men who are below the induction age. Over-all, total male enrollment—for all 4 years of college—would be at least 845,000 for the 1951-52 school year. It is estimated that at no time during the period of this program's operation between now and 1954 would the enrollment of male freshmen (not including those under age 18) decline below the 191,000 mark, and total male enrollment in college would not decline below 719,500—a minimum very close to the 1939 prewar figure.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROGRAM FOR 75,000 STUDENTS

The arguments listed below concern themselves with the educational issues which emerged during the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings.

Included are not only the contentions advanced by the witnesses who appeared, but also those presented by individuals and organizations who requested that their material be inserted in the record. There may be arguments other than those presented, but this study summarizes only those which appear in the record.

Not all arguments presented as opposing the Department of Defense proposals are directly in conflict with those proposals. Any time a variation of the proposals was presented, it was placed in the opposing column.

It will be noted that some witnesses are listed as both "for" and "against" the same measure. This is due to the fact that occasionally a witness would either point out arguments on the other side or would present evidence which could be interpreted as being a variation of the Department's proposals. All such arguments have been included for the purpose of securing a more balanced picture. Also, it should be carefully noted that not all of these extracts are in their full context. Every effort was made by the staff to present an accurate summary, and the committee hopes that no inaccuracies have crept in due to the need for condensing the wealth of material into the briefest possible space.

Not all of the material is in the nature of direct quotes. Frequently remarks from different parts of the record have been combined into one statement. Occasionally, in answer to a long question, a witness would say "Yes" or "No," or "I agree." In these instances the content of the question has been attributed to the witness. Care has been taken to see that no witness is quoted out of context to secure a meaning other than the one intended.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS OF 75,000 EDUCATIONAL DEFERMENTS

TESTIMONY FAVORING PROPOSALS

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

1. *Hon. George C. Marshall, Secretary, Department of Defense*

We recognize that there can be no long-range security for America in a program that denudes our industries and farms of skilled technicians or that interferes with our preeminence in science and general education. The proposed legislation contains specific safeguards intended to keep our colleges, laboratories, and industries healthy. . . .

2. *General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower*

(a) Senator JOHNSON. We have a proposal in this bill that provides that 75,000 of the boys taken in at 18 will have military training for 4 months and then on the basis of some test that has not been worked out as yet will be selected to pursue their studies in the sciences, medical schools, dental schools, engineering schools, and what not; and that figure was arrived at based upon recommendations made by a leading group of educators.

General EISENHOWER. I think it is wise myself.

(b) That 75,000, as I understand it, is really nothing but a stopgap in the first 2 years. After the first 2 years there is no diminution of the men that can go to the universities.

(c) I would certainly like to see you producing an officer and technical class as you go along. It has to be done, and there has to be a proper marriage between the universities of the United States . . . and the armed services. . . .

(d) I would say that unless there was some way in which military training was going to go ahead for the length of time and on an intensive scale that made it real military training, I would take him out of uniform (when he returns to college) and require him to do his military service later. . . .

3. *General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

(a) . . . a certain number ought to be deferred for the time being, otherwise you are going to interfere very materially not only with our educational institutions . . . you are going to interfere with the gradual flow of scientists and specialists that you need. If you do not make some such provision, you will have a 2-year gap here. After that . . . of course, these people will start going to school again at age 20 or 21. . . .

(b) . . . if you would visit Camp Jackson . . . you would find that only a small proportion of those (facilities) could be furnished around a college and an armory.

(c) . . . I do not say there is not some use that the college facilities could be put to, particularly in training specialists . . . if you are going to exercise the control over the men which we think is necessary . . . you cannot have them scattered around in bunches of houses or dormitories.

4. *Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service*

(a) I think the . . . 75,000 who are chosen out of each of the next 3-year groups plus, perhaps, a hundred thousand more . . . in the ROTC, will furnish a sizable base of people who will be engaged during this period in . . . college and postgraduate training. . . . The 75,000 was each year . . . after 3 years it will be 225,000.

(b) (I recommend) that the men chosen to be postponed for college be on the basis of general acceptance, to be determined competitively by appropriate tests, and their continued postponement be based on their performance as students. . . .

(c) It is impossible to institute a plan which would permit of deferments for the purpose of education unless there is assurance that the plan will be continued long enough for those receiving deferments also to meet their service obligations. otherwise a deferment becomes simply a means of evading service. . . .

(d) . . . who knows what we will need 10 years from now? So I have been converted to the belief that we should choose people on the basis of their competence rather than attempting to swerve young boys into courses that we at the moment think are highly necessary.

5. *Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations*

We concur in the principles and the details of the plan as it has been presented here.

6. *Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army*

I am thoroughly in accord with the legislation which is under consideration before your committee and with the principles that are involved in that legislation.

7. *Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force*

The Air Force strongly endorses and supports the program presented to you by the Department of Defense.

8. *Brig. Gen. H. C. Parks, United States Air Force*

We are accelerating our ROTC program and that will be reflected as part of this legislation . . . to give us approximately 11,300 graduates, ROTC graduates, available for new commissions. . . . That would utilize to a considerable extent the educational institutions.

9. *Hon. Anna M. Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary of Defense*

(a) If any man reaches the age of 18 and is in high school, he will remain there until he reaches his nineteenth birthday or finishes high school. If any man is in college at the time of his eighteenth birthday, he will be permitted to finish his college year.

(b) The Department of Defense has offered . . . a proposal for an expanded program of college training of young officers through the ROTC . . . improvement on present ROTC program, and an elaboration of subsidized program, known as the Holloway plan. . . . Students selected for the (Holloway) plan would have to serve an initial 4-month period of basic military training under universal program. Obligation of service would have to be fulfilled after graduation. . . . Upon completion of ROTC service, he owes 2 years, or 3 years if he is under a subsidized plan. . . . (In regard to whether we expect to give 4 months' training to ROTC men too)—it might be a waste of money to give 4 months' training to those men because during their period of college training in ROTC they will get far more than what they need or would get in those 4 months. . . .

(c) In the first 3 years of universal military service and training, the President would have authority to suspend temporarily active-service requirement of up to 75,000 students so they could complete college training, vocational training, and keep the educational pipeline from drying up. . . . (The Department recommends that 75,000 should be selected) on the basis that all the educators, scientists, and all the organizations working under Mr. Symington—the committees on the outside—told us that between sixty and seventy-five thousand would meet the needs for doctors, scientists, educators, and those of all other qualifications. . . . We took the maximum figure that the group of educators who felt must be given this training. . . . They said from 65,000 to 75,000, and that is why we put the maximum at 75,000.

(d) The 3-year limit on this provision is based on the belief colleges would be back on a stable footing after the first class of universal military service and training inductees completed service. . . . Every man 18 years old . . . will have to take 4 months' basic training.

(e) (This) maximum of 75,000 does not go into ROTC.

(f) Methods for selecting students to be deferred and for deciding courses of study that would be important to national interest should be left entirely in civilian hands under procedures to be drawn up by the President and approved by Congress.

(g) The only safeguard we ask for . . . is . . . that the proper share of men go into the land-grant colleges and into the smaller colleges.

(h) If their education is subsidized, which might have to be they owe additional time. . . . Men who can afford to go will get the number of years they require; men who cannot afford to go but who want to work their way through . . . may take 6 years instead of 4. (For) men who cannot work their way through and cannot afford it, we suggest some sort of national scholarship. . . .

(i) College training courses for military personnel on active duty . . . may involve as many as 50,000 men a year.

(j) There may be . . . 35,000 a year . . . in ROTC . . . and 75,000 (in the other group, plus) 50,000 in the service. (This gives a total of 160,000 per year.) . . . Plus those 18-year-olds who cannot be taken in even if you passed the law, the first time, plus those men who are in the schools now who would be continuing their deferment.

10. *Earl J. McGrath, Commissioner, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency*

(a) If we are facing an extended period of time in which substantially the whole number of physically fit college-age men will be eligible for induction, it is absolutely essential to the national interest that some device be worked out whereby we can assure a continuous flow of men in training for the occupations and professions without which the national strength and well-being are gravely impaired.

(b) . . . This general picture is one of difficulty, even of hardship, for many small colleges; but . . . drastic cuts in total enrollments for all colleges will not be the order of the day. . . . I am not making the argument here that these students should be retained in colleges to protect the colleges.

(c) At the undergraduate level, very careful consideration should be given before placing limitations on the student as to field of study. . . . A large proportion of undergraduate students do not have a specific field of interest at the age of entrance to college . . . as demonstrated by experience in the Second World War, we do not know which fields of study may emerge as critical as the war continues.

(d) . . . If the program were accelerated, you would put the 75,000 out each year for 3 years rather than 4, in which case you would have 225,000 in process at one time rather than 300,000.

11. *Hon. Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor*

(a) I agree with the provision that authorizes the President to enable 75,000 youngsters to carry on their schooling.

(b) I agree with retaining the present provisions of the Reserve Officers Training Corps.

(c) . . . Seventy-five thousand youngsters will be able to go on to college. Last September 86,000 men were admitted to college under the ROTC program. A continuation of both programs would result in the admission of about 150,000 yearly to college.

12. *Edward J. Overby, Assistant to the Secretary, Department of Agriculture*

This Department concurs in the policy of the proposed program for universal military training and service.

13. *Dr. Charles A. Thomas, chairman, Scientific Manpower Advisory Committee, National Security Resources Board*

(a) The committee . . . believes at present that the number 75,000 is about right for the Reserve Specialist Training Corps, as a military matter.

(b) Senator CHAPMAN. Under this plan, Doctor, when these 75,000 students are carefully selected, it is true, is it not, that a much smaller proportion of them would fall by the wayside, going on through their college course, than is ordinarily the case with freshmen entering college?

(c) Dr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, that is what the educational members of my committee tell me. That is true.

B. PROFESSIONAL, LABOR, AND FARM GROUPS

14. *Dr. M. H. Trytten, Director, Office of Scientific Personnel of the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council*

I am happy to see that the present bill recognized that these students should not be in military status.

15. *James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer, Congress of Industrial Organizations*

The CIO strongly endorses the principle that military requirements should not interfere with the flow of trained engineers, scientists, doctors, social scientists, and those trained in the humanities. . . .

C. EDUCATIONAL GROUPS

16. *Karl T. Compton, chairman of the corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

The plans which were submitted to you by the Department of Defense give, in my judgment, appropriate recognition to the continuing importance of education and to the role which the colleges can play.

17. *James P. Baxter III, president of Williams College and chairman of the committee on manpower of the Association of American Colleges*

(a) If this bill is adopted, there will be an opportunity to return to college after a man has had 2 years' training. Suppose he does not get in this group of 75,000 . . . suppose that he goes through with 2 years and 3 months, he will still have an opportunity to start in a lot of professional careers.

(b) . . . I feel strongly that educators should not urge you to defer students to complete their college work, unless those students are working on an accelerated program.

18. *Harold W. Dodds, president, Princeton University*

(a) . . . I do endorse heartily the proposals which have been submitted to you. . . . No other proposal that I have seen or been able to dream up myself provides the element of long-term durability which I think is necessary, with a minimum of possible violence to higher education and the lives of young men generally. . . .

(b) From the standpoint of the colleges, this would offer a larger freshman class than otherwise, which will be very advantageous to the colleges by helping to balance their enrollments between the upper and lower years of college. A further "phase" element is that the plan is not to call more than 450,000 18-year-olds during the first year. . . .

(c) . . . I am utterly opposed to the general deferment of young men in college who are not preparing in these special essential branches. To make college a haven of refuge for even the brightest students in these broader fields not immediately pointed to the defense effort would destroy their moral influence and capacities as future leaders of our democracy. To protect a young man from the necessity of national service just because he happens to be bright and scholarly inclined, as some have suggested, would be bad for him and destructive of his leadership possibilities.

19. *Detlev W. Bronk, president of Johns Hopkins University, president of the National Academy of Science, president-elect of the American Association for the Advancement of Science*

(a) . . . I am . . . in favor of the proposed program in the second instance, because it provides for furloughing or making possible the furloughing of 75,000 men, men for the ROTC, and 50,000 for in-service training. . . . There is a great need for trained men in the operation of the armed services at the present time.

(b) Whether they were in uniform or not in uniform, I cannot believe would make any particular difference to the universities, provided the universities had the opportunity to carry forward their educational program in the way in which they thought was most satisfactory.

20. *Ralph W. McDonald, National Education Association of the United States*

We strongly favor the provision suggested in section 6 (d) (1) that would authorize the selection of at least 75,000 young men annually for college study . . . The selected students should be free to enter accredited colleges and universities of their choice and pursue college programs of their choice in any of the recognized disciplines of American higher education.

21. *Dr. Leonard Carmichael, president of Tufts Medical and Dental Schools and member of the American Council on Education*

A plan should be developed by means of which a limited group of students, possibly 75,000 or more, should be referred back to colleges of their own choice, so far as possible, for full education, after completing their basic training of not more than 4 months in the Armed Forces. The testing and selection of this group should be done by competent, professionally trained civilians.

22. *William G. Saltonstall, principal, the Phillips Exeter Academy*

I favor the provisions in the bill for deferment of 75,000 men per year to engage in study or research in medicine, engineering, and the humanities.

23. *Leonard C. Smith, chancellor, Georgetown University*

. . . Members of the Armed Forces, upon application and after a proper test of their capabilities, should be permitted to enroll in a college of his choice to pursue his course of studies upon which he would receive college credits and degrees. The college can adopt an acceleration program which would permit graduation in approximately 2½ years.

24. *A. Gundlach, Berea College, Berea, Ky.*

. . . We, the general faculty of Berea College, urge the adoption of a plan for deferment of college students.

25. *F. G. Macomber, dean, School of Education, Miami University*

. . . immediately after reaching the age of 18 . . . men shall be inducted into the military, classified . . . tested for intellectual capacity, and then assigned, if qualified and requested, to the cooperative educational program. . . . Such men would be subject to a basic military training program of 3 months and conducted at a regular military camp or station during the first year following his eighteenth birthday.

26. *Association of American Universities*

(a) That from among those who have completed 1 year's service the Armed Forces may select candidates to pursue Reserve Officers Training Corps courses, on condition that they be obligated to serve an additional 2 years upon completion or termination of such courses.

(b) . . . An appropriate percentage of inductees shall be designated as eligible to suspend their military service to take specialized training for professions and trades essential to the military needs of the Nation.

27. *Association of American Colleges*

. . . We recommend that after basic training a substantial number of properly qualified young men be furloughed to colleges of their choice for further education in all areas of learning before completing their required military service. . . . Special consideration should be given to a Federal scholarship or loan program.

28. *Raymond F. McClain, president, Transylvania College*

Transylvania College supports resolution of the Association of American Colleges bearing on manpower situation.

29. *Association of Colleges and Universities of the State of New York*

. . . Applicants for post high school training and education might well be required to meet certain standards imposed by a national test, as well as the admission requirements of accredited institutions.

D. VETERANS ORGANIZATIONS

30. *Col. Edwin S. Bettelheim, Military Order of World Wars*

. . . We are in favor unanimously of this bill.

31. *Harold Russell, National Commander, AMVETS*

. . . There is a basic need for the 4 months training, and . . . afterward the men should be submitted for training in the arts and sciences.

32. *Bernard Weitzer, national legislative director, Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America*

We strongly support the provision for deferment of 75,000 persons annually to engage in study or research.

33. *Omar B. Ketchum, legislative director, Veterans of Foreign Wars*

. . . A reasonable number of carefully selected students in medicine and the sciences should be given deferments. . . . It is not anticipated that more than 75,000 to 80,000 young men would be deferred yearly on those grounds. . . .

E. OTHER GROUPS

34. *Dr. Vannevar Bush, Committee on the Present Danger*

(a) In the transition period, in order to keep a proper flow of scientific and technical men, I feel we have to compromise and send some men directly without camp training for that purpose. . . . I feel sure—I think 75,000 . . . covers it. I hope . . . it is less. . . .

(b) My personal opinion is we should not attempt to put these fellows in uniform or that we should give any Federal subsidy for their education.

35. *Dunlap C. Clark, United States Chamber of Commerce*

The President should be authorized to release from active service, after basic training, 75,000 inductees per year to permit them to study or conduct research in medicine, science, engineering, and allied fields, subject to later military

service. . . . College students in Reserve Officers Training Corps and similar units should be deferred if they agree to accept a commission upon completion of the course. . . .

36. *Gilbert F. White, Friends Committee on National Legislation*

Congress must specifically direct that institutions receiving such students be completely free of direct or indirect supervision by military authorities.

37. *Arthur L. Williston, Citizens Committee for Universal Military Training*

I am very definitely and unqualifiedly in favor of every feature of this bill. I think it is the most intelligent, comprehensive and valuable contribution that has been made to the people by Congress at any time. . . . No school or college that I know of claims to, even in two of its first years, offer training equal or comparable to the scientific foundation and training that the Army can furnish youth of special talent in 1 year, for example, in radar, aeronautics, . . . or a score of other branches.

TESTIMONY OPPOSING PROPOSALS

Actually none of the witnesses were opposed to the basic idea of assuring a flow of students into educational institutions in the fields of science, engineering, medicine, and allied fields. The only differences being as to numbers and methods of accomplishing this.

A. PROFESSIONAL, LABOR, AND FARM GROUPS

1. *Clarence E. Davies, secretary, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, director of program of the Engineering Manpower Commission of the Engineers Joint Council*

There is a present annual need of a minimum of 50,000 freshmen engineering students. . . . the provision in the bill by which a maximum of 75,000 persons to be selected annually for study or research in medicine, the sciences, engineering, the humanities, and other fields would appear to be inadequate.

2. *Paul H. Robbins, executive director, National Society of Professional Engineers*

(a) A proposal to restrict by law over a 3-year period the number of persons who can be released for study to 75,000 or for that matter, to any specific figure is of dubious wisdom.

(b) Fifty thousand of this year's engineering graduates have been absorbed into either Government or private employment . . . this number of graduates has proved far from sufficient for the country's needs.

(c) . . . the number of engineers needed in the next several years has been conservatively placed at a minimum of 30,000 graduates per year . . . nearly double this number will have to enter the freshman engineering classes to produce such a figure . . . nearly all the 75,000 students temporarily exempted under this bill would have to turn to engineering rather than to any other equally vital profession for the graduating classes 4 years hence to meet the conservatively estimated requirement of 30,000 engineers.

3. *Dr. M. R. Trytten, director, Office of Scientific Personnel of the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council*

I am uneasy about the upper limit of 75,000. It must be recognized that this number will not yield a graduating class 4 years later of 75,000, but a number somewhat smaller than this due to attrition of one kind or another. The eventual number of graduates may be as low as 50,000 . . . 75,000 must serve all needs, including the health fields, the healing arts, the sciences, and all other fields of training.

4. *Stockton Kimball, chairman of the Joint Committee on Medical Education in Time of National Emergency*

To supply the students needed by the medical schools alone will require that at least 10,000 to 12,000 men enter college each year. . . . We understand that last year 50,000 engineers were graduated and were immediately employed. Thus the 75,000 would barely take care of the Nation's needs in just these two areas.

5. *Dr. Harvey Stone, Johns Hopkins, member of the Council on Medical Education*

(a) . . . the provision of this obligatory 4-month period of basic training seems to me to have a good many objections to it. In the first place, how valuable is

that training going to be when the man becomes a commissioned officer 5 or 6 years later. Certainly any immediate benefit in the way of physical hardening is gone. . . . It is an expensive provision. . . . It costs about \$120 to just outfit and equip a man with his uniform, etc. . . . You keep him for 4 months in this highly questionable training and you keep 75,000 of them, according to this bill, in that program—you are just wasting several million dollars quite unnecessarily.

(b) I think (that 75,000) is quite inadequate from all I can understand about it, and I believe that any specific number written in would be a mistake.

6. *Dr. Rudolph H. Friedrich, American Dental Association*

The Council on Dental Education of the Association estimates it is necessary to provide an annual reservoir of about 5,000 students from which to select the entering dental class. . . . All of the dental schools in the country can admit a freshman class of 3,200. From this number about 2,800 will be graduated. . . . If 5,000 or 6½ percent of the 75,000 proposed withdrawals will be required to fill the dental schools alone, considering the needs of all the other educational groups also, this number should be expanded or a more definite policy of deferment should be followed.

B. EDUCATIONAL GROUPS

7. *John Scott Everton, president, Kalamazoo College*

(a) I question seriously whether the allocation of such a meager number annually will adequately provide the trained manpower to meet the critical needs of this Nation including its international commitments in the years ahead . . . no Nation will remain strong that does not make adequate provision for leadership of all types—political, economic, religious, scientific, and in other fields of endeavor.

(b) Seventy-five thousand men is completely unrealistic and inadequate. . . . Distributed among the universities and colleges of the country, it would average out to less than 100 men in each of our institutions.

(c) Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, you think 75,000 ought to be a minimum and the more realistic figure would be 150,000?

Mr. EVERTON. That is correct.

(d) Is there much to be gained on insisting on a period of basic training before releasing them for their period of study in the colleges and universities?

8. *E. H. Hopkins, Vice President, Washington State College*

(a) . . . The deferment of 60,000 to 80,000 college students from military training and immediate duty would be seriously insufficient to meet present and future needs for trained specialists and leaders of whom there is a genuine shortage even at the present time. . . .

(b) . . . If the number of male college students were reduced to that number, the plan would, over the next few years, break the backs of a tremendously large number of our well-established and reputable colleges and universities. . . .

9. *Ralph W. McDonald, National Educational Association*

(a) . . . A 4-month period of basic training would be largely wasted upon a young man who would not enter into active military service until years afterward.

(b) Senator MORSE. Do you think I would be wrong, Mr. McDonald, if I said we could take judicial notice of the fact that a proposed 75,000 group would not begin to suffice in meeting those needs?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes. Perfectly obvious.

10. *W. R. White, President, Baylor University*

(a) . . . a plan which will coordinate the resources of our colleges and universities and the needs of our military services with the least possible injury to our youth, educational institutions, and social order would be most desirable.

(b) As far as the 75,000, I would increase it . . . I think the figure you used a moment ago. Make that as a minimum and then set your maximum higher, one hundred twenty-five or one hundred fifty thousand.

11. *J. S. Nicholas, Director, Osborn Zoological Laboratory, Yale University*

(a) . . . Up to 75,000 students now in college may have service postponed to varying degrees but entirely at the discretion of the President. To take care of minimum military needs this is totally inadequate.

(b) . . . ; the enrollment in engineering alone should be in the range of one hundred fifty to two hundred thousand men allowing only 20 percent increase for military needs. . . .

In addition to this, there must be provided manpower for the supply of chemists, physicists, mathematicians, geologists, biologists, and other specialists.

(c) The dangerous minimum of 320,000 is needed for technical and specialized training alone.

12. Charles E. Odegaard, *Executive Director, American Council of Learned Societies*

I question only the wisdom of establishing by law a fixed ceiling of 75,000 men annually. . . . It would seem wiser to remove the ceiling, leaving the exact figure entirely to administrative determination, or providing if anything a minimum rather than a maximum.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON EDUCATIONAL DEFERMENTS

FAVORING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROPOSALS

1. In view of our military needs, we cannot afford to defer more than 75,000 students each year.

2. In addition to the deferment of 75,000 freshmen each year, the ROTC programs will be accelerated so that as many as 90,000 each year will attend school under Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC programs. Also, as many as 50,000 men from the Armed Forces may be sent to school each year.

3. Students in high school and college will be permitted to finish their school year before they are inducted.

4. The total number of graduates from colleges and universities will not be drastically cut due to the fact that the 75,000 students will be selected by a highly selective test which will result in a much smaller proportion of young men being dismissed from college for scholastic reasons.

5. Men cannot be adequately trained at colleges since the necessary military facilities and supervision will be absent.

6. The 3-year limit on the program of deferment is justified by the fact that after 3 years the first group inducted will be returning to school.

OPPOSED TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROPOSALS

1. There is a need to defer far more than 75,000 men per year.

(a) Far more than 75,000 must enter as freshmen each year in order to secure 75,000 graduates 4 years later.

(b) 5,000 premedical students, 4,000 pharmacy students, 10,000 premedical students, and 100,000 engineering students must enter college each year to secure the necessary graduating class to meet our national needs. This totals 119,000 entering students per year without taking into account the other necessary groups.

2. The proposed student deferment should be made permanent rather than for only 3 years.

3. The 4-month period of training to be given prior to education is wasteful in time and money since the training can be of little value to men who would not use such training for 3 or 4 years.

4. If no more than 75,000 are deferred yearly, a large number of our well-established and reputable colleges and universities will be broken.

COLLEGE ENROLLMENTS

Table I shows the estimated number of students that would be enrolled in each class in college in the years 1951 to 1954, inclusive, on the basis of no blanket deferments for any class and the inclusion of 75,000 trainees per year. For purposes of comparison, table II is enclosed. The second table is identical with table I, except that it adds estimates of the number of students that would be enrolled if all persons presently eligible to be drafted from this year's junior and sophomore classes were deferred, and one-half of those eligible for induction from this year's freshman class were to be deferred.

TABLE I.—*Tentative projection of number of full-time male undergraduates in each college class (freshman-senior), on the basis of no blanket deferments, 1951-54*¹

[Federal Security Agency, Office of Education, Research and Statistical Service, Feb. 7, 1951]

Year	Component	Freshmen	Sophomores	Juniors	Seniors	Total full-time male undergraduates	4-year male college graduates
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1950-51	Veterans of World War II.....	58,000	100,000	125,000	140,000	-----	-----
	IV-F's.....	25,000	15,000	10,000	15,000	-----	-----
	ROTC.....	65,000	52,000	44,000	40,000	-----	-----
	Total.....	148,000	167,000	179,000	195,000	689,000	187,400
1951-52	Veterans of World War II.....	25,000	46,400	88,000	119,000	-----	-----
	IV-F's.....	26,000	17,500	12,000	9,300	-----	-----
	75,000 selected.....	75,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	ROTC.....	90,000	58,500	50,700	42,900	-----	-----
	Total.....	216,000	122,400	150,700	171,200	660,300	166,100
1952-53	Veterans of World War II.....	-----	20,000	40,800	83,600	-----	-----
	IV-F's.....	26,000	18,200	14,000	11,200	-----	-----
	75,000 selected.....	75,000	67,500	-----	-----	-----	-----
	ROTC.....	90,000	81,000	57,000	49,400	-----	-----
	Total.....	191,000	186,700	111,800	144,200	633,700	140,100
1953-54	Veterans of World War II.....	-----	-----	17,600	38,800	-----	-----
	IV-F's.....	27,000	18,200	14,600	13,000	-----	-----
	75,000 selected.....	75,000	67,500	65,800	-----	-----	-----
	ROTC.....	90,000	81,000	79,000	77,000	-----	-----
	Total.....	192,000	166,700	177,000	128,800	664,500	125,200

¹ The figures above do not include any estimate of the number of returning servicemen who may go to college after completion of their term of duty. Estimates for this group are very difficult to make; but it is not anticipated that this group will be of much numerical importance until the academic year 1954-55.

TABLE II.—*Tentative projection of number of full-time male undergraduates in each college class (freshman-senior), classified according to draft status, 1951-54*¹

[Federal Security Agency, Office of Education, Research and Statistical Service, Feb. 7, 1951]

Year	Component	Freshmen	Sophomores	Juniors	Seniors	Total full-time male undergraduates	4-year male college graduates
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1950-51	Veterans of World War II.....	53,000	100,000	125,000	140,000	689,000	-----
	IV-F's.....	25,000	15,000	10,000	15,000		
	ROTC.....	65,000	52,000	44,000	40,000	370,000	-----
	Draft-eligible.....	148,000	87,000	44,000	91,000		
	Total.....	296,000	254,000	223,000	286,000	1,059,000	274,700
1951-52	Veterans of World War II.....	25,000	46,400	88,000	119,000	660,300	-----
	IV-F's.....	26,000	17,500	12,000	9,300		
	75,000 selected.....	75,000	-----	-----	-----	184,500	-----
	ROTC.....	90,000	53,500	50,700	42,900		
	Draft-eligible.....	-----	74,000	69,600	40,900	184,500	-----
	Total.....	216,000	196,400	220,300	212,100	844,800	205,300
1952-53	Veterans of World War II.....	-----	20,000	40,800	83,600	633,700	-----
	IV-F's.....	26,000	18,200	14,000	11,200		
	75,000 selected.....	75,000	67,500	-----	-----	123,900	-----
	ROTC.....	90,000	81,000	57,000	49,400		
	Draft-eligible.....	-----	-----	59,200	64,700	123,900	-----
	Total.....	191,000	186,700	171,000	208,900	757,600	202,200
1953-54	Veterans of World War II.....	-----	-----	17,600	38,800	664,500	-----
	IV-F's.....	27,000	18,200	14,600	13,000		
	75,000 selected.....	75,000	67,500	65,800	-----	55,000	-----
	ROTC.....	90,000	81,000	79,000	77,000		
	Draft-eligible.....	-----	-----	-----	55,000	55,000	-----
	Total.....	192,000	166,700	177,000	183,800	719,500	178,000

¹ The figures above do not include any estimate of the number of returning servicemen who may go to college after completion of their term of duty. Estimates for this group are very difficult to make; but it is not anticipated that this group will be of much numerical importance until the academic year 1954-55.

EFFECT ON ROTC PROGRAMS

Under this bill, a person selected for enrollment or continuance in a college ROTC or similar program, and who agrees in writing to accept a commission, if tendered, to serve not less than 2 years on active duty, and to remain a member of a Regular or Reserve component until the eighth anniversary of receipt of a commission (less period of active service), may be deferred from induction for training and service until after completion of the course of instruction, providing that he has completed a period of training equivalent to that given in basic training, and so long as he continues in a Regular or Reserve status upon being commissioned. In addition, the bill would affirmatively authorize establishment of officer candidate training programs so as to afford personnel who are not selected for one of the other available programs an opportunity for attaining commissioned status while on active duty.

The proposed bill would enlarge the present ROTC exemption to include Midshipmen, Merchant Marine Reserve, United States Naval Reserve, and Cadets, United States Coast Guard Academy, as well as students enrolled in an officer procurement program at military colleges, the curriculum of which is approved by the Secretary of Defense.

This bill does not in any way curtail or restrict the present ROTC programs. In fact, the Department of Defense anticipates that the annual entering class of ROTC students will be increased from the present total of about 70,000 to 90,000 by the school year 1951-52.

INTEGRATION OF MILITARY TRAINING WITH THE NATION'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

It is the belief of the committee that the program, as outlined, represents the maximum proper integration of military training with the Nation's educational system. The committee does not feel that the Nation's institutions of higher learning should be transformed into military training camps. In an enforced marriage of military discipline and academic freedom, it is unlikely that the freedom of the classroom would long survive. Relying upon our colleges and universities to train the men now needed for our Nation's defense would be uneconomical, inefficient, and ultimately costly to the Nation's intellectual progress.

THE NECESSITY FOR UNIVERSAL TRAINING AND SERVICE

The committee believes there is a clear necessity for a program of universal military training and service.

It is the committee's particular belief that the necessity for defending this Nation is not an obligation to be fulfilled by only a select few of the Nation's young men. The duty of bearing arms in defense of the Nation is a universal duty. Therefore, we believe that universality, not selectivity, should be the basis of the assignment for military duty.

The urgencies of the present moment are such that it is not feasible totally to adopt the principle of universality. Because we have not had a reservoir of men trained either for military duty or duty in civilian occupations which was considered adequate for maintaining our all-important productive superiority, a certain degree of selectivity has been necessary. For example, to safeguard the Nation against exhaustion of the supply of doctors, it has been necessary to provide broad authority for local boards to defer men now training to be doctors, so that they may complete their medical training.

In no instance, however, does the bill permit individuals or groups totally to escape the obligation for military service. Those men who enter the college training program, for example, must complete basic training before or during their college training. Upon completion of their college training, these men are still obligated to complete the full term of military service required of all young men inducted.

There is no sanction or opportunity for "draft dodging" in the provisions of this bill.

Eventually, as the needs of the moment are met, the committee feels that it should be the policy of the Nation to apply the requirement for military training service on a strictly universal, impartial basis of age. For this purpose, the bill provides that when the interest of national security permits, a program of universal military training and service should be instituted. This will assure us of a constant reservoir of trained men for our Reserve forces.

The penalty and jeopardy of peace-loving nations is that the potential aggressor always holds the advantage of the initiative. Thus,

the United States must mount its defenses on a basis that will find us equally strong whether the show-down comes this year or 20 years from now. The only way we can maintain a military posture of the kind that is required without a huge standing army and a ruinous drain on our economy is by revitalizing our National Guard and the Reserve components. Universal military training and service will assure a steady flow of trained young men into the National Guard and Reserve components and thus make possible the enduring strength we need, with minimum dissipation of our productive energies.

This will have the effect of preserving our civilian institutions by keeping our economy healthy, allowing greater orderliness in our planning of education, science, industry, and agriculture, while holding our professional Military Establishment to the smallest number consistent with our national security needs. It will have the further effect of permitting a rapid expansion of our active strength in a sudden emergency through the recall of trained reservists to military duty, rather than relying on inductions of large numbers of completely untrained men.

The knowledge that our defenses would be in a state of constant alert, and that the cost of the total program would be within our capacity to support, would be a major deterrent to further aggression on the part of our potential and present enemies. The removal of any basis for doubt of our intention to remain strong would be a potent spur toward peace in the world.

Because universal military training and service is democratic in concept and democratic in application, it is necessary that the fullest practicable measure of civilian interest and guidance be provided in the administration of the program. To this end, the bill provides, effective at such time as the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, finds that such order is justified by the strength of the Armed Forces in the light of international conditions, that the President may issue an Executive order which will eliminate all periods of active service but will retain the requirement for initial basic military training. At, or somewhat prior to, that time, the President is authorized to establish a National Security Training Commission. The manner in which the Congress retains its control over the adjustment or shortening of the periods of training or service is discussed in section (m) of the section-by-section analysis.

This Commission, which will be composed of five persons to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, will consist of three civilians and two active or retired members of the Regular components of the Armed Forces. This will assure that the universal training program will be under predominantly civilian control and supervision.

The National Security Training Commission will, subject to the direction of the President, establish policies and standards with respect to the conduct of initial basic military training (including the moral, religious, recreational, informational, and educational phase of such training). It will also, subject to the direction of the President, designate the Federal departments and agencies which will carry out such training, and all departments and agencies so designated are required to carry out such training in accordance with the policies and standards prescribed by the Commission. Men who, at the time the universal training program goes into effect, have not attained

their nineteenth birthday, and are not members of the Armed Forces, shall be liable for basic military training for a period of not less than 4 months and not more than 6 months. The committee considered including details as to the term of service, salary, and other refinements relating to the Commissioners. However, due to the fact that the Commission probably will not be appointed for a number of years, due to the further fact that some of the members of the Commission may be retired military personnel subject to the dual compensation status, and due also to the fact that future salary scales are difficult to predict, the committee felt that these problems should be solved administratively, or by supplementary legislation.

The bill also provides for the establishment of different pay schedules for men inducted under the military-training program in the post-emergency period, as against those that would prevail now. Because all enlistees and all inductees are at the present time and will in the immediate future be sharing the same barracks, training assignments, and doing the same service, they should receive the same pay. Any discrimination in compensation would be impossible to justify under these circumstances.

However, when the program becomes purely one of training, with no obligation for active service, after the training, the bill provides that the monthly rate of pay for trainees may be cut to \$30. This would mean substantial economies in the operating cost of the program for a nonemergency period. The dependents of trainees will receive the same benefits as the dependents of persons in the lowest enlisted pay grade.

The committee believes it is pertinent to observe that a planned, organized, orderly universal training and service program can provide infinitely superior protection for the character and welfare of our young men than conditions prevailing in periods of hurried mobilization. It is better to have our young men trained under a program dedicated and organized to the express purpose of considering their youth and welfare, than to throw them into the military service during periods of emergency when no well-planned consideration can properly be given to any demand other than that of transforming the men rapidly into qualified soldiers as rapidly as possible.

THE NECESSITY FOR OBLIGATORY RESERVE SERVICE

The committee believes that it is necessary to require that service in the Reserves be obligatory for men who have completed their regular training and service.

To realize fully the benefits of universal military training and service, it is necessary to retain a commitment on the services of the young men who receive that training. Furthermore, it is wasteful to the national strength to maintain a Reserve force only at the whim and preference of individuals.

Essentially, the requirements of national strength are twofold: (1) A minimum armed force in being, and (2) a maximum Reserve force in a state of readiness. The larger and more effective our Reserve force, the smaller we can permit our standing force to become. It is in the interest of our national economy to assure a large and effective Reserve at all times.

Under this bill, persons inducted into the armed force for 26 months would be required to serve in the Reserve for a period of approximately

6 years after completion of their tour of active duty. This time requirement could be reduced by service in the National Guard or in other organized units of the Reserve components.

It will be noted that under the 1948 act if a member of the Reserve serves in an organized unit, he can reduce his Reserve service to 3 years. In the unorganized Reserve, he is obliged to serve 5 years. The present bill is so written as to permit the President to reduce the period of Reserve service based upon the degree of participation in the Reserve activities, thus accomplishing the objectives of the 1948 act, but allowing a much greater degree of flexibility in meeting the requirements of special programs.

The committee recognizes that our Reserve program since World War II has not been adequate or realistic. We have requested that the necessary corrective action be taken and have received assurances that a new program is being prepared by the Department of Defense and will be submitted in the near future.

THE NECESSITY FOR MAINTAINING NATIONAL GUARD STRENGTH

The committee believes that it is necessary for the national security to maintain an adequate strength for the National Guard.

Section 1 (d) of the Selective Service Act of 1948 contained a congressional declaration to the effect that it is essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard, both ground and air, as an integral part of the first line of defenses of this Nation be at all times maintained and assured. The Department of Defense favors retention of this declaration in the present law. The committee agrees that this national policy should be continued.

The act of 1948 contained two provisions which, in effect, permitted special deferments for National Guard groups. The first was a provision which exempted from training and service under the Selective Service Act persons who on June 24, 1948, were members of organized units of the Reserve components, including the National Guard and the Air National Guard. No change is made in this provision, except to change the date to February 1, 1951.

An additional provision in the 1948 act provided that in those cases in which the governor of any State determined, and issued a proclamation to such effect, that the authorized strength of any organized unit of the National Guard of his State could not be maintained by the enlistment or appointment of persons not liable for induction under the Selective Service Act, individuals who had not yet reached the age of 18 years and 6 months could by enlisting or accepting appointments in the organized units of the National Guard or Air National Guard of that State be deferred from training or service under the Selective Service Act so long as they continued to serve satisfactorily as members of such unit. The Department of Defense recommended this provision apply only to those already in the guard, and not to those under 18½ who might come in after passage of the bill. The National Guard, however, earnestly urged that it was essential to its continued existence that it be permitted to accept men under 18½ years old until such time as the Secretary of Defense found that adequate numbers of trained personnel were available to enable the guard to maintain its authorized strength.

The committee feels that the best interests of the country, and of the National Guard as well, will be served by permitting the guard to maintain its authorized appropriated strength at all times. Accordingly this legislation allows the guard to accept men under 18½, who have not received induction orders, until the Secretary of Defense makes the finding that the guard's authorized appropriated strength can be maintained from the pool of available trained personnel.

VII. DISCUSSION OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE BILL

CALL OF RESERVE AND RETIRED PERSONNEL TO ACTIVE DUTY

The Selective Service Act of 1948, as amended by Public Law 599, Eighty-first Congress, authorizes the President, until July 9, 1951, to order, with or without their consent, members of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces, and retired personnel of the Regular Armed Forces, into the active military or naval service, for periods of not to exceed 21 months.

The Department of Defense recommended that this authority be extended to June 30, 1953, and be amended to provide for a longer period of service instead of the present 21-month period. In addition, it was recommended by the Department of Defense that the present authority to induct physicians, dentists, and allied specialists, which authority expires July 9, 1951, be extended to June 30, 1953. The committee approves these proposals as incorporated in the bill.

Military representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps unanimously testified that the 21-month period is inadequate for the needs of the service under present-day conditions. In calling Reserves and retired personnel to active duty, the period of service must be long enough to provide efficient use of such personnel. The committee believes that present exigencies require that this recommendation of the Department should be accepted.

APPORTIONMENT OF VARIOUS PHYSICAL AND MENTAL PROFILES AMONG THE SERVICES

Under the present law, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to prescribe standards for determining physical and mental fitness of persons inducted. However, a certain latitude is afforded the various services, in that the inductee must, in addition, be acceptable to that particular service. The bill is so worded as to place this responsibility more clearly in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has assured the committee that he intended to impose a firm requirement that each service receive a fair share of the various physical and mental profiles secured by enlistment as well as induction. This would insure a balanced distribution among the Army, Navy, and Air Force of men with the qualities needed for leadership and for maximum combat effectiveness. The committee has, in reliance upon such assurance, not inserted such requirements into the bill. We will, however, watch with interest the development and operation of these proposed directives.

EXTENSION OF ENLISTMENTS

Public Law 624, Eighty-first Congress, provides that until July 9, 1951, the President is authorized to extend all enlistments in any component of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps for a period not to exceed 12 months. That law was approved July 27, 1950, as an emergency measure to prevent a reduction of our Armed Forces as a result of termination of enlistments at a time when an expansion of the Armed Forces was necessary.

Authority further to extend enlistments is as urgently needed today as it was when Public Law 624 was enacted. It is essential that the Armed Forces retain as many of its experienced personnel as is possible during this current emergency period of rebuilding the military forces. This action has the effect of adding an equivalent of 84,000 men to the manpower pool in fiscal 1953 and of 63,000 in fiscal 1954.

The bill provides that the authority of the President to extend enlistments under Public Law 624 be continued until June 30, 1953, together with the proviso that no person shall have his period of enlistment extended for more than 1 year. In the absence of a further deterioration of world conditions, it is considered fair and equitable that the enlistee not be subject to involuntary extension of his enlistment for more than 1 year.

ENLISTMENT OF ALIENS IN THE REGULAR ARMY

The bill contains a provision increasing to a maximum of 25,000 a year for a period of 5 years, the number of aliens who may be accepted for 5-year enlistments or reenlistments in the Regular Army. This is an amendment of Public Law 597, Eighty-first Congress, which establishes a ceiling of 2,500 for alien enlistments or reenlistments.

Responsible congressional, civilian, and military witnesses testified that aliens of a type who would be of great value to our services are available, and are anxious to enlist. The screening processes required under the present law are most meticulous. Also, the enlistment term is 5 years. As a consequence, the committee agrees that every advantage should be taken of this pool of potential manpower.

To insure that this provision is not regarded as a substitute for our own responsibilities and efforts, this portion has been written as a separate title of the bill.

VIII. ADMINISTRATION RECOMMENDATIONS

The administration recommendation submitted by the Department of Defense was revised by the committee in several respects. The most significant are the following:

Lower the registration age from 18 to 17—not adopted by the committee.

Permit the induction of 18-year-olds for service without first utilizing the 19-26 pool available to the local board concerned—not adopted by the committee.

Civilian control of the military training program—changed by the committee to conform to the concept of the Compton Commission.

Selection of the 75,000 students authorized for special study and research—clarified by the committee by providing that selection be made by a commission appointed as prescribed in the bill, and on a competitive basis.

The program for the rehabilitation of certain of those young men who are not now physically qualified to enter the Armed Forces was not adopted by the committee due to the fact that no adequate plan was presented by the Department of Defense or the Administration.

The letter of the Secretary of Defense to the chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee, dated January 17, 1951, is hereby made a part of this report.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, January 17, 1951.

HON. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
*Chairman, Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee,
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate.*

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to provide for the common defense and security of the United States and to permit the more effective utilization of manpower resources of the United States by authorizing universal military service and training, and for other purposes.

This bill would establish a program of universal military service and training; it would lower the minimum age for induction into the armed services from 19 years to 18; it would extend the period of service for those inducted from 21 months to 27, and it would add 1 year to the enlistment period of all men whose original enlistments were scheduled to expire during fiscal years 1952 or 1953.

This is the principal proposal in the Department of Defense legislative program for 1951. The principles embodied in this legislation have the approval of the President, the Bureau of the Budget, the Director of Selective Service, and all the civilian agencies concerned with manpower problems. Its prompt enactment by the Congress is urged by the Secretary of Defense and the civilian and military heads of all the Armed Forces.

Purpose of the legislation:

In the judgment of the Department of Defense, this bill represents the best way to meet our immediate need for expanded fighting forces and, at the same time, provide an enduring base for our military strength. Any program that fails to accomplish both these objectives, at a cost we can support, will be inadequate to guarantee our own security or to contribute to the establishment of lasting peace.

We are confronted with a world situation of such gravity and such unpredictability that we must be prepared for effective action, whether the challenge comes with the speed of sound or is delayed for a lifetime. To continue to put our reliance on our forces in being without making provision for a dependable civilian reserve of trained military manpower would put a crushing burden on the productive economy that is the basis of our national strength.

What we need, and what this bill would provide, is the assurance that we would be able to build up our combat forces with all possible speed and that we would be able to maintain whatever strength might be needed for as long as might be necessary to insure world peace. Through the authorization of a permanent system of universal military service and training, we could achieve these ends with minimum cost in men and money and with the least necessary dislocation of industry, agriculture, education, and family life.

The bill would make it the national obligation of all physically fit young men reaching the age of 18 to undergo military service and training and to follow that service with a specified term of duty in a Reserve component. The obligation to serve would be universal, but care would be taken in the first years of the program not to bring in 18-year-olds so rapidly that they could not make a useful contribution to our immediate military strength. As part of this orderly introduction of universal military service and training, effort would be made to confine initial calls to those closest to their nineteenth birthday. This would insure the greatest fairness in the way we put the plan into operation.

Under the bill, moreover, no youth under the age of 19 could be sent overseas with less than 4 months of training. This would virtually rule out, except in a dire emergency, the probability that any young man brought into service in the early years of this program would go into a combat area before he was 19. How-

ever, it is our strong fear that writing into the law a specific prohibition against sending men out of the United States before their nineteenth birthday would cripple the services in meeting a sudden, ruthless, and violent action by our possible enemy.

Experience in both World Wars has shown that men of 18 are among our bravest and best fighters; they have a strength and spirit that is both a support and an inspiration to their comrades-in-arms. But if they are to make their full contribution to our defense efforts, we must make certain that they receive adequate training and that they then be allowed to take their rightful place as a mainstay of our fighting forces, to the extent that the national interest requires.

In the present period of urgent need for enlarging our combat potential, those who were brought into the universal military service and training program would serve for a total period of 27 months, of which at least 4 would be devoted to training. As soon as the need abated, the President would have the right to cut down the service requirement and eventually to eliminate everything, except training. There would remain at all times an obligation that these young men reaching 18 devote from 4 to 6 months to training so they could be fitted into Reserve units and thus give us a durable layer of military protection that would survive the alternate moods of public alarm or complacency.

The suggestion that the term of service and training be longer than the present selective-service period of 21 months is based on the unanimous opinion of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps that 27 months is the shortest period of service that is consistent with national security in this period when so much of our effort and our personnel must be devoted to the training of men entering military duty for the first time.

It takes so long and requires such an outlay in both funds and training personnel to impart the basic military skills required in our highly mechanized military forces that the release of men in less than 27 months at this crucial stage of world history represents a major element of military weakness. The proposal that the total term of service be 27 months would apply not only to those coming in under universal military service and training, but also to those under selective service. Under the present 21-month term, men return to civilian life just at the point when their military usefulness becomes greatest. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, has estimated that we would gain nearly 50 percent in practical utility by the extra 6 months of service we recommend.

We recognize that 6 months is a long time in the lives of our young men. We make this recommendation for longer service only because we believe it is imperative to the attainment of the combat readiness we need in the tense months and years that lie ahead.

It is the recognition that our plans must be as dependable over the long haul as they are in the next year or two that makes the Department of Defense so emphatic in its belief that universal military service and training should be enacted without delay. We do not contend that there is no other way to meet the immediate manpower goals of the armed services, but we do insist that there is no other method that answers our immediate and our long-term needs with the same degree of certainty, the same economy, and the same regard for the total needs of our country, both civilian and military.

Since Washington first tried to win congressional approval for a program of universal training 150 years ago, our military effectiveness has been hampered and our survival as a Nation imperiled by the lack of trained reserves. Our desire for peace has caused us to throw aside our military strength before peace was secure, and the result has been to encourage aggression and war on the part of our potential enemies.

Universal military service and training represents the most effective, economical, and democratic answer to this problem. It avoids the necessity for maintaining over the years a large standing Army, Navy, and Air Force and thus contributes not only to a Military Establishment that is within our capacity to sustain but also keeps intact our American tradition of holding the professional military forces to the lowest level compatible with our security.

This is the time to give convincing proof both to those who hate us and those who look to us as a citadel of liberty that we have adopted a military posture that we can and will maintain for as long as it may be needed, on a basis that guarantees equality of sacrifice and that will not impose a ruinous financial drain on our productive energies.

We feel that the year between a young man's eighteenth and nineteenth birthdays is the proper year in which to begin fulfilling the obligation for service this bill would establish. This is the age that would entail the least upset in the life

of a young man and the smallest dislocation of education, industry, and family life.

At 18 most young men are finishing high school and not yet embarked on college or a life work. Few have married, and even fewer have children. They are at a transitional stage in their careers. We do not minimize the hardship it causes them or their families to have these young men enter military service, but this hardship is substantially less than that involved in calling in men after they have their roots more deeply fixed in jobs, higher education, and family or community affairs.

We would be operating too closely to the danger line if we had to satisfy our present military manpower ceiling of 3.5 million men with no changes in the present selective-service law, other than a 27-month period of service and a 1-year extension of enlistments. Any rise in casualties or any worsening of the military situation that forced an upward revision of our strength requirement would wipe out the safety margin and jeopardize attainment of the needed force.

It would, of course, be possible to call up husbands and fathers among the nonveteran group between the ages of 19 and 26, but the social damage of such a call would be incalculably greater than that involved in calling 18-year-olds, very few of whom have dependents. It would also be possible to ask congressional authorization to recall veterans, but no one could seriously argue that it was fair and democratic to recall those who have already given so much to the service of their country while these younger men remained immune from duty.

We feel that broadening the liability for service to take in 18-year-olds is not only necessary and just but, also, it will make it easier for us to build our military strength to the required levels with minimum disruption of the industrial, agricultural, scientific, and educational resources that play so substantial a part in our greatness as a Nation and a force for world betterment.

We recognize that there can be no long-range security for America in a program that denudes our industries and farms of skilled technicians or that interferes with our preeminence in science and general education. The proposed legislation contains specific safeguards intended to keep our colleges, laboratories, and industries healthy. Moreover, the calling up of 18-year-olds will considerably increase our ability to recommend deferments in the 19 to 26 group for men who possess skills that are essential to the promotion of high industrial and agricultural production or who are pursuing courses of study in fields of vital importance to both our civilian and military economy.

In recognition of the democratic principle that all military undertakings should have civilian understanding, interest, and support, provision is made for the appointment of a committee of distinguished citizens to advise the President on administration of the universal military service and training program and the welfare of men inducted under it. Similarly, all procedures for selecting students to be deferred and for supervising any program of national scholarships that might be set up to insure fullest equality of educational opportunity would be in the hands of civilian experts, rather than the military authorities.

We are mindful that the principle of equal obligation requires that every young man who can be effectively used in the Military Establishment participate in the program. Accordingly, we ask the Congress to consider the establishment in a civilian agency of a plan to assist in the rehabilitation of those who suffer from minor physical handicaps and who are desirous of making their contribution to the national welfare through induction into this program.

It is our conviction that this bill will give our country the maximum return in security for every dollar we invest in a military program that may have to be maintained at a high level for years to come.

We feel that it represents the practical way to put into effect an enduring program for the protection of our country and the defeat of aggression—a plan that is geared both to our immediate and long-term problems and that can be sustained with minimum strain on our human and industrial resources. Its adoption will be a major contribution to the strengthening of the country and the attainment of stability and peace in the world.

Respectfully submitted.

(Signed) GEORGE C. MARSHALL

SECTION IX. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

SECTION 1

(a) Changing the title of the present Selective Service Act

This subsection changes the name of the Selective Service Act of 1948 to Universal Military Training and Service Act and revises the declarations of intent in the present Selective Service Act in order to be consistent with the purposes of the bill. In general, the act contemplates a training period of prescribed length followed by a period of service. Hence, the proposed legislation is a combination of universal training with universal service.

(b) This subsection is in the present law.

(c) This subsection is in the present law with only technical changes made.

(d) This subsection is in the present law.

(e) This subsection is in the present law.

(f) This subsection is included to establish the concept of universality contemplated by this bill.

(g) The importance of moral, religious, and spiritual values.

This subsection is new language. It is intended to reflect the intent of Congress that the realization and development of high moral, religious, and spiritual standards shall be maintained within the Armed Forces.

(b) Repealing authorized statutory strengths of the military services

Section 2 of the 1948 act provides for the following statutory strengths, which aggregate 2,005,882:

Army-----	837, 000 plus	110, 000 1-year enlistees
Navy-----	666, 882 plus	36, 000 1-year enlistees.
Air Force-----	502, 000 plus	15, 000 1-year enlistees.
Totals-----	2, 005, 882	161, 000

These statutory ceilings were suspended until July 31, 1954, by Public Law 655 approved August 3, 1950. This suspension is not changed by this bill.

Although the proposed legislation would repeal section 2 of the 1948 act such action would not have the effect of permanently removing the strength ceilings of the Armed Forces, because these ceilings are prescribed in other statutes.

(c) Lowering the induction age from 19 to 18

The present Selective Service Act imposes an obligation for training and service on "every male citizen of the United States and every other male person residing in the United States" who is between ages 19 and 26. The proposed legislation would lower the induction age from 19 years to 18 years, thereby making the age group 18-26 liable for induction into the military service.

Elsewhere in the bill provision is made whereby registrants under age 19 shall not be inducted for service until those who are over age 19, and who are deemed by the local board to be available for induction, have been inducted.

(d) *Change of wording necessitated by repeal of section 2, and the authorizing of selection by age*

The present Selective Service Act authorizes the President to induct such numbers of persons as may be required to provide and maintain the personnel strength which were provided by section 2 of the act. Subsection (b) above proposes that section 2 of the act be repealed. If personnel strengths are repealed or temporarily suspended the change of wording herein recommended becomes necessary.

The proposed legislation would also specifically authorize selection and induction by age, which is essential for establishing universal military training and service.

(e) *Standards of physical and mental acceptability*

Under the existing law no person shall be inducted unless and until he is acceptable to the Armed Forces and his physical and mental fitness for such training has been satisfactorily determined under standards prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The proposed legislation would clarify the present language of the Selective Service Act in order to assure uniformity in all standards of acceptability of *inductees* in all the Armed Forces. The present wording removes the implication that the three services could establish unilateral standards.

The need for correcting the present imbalance among the services insofar as the utilization of the different physical and mental profiles is concerned, and the congressional interest therein, is discussed in a later section of the bill.

(f) *Limitation as to place of assignment for individuals under age 19*

The existing law requires that individuals inducted into the Armed Forces shall be assigned to stations and units of such forces. The proposed legislation would add a safeguard that no trainee (a person who is inducted before age 19) shall be permanently assigned to duty at any installation which is located outside of the United States or to duty in a combat area during his initial period of basic training (first 4 to 6 months after induction) and that such persons be given full and adequate training.

The bill also provides that no "other member of the Armed Forces" who is enlisted, inducted, or ordered to active duty after the date of enactment of the bill shall be assigned to combat duty in a combat area until he has had at least 4 months of basic training.

It is not the intent of this provision to impose unreal or capricious restrictions on the assignment of personnel. The committee realizes that many specialists, such as physicians, dentists, railway operating personnel, repair crews, petroleum distributing units, and many other categories, do not require the same basic training as is so necessary for front-line combat troops. It would be unrealistic to insist that persons in categories such as these receive, for example, the same basic training as the individual infantryman or marine. Similarly, an adequately trained reservist who is placed on active duty should not necessarily be required to again undergo basic training, whereas a reservist who has had no previous training obviously should.

The intent of the provision is to insure that individuals whose assignment calls for actual combat with an enemy shall not be committed to action until they shall have had the basic training referred to herein.

(g) Increasing the induction period

Under the present Selective Service Act, induction is for a period of 21 consecutive months. The bill proposes to increase the induction period to 26 consecutive months, unless sooner released, transferred, or discharged.

Provision is made elsewhere in the bill for the shortening, or the eliminating, of the period of service when such action is either directed by a concurrent resolution of the Congress or found by the President to be justified by the strength of the Armed Forces in the light of international conditions.

(h) Repeal of mandatory short-term Army enlistment

The present Selective Service Act contains a number of provisions intended to insure a vigorous enlistment campaign. It was the intent of the Congress that by insisting upon a vigorous recruitment procedure the number of inductions could be materially reduced.

One of these provisions required that persons in the 19 to 26 age group should be offered an opportunity to enlist in the Regular Army for a period of 21 months. This short-term enlistment did not apply to other military services, nor did it apply to persons under age 19 or over age 26.

The proposed legislation would repeal the provisions which require the Army to accept this short-term enlistment. Persons inductible under this bill may now apply for voluntary induction under section 4 (c) (4) of the act.

(i) Periods of Reserve service

Under the present Selective Service Act an individual who has served for less than 3 years is required to join a Reserve component and serve therein for a prescribed period of time.

The period of Reserve service required by the present law is: 3 years of service if in an organized unit; 5 years of service if not a member of an organized unit.

The proposed legislation prescribes new post-service Reserve obligation for all persons hereafter inducted, enlisted, or appointed prior to attaining 26 years of age. They are required to serve in a Reserve component for a period not to exceed 8 years (less periods of active military service).

The Secretary of a military department (and the Secretary of the Treasury) may prescribe transfer to an organized unit of a Reserve component or an officers' training program.

Persons previously transferred to a Reserve component are not covered by the new requirement but retain the obligation under which they were transferred.

Administrative flexibility is provided for equating or reducing this requirement, by regulation of the Secretary of Defense. Persons entering the service at age 26 or above are not subject to any post-service Reserve requirement. This subsection also provides authority for the release of persons on active duty who volunteer to join certain organized units of the Reserve prior to the terminal date of their period of active service in order to stimulate persons to voluntarily join the National Guard and other Reserve units which are critically short of qualified personnel.

(j) *Providing Presidential authority to reduce certain pay scales*

Under the present Selective Service Act, persons who are inducted "for training and service" receive the same pay, allowances, etc., as apply to other enlisted men of comparable grade and service.

The proposed bill provides the same pay and allowances as now exist for persons inducted into the Armed Forces but permits the President to reduce the basic pay of *trainees* to \$30 for a period of not to exceed 6 months when the type or duration of training and service required hereunder is changed. During such period, however, the dependents of trainees would receive the same benefits as the dependents of persons in the lowest enlisted pay grade.

(k) *Repealing the 1-year enlistment program for 18-year-olds*

The present Selective Service Act contains a provision for the enlistment of persons between ages 18 and 19 for a period of 1 year. This 1-year period of service to be followed by 6 years of service in the Reserve components.

The actual operation of the program was of very brief duration. The proposed legislation would repeal those provisions of the 1948 act authorizing it.

The experience of the Armed Forces has revealed that the period of 1 year is insufficient to train enlistees *and* to obtain a useful amount of service from such an individual. It was also found that a program of 1-year enlistees diverted substantial numbers of personnel for training activities without providing any substantial input of trained personnel into active service for a sufficient period of time to fill the needs of the Armed Forces.

(l) *Extending the period of service for physicians, dentists, etc.*

This subsection extends the period of service for physicians, dentists, and allied specialists from 21 months in consonance with the period prescribed for inductees and reserves.

(m) *Authority to shorten the induction period*

A previous subsection of the proposed legislation lengthens the induction period from 21 months. An induction period is divided into two phases—for example, 4 months of "training," and the remaining months of "service."

(1) *Adjusting or shortening the periods of service or training.*—The proposed legislation would authorize the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, to increase the period of training to not to exceed 6 months; to decrease the remaining period of service, but in no case to a lesser period of time than can be economically utilized; or to require only training without service. It provides further authority for changing or modifying the training given under the act. The President may vary his instructions with respect to different age groups, but otherwise such regulations must be uniform as to all services and as to the date of entry on active duty. This authority will permit coordination of the universal military training and service program with the needs of the Armed Forces generally.

The proposed legislation also provides that, effective at such time as the President eliminates periods of active service in the Armed Forces authorized under this title, individuals under age 19 may be inducted for not less than 4 months of training in a National Security Training Corps.

To insure that the Congress retains full authority to adjust or shorten periods of service or training, the bill also provides that such adjustment or shortening shall take place upon the adoption of a concurrent resolution of the Congress declaring that such should be the case.

(2) *Creating a National Security Training Commission.*—This paragraph provides for the establishment of a National Security Training Commission, and specifies its general method of appointment and its general responsibility.

(n) *Selection by age*

(1) *Induction by age groups.*—This paragraph would amend the technical provisions relating to selection and induction to authorize selection and induction by age groups which is essential for the establishment of universal service and training.

The language in this paragraph is the same as that in the 1948 act, except that the final proviso is added at the end.

(2) *Requirement that all available persons in the 19-26 pool must be taken by the local board before 18-year-olds are inducted.*—This paragraph adds to the present language of subsection 5 (a) of the Selective Service Act of 1948 a new paragraph (2) which prohibits a local board from inducting an 18-year-old until all available persons in the 19-26 pool have been taken. The paragraph also provides that when it is necessary to take 18-year-olds to meet quotas, the older ones shall be selected first.

The prohibition against inducting 18-year-olds imposed by this paragraph ceases to operate when, at some future time, the President announces by Executive order that the required periods of active service can be eliminated, or the Congress should so declare by concurrent resolution.

The committee had originally intended to write into the bill certain legislative directives, in addition to the provisions of this paragraph, which would insure a greater utilization of the present pool of IV-F's and a more uniform utilization among the three services of the various physical and mental profiles.

It was felt by the committee that although those objectives could be accomplished administratively, the fact that they have not been so accomplished has resulted in considerable public concern, and public sentiment that the Congress should affirmatively write appropriate language into the pending bill to accomplish these reforms.

The committee has been informed by the Department of Defense that the Department of Defense is currently formulating instructions which not only will require a greater utilization of the pool of registrants now classified IV-F, but will place the three military services more nearly on a "share and share alike" basis insofar as the various mental and physical profiles are concerned, and for enlistments as well as for inductions.

The committee feels that the accomplishment of such objectives is of fundamental importance. To insure that reasonable and adequate progress toward carrying out the assurances made to the committee by the Department of Defense is made, the committee proposes to maintain a close surveillance in this field on a "watch-dog basis."

(o) *Clarifying the status of certain deferments for Reserve service; enlistments in the National Guard of persons below 18½ years of age*

(1) *Status of persons who enlist in organized units of the Reserve components subsequent to date of enactment of 1948 act.*—Individuals who became members of the Reserve components through voluntary enlistment subsequent to June 24, 1948, are not eligible for deferment under the authority of the present statute, inasmuch as they acquired their Reserve status subsequent to the date of enactment of the act. The Director of Selective Service is suspending administratively the processing of these individuals on the grounds that it would be illogical to induct them into another service. The amendment would clarify their position by placing them on a deferred status, the same as those who enlisted prior to the 1948 act.

(2) *National Guard enlistments.*—The present Selective Service Act authorizes a person who enlists in an organized unit of the National Guard prior to attaining age 18½ to be deferred from induction so long as he serves satisfactorily in such unit. The purpose of this provision of the 1948 act was to provide the National Guard with a source of personnel.

The operation of the 1948 act discloses that this provision has worked satisfactorily and has resulted in a total of perhaps 100,000 young men of this category entering the National Guard during the last 2½ years.

The proposed legislation establishes a method whereby the Secretary of Defense may terminate this enlistment program when he finds that trained men from other sources are available.

(3) *Technical amendment.*—This is a technical amendment made necessary by the two preceding paragraphs.

(p) *Merchant marine, midshipmen, and military college students*

The proposed legislation providing that Naval Reserve midshipmen attending merchant marine schools and students enrolled in military colleges which have ROTC programs and which are approved by the Secretary of Defense shall be exempt from registration and induction. These categories of students receive military training and upon graduation are commissioned in the Reserve components of the Armed Forces.

(q) *ROTC, college, and other programs*

(1) *Three-year program for 75,000 college students.*—This paragraph provides for the continuation of a flow of not to exceed 75,000 persons annually into educational institutions, this number to be in excess of the normal inflow provided by ROTC students, IV-F's, and draft-liable students.

It authorizes the President to relieve from active service upon completion of their initial period of training 75,000 persons enlisted or inducted into the Armed Forces for study or research in medicine, science, engineering, the humanities, or other fields determined to be of national interest. The proposed legislation requires that these individuals shall be selected by a Commission nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The appointment of this Commission is to be on a bipartisan basis; selection of individuals is to be accomplished on a competitive basis in accordance with rules and regulations established by the Commission. Further, it is the intent of

the committee that the selection processes shall be operated so as to give qualified young men from all parts of the Nation the same opportunity to compete for selection.

Within 10 years from the completion of their education or research, individuals so deferred may be reordered into active service for completion of their required period of service, unless they perform service in the national interest for an equivalent period.

This program would be under civilian control. Provision is made for the financial assistance of qualified students who need such assistance to take advantage of the program.

(2) *ROTC students*.—Persons selected for enrollment or continuance in the senior division, ROTC or similar programs may be deferred from induction. They must agree to accept a commission and serve 8 years after appointment (2 years on active duty or 3 years if subsidized). Such persons, however, would be required to have completed at least the equivalent of an initial period of basic training while enrolled in such programs.

(3) *Officer-candidate programs*.—The Secretary of each Military Department (and the Secretary of the Treasury) is authorized to establish officer-candidate programs. These programs are designed to give personnel not selected for one of the other comparable programs authorized under this section an opportunity for attaining commissioned status while on active duty.

The services are conducting officer-candidate programs currently, without the benefit of this specific legislative authority. The purpose of inserting this authority into the bill is to emphasize the intent of the Congress that programs of this sort, in addition to the college programs, are to be kept open.

(4) *Existing authority whereby the President may defer students is not disturbed by this legislation*.—This paragraph states that nothing in this subsection shall prejudice the President's deferment powers granted under subsection 6 (h) of the act. It is pursuant to such powers that all deferments of persons whose activity in any occupation or industry or in the fields of science, study, or research are currently being made. Comparable discretionary authority was contained in the 1940 act, which was in effect during World War II.

(r) *Liability for induction of nonveteran, nonfathers in the 19-26 group*

Subsection 6 (h) of the present Selective Service Act authorizes the President to provide for the deferment of persons in a status with respect to persons dependent upon them for support which renders their deferment advisable; also persons who have wives or children or wives and children with whom they maintain a bona fide family relationship in their homes.

The proposed legislation amends subsection 6 (h) by removing the discretionary authority of the President to defer a married person who is a "nonveteran, nonfather."

Testimony presented to the committee indicates that there are a maximum of 290,000 nonveteran nonfathers who would be made available for induction by this change in the existing law. The committee is of the opinion that individuals in this category may very properly be required to fulfill their obligation for service, and that they should be called before the 18-year-olds.

(s) *Deferment of high-school and college students*

The present Selective Service Act authorizes the *postponement from induction* of a high-school student until he graduates or until he attains age 20. The proposed legislation would lower the maximum age from 20 to 19 and change the "postponement" provision to a "deferment" provision.

The present Selective Service Act also provides for a *postponement of induction* of any person pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college until the end of the academic year. This provision would provide for a deferment in lieu of a postponement.

The purpose of changing the postponement features to deferments is to remove any doubt that such persons may enlist during that period.

(t) *Provisions relating to certain conscientious objectors*

The Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 provided that persons found to be conscientiously opposed to noncombatant service should be assigned to work of national importance, under civilian direction. The 1948 act provided that they should be deferred.

This provision returns to the language used in the 1940 act, with the added requirement that assignment to such work of national importance shall be for the prescribed induction period—26 months.

(u) *Period of active duty for certain reservists*

Under the present Selective Service Act an individual who has had less than 90 days of previous active duty may be ordered into the active service for the normal induction period of 21 months.

The proposed legislation would repeal this obsolete provision in the present act.

(v) *Clarification of certain provisions relating to reemployment rights*

Section 9 of the 1948 act prescribes in considerable detail the reemployment rights which accrue to an individual who is enlisted or inducted into the military service. This section of the existing statute has worked very satisfactorily excepting with respect to cases which are discussed in this section of the proposed legislation.

(1) *Extending reemployment rights to persons who serve not more than 4 years.*—Under existing law reemployment rights are extended to persons who enlist for not more than 3 years. The proposed legislation would extend these rights to persons who serve for not more than 4 years. Thus it will be seen that the test is the length of time an individual serves and not the length of time for which he originally enlisted.

Under the proposed legislation an individual who enlists for 5 or 6 years but is released from service in 4 years or less would be entitled to reemployment rights; under the existing law he would not. Furthermore, under existing law an individual is entitled to reemployment rights only upon the expiration of his first enlistment after the date of enactment of the Selective Service Act of 1948. Under the proposed legislation it is immaterial how many times an individual may have enlisted after the date of enactment of that act so long as his total service does not exceed 4 years.

(2) *Clarification of what reemployment rights flow to an individual.*—Under existing law an employee of the Federal Government who is

called to active duty, but who may shortly thereafter be determined to be physically unfit and is thereupon relieved from active duty, is nevertheless entitled to reemployment benefits. These reemployment benefits in effect give him a superseniority in the Government service for a period of 1 year. The proposed legislation would deny reemployment benefits in these cases involving Federal Government employees who are determined to be physically unfit shortly after having been called to active duty.

(3) *Reinstatement rights for persons rejected for military service.*—This proposal gives for the first time reinstatement rights to those persons who leave private or Federal employment to enter the Armed Forces, but who are rejected by such forces. As written, the proposed legislation provides these reinstatement rights shall also be applicable to persons who leave private or Federal employment for the purpose of induction into, entering, determining their physical fitness to enter, or performing training duty in, the Armed Forces. The proposed legislation provides for the reinstatement of such persons provided they make "prompt application" therefor.

(w) *Nonapplicability of certain laws*

The present Selective Service Act exempts uncompensated officials of the Selective Service System and individuals appointed to conduct hearings on certain appeals from certain laws applying to Government officials.

The proposed legislation would include members of the National Selective Service Appeal Board within such exemption.

(x) *Changes in definitions*

The proposed legislation would add to the present definition section in the Selective Service Act of 1948 definitions of the following terms:

active service and training
trainee
initial period of training
inductee.

(y) *Termination provisions*

(a) *Provisions in case of conflict with existing law.*—Section 17 (a) of the present Selective Service Act suspends all laws which are in conflict with the provisions of such act, to the extent of such conflict, *for the period in which the act shall be in force.* The proposed bill will remove the italicized portion from the present language.

As section 17 (b) of the present Selective Service Act now stands it enumerates the portions of the act which shall remain in force after the act itself shall have become inoperative *and prescribes the termination date.* Originally the termination date was to be the second anniversary of the date of enactment, which would have been June 24, 1950. This termination date was extended to July 9, 1951, by the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950. The proposed legislation omits this subsection of the present Selective Service Act, thereby making the act permanent legislation with no termination date.

(b) *Authority for appropriations.*—The authority for appropriation language contained in section 17 (c) of the present Selective Service Act is not changed by the proposed legislation except that a sentence has been added which provides that funds appropriated for the adminis-

trative expenses for the National Security Training Commission shall be appropriated directly to the Commission.

(z) *Extending present authority to order Reserve components to active Federal service*

The present Selective Service Act originally contained no authority whereby Reserve components could be ordered to active Federal service excepting the rather limited authority contained in section 7 of the original act referring to those reservists who had previously had less than 90 days of active service.

The Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 added to the original statute an additional section which authorized the ordering to 21 months active Federal service of the Reserve components effective until July 9, 1951.

The proposed legislation would extend the effective date of this authority from July 9, 1951, to July 1, 1953. It would also extend the mandatory period of service from 21 months to conform to previous changes recommended by the proposed legislation—26 months.

MISCELLANEOUS TERMINATION DATES

Section 2. Extension of volunteer enlistments

The act of July 27, 1950, authorizes the President to extend all enlistments for a period of 12 months; this authority expires on July 9, 1951. As a consequence, an enlistment expiring at any time prior to July 9, 1951, could be extended for a period of 12 months. Enlistments expiring after that date could not be extended.

Section 2 (a) of the proposed legislation would move the expiration date of this extension authority from July 9, 1951, to July 1, 1953. It would also provide that no enlistment which had been extended under the previous authority could again be extended for any additional period.

Section 2 (b) would extend Public Law 779 of the Eighty-first Congress which authorizes the induction of physicians, dentists, and specialists until July 1, 1953.

Section 3. Strength limitations for female personnel

Existing law fixes a percentage strength for women in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps by prescribing that not to exceed 2 percent of the authorized personnel total should be women.

Section 3 of the proposed legislation removes this percentage limitation.

Section 4. Effect on persons now serving on active duty

Section 5 of the proposed legislation provides that increases in period of service for any category shall apply to persons in such category who are serving on active duty on the date of enactment.

Section 5. Separability

This section is a routine separability clause.

Section 6. Short title

This section provides that the bill, if enacted, shall be cited as the "1951 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act".

Title II. Expanding the present authority for the enlistment of aliens

Under existing law authority is given for the enlistment of a total of 2,500 aliens in the Armed Forces. The law is effective for 3 years. Under the terms of this bill, the law would be effective for 5 years and the authority would be enlarged so as to permit the enlistment of not to exceed 25,000 aliens per year. Since the statute would expire in 5 years, the maximum number so enlisted would be 125,000.

To insure that this program is not regarded as a substitute for the steps recommended by other sections of the bill, this provision appears as a distinctly separate provision.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with subsection 4 of rule XXIX of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill are shown as follows: Existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman.

The Selective Service Act of 1948:

TITLE I

SECTION 1. (a) This Act may be cited as the ["Selective Service Act of 1948".] *"Universal Military Training and Service Act"*.

(b) The Congress hereby declares that an adequate armed strength must be achieved and maintained to insure the security of this Nation.

(c) The Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and privileges of serving in the [armed forces and the reserve] *Armed Forces, including the Reserve* components thereof, should be shared generally, in accordance with a system [of selection] which is fair and just, and which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective national economy.

(d) The Congress further declares, in accordance with our traditional military policy as expressed in the National Defense Act of 1916, as amended, that it is essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard, both [Ground and Air] *ground and air*, as an integral part of the first line defenses of this Nation, be at all times maintained and assured.

To this end, it is the intent of the Congress that whenever Congress shall determine that units and organizations are needed for the national security in excess of those of the Regular components of the ground forces and the air forces, and those in active service under this title, the National Guard of the United States, both [Ground and Air] *ground and air*, or such part thereof as may be necessary, together with such units of the Reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal service and continued therein so long as such necessity exists.

(e) The Congress further declares that adequate provision for national security requires maximum effort in the fields of scientific research and development, and the fullest possible *development and* utilization of the Nation's technological, scientific, and other critical manpower resources.

(f) *To this end, the Congress further declares that it is the duty of all citizens to engage in such training for civilian and military service as will prepare them for the assumption of their responsibilities as citizens of a free and democratic Nation and provide a continuing flow of personnel recently trained in modern techniques and assure a vital, ready reservoir to fill the military and civilian needs of the Nation.*

(g) *The Congress declares it to be in the national interest that personnel serving in the Armed Forces be protected and encouraged in the realization and development of those moral, spiritual, and religious values, consistent with the religious beliefs and convictions of the individuals concerned, which are fundamental in the preservation and strengthening of the fiber of American citizenship. In the pursuit of this end, the Congress further declares that it shall be the duty of every commanding officer in every echelon of command in the respective services of the Armed Forces to maintain to the highest possible degree within his command those conditions and influences calculated to protect the health, morals, and spiritual welfare of the personnel of his command.*

[AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTHS]

[SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the authorized active-duty personnel strength of the armed forces, exclusive of personnel of the reserve components on active duty for training purposes only, officer candidates, personnel of the armed forces employed in the Selective Service System, and persons paid under the appropriations for the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve, is hereby established as follows: (1) Of the Army of the United States, eight hundred thirty-seven thousand plus one hundred ten thousand one-year enlistees; (2) of the Navy, including the Marine Corps, the present authorized statutory strength of six hundred sixty-six thousand, eight hundred and eighty-two, plus thirty-six thousand one-year enlistees; and (3) of the Air Force of the United States, five hundred two thousand plus fifteen thousand one-year enlistees. The strength herein established for each of the armed forces shall mean the daily average number of persons on active duty therein during the fiscal year.]

REGISTRATION

SEC. 3. Except as otherwise provided in this title, it shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.

TRAINING AND SERVICE

SEC. 4. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States, who is between the ages of [nineteen] *eighteen* and twenty-six, at the time fixed for his registration, or who attains the age of [nineteen] *eighteen* after having been required to register pursuant to section 3 of this title, shall be liable for training and service in the armed forces of the United States. Any citizen of a foreign country, who is not deferrable or exempt from training and service under the provisions of this title (other than this subsection), shall be relieved from liability for training and service under this title if, prior to his induction into the armed forces, he has made application to be relieved from such liability in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the President; but any person who makes such application shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States. The President is authorized, from time to time, whether or not a state of war exists, to select and induct into the [armed forces] *Armed Forces* of the United States for training and service in the manner provided in this title (*including but not limited to selection and induction by age group or groups*) such number of persons as may be required to provide and maintain [the personnel strengths (other than one-year enlistee personnel strengths) of the respective armed forces authorized by section 2 of this title and such number of persons as in his judgment may be required for the United States Coast Guard] *adequate Armed Forces*.

No person shall be inducted *into the Armed Forces* for training and service under this title [unless and] until [he is acceptable to the Armed Forces for such training and service and] *his acceptability in all respects (including his physical and mental fitness for such training and service) has been satisfactorily determined under standards prescribed by the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the United States Coast Guard)*.

No persons shall be inducted for such training and service until adequate provisions shall have been made for such shelter, sanitary facilities, water supplies, heating and lighting arrangements, medical care, and hospital accommodations, for such persons, as may be determined by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Treasury to be essential to public and personal health.

The persons inducted into the Armed Forces for training and service under this title shall be assigned to stations or units of such forces. Persons inducted into the land forces of the United States pursuant to this title shall be deemed to be members of the Army of the United States; persons inducted into the naval forces of the United States pursuant to this title shall be deemed to be members of the United States Navy or the United States Marine Corps or the United States Coast Guard, as appropriate; and persons inducted into the air forces of the United States pursuant to this title shall be deemed to be members of the

Air Force of the United States. *Every trainee shall be given full and adequate initial basic training for service in the Armed Forces into which he is inducted and no trainee shall, during his initial period of basic training, be assigned for duty in a combat area, or be permanently assigned for duty at any installation located on land outside the continental limits of the United States; and no other member of the Armed Forces of the United States who is enlisted, inducted, or ordered to active duty after the date of enactment of the 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act shall be assigned to combat duty in a combat area until he has had at least four months of basic training. This section shall not prevent residents of Territories and possessions of the United States from being trained in the Territory or possession from which they were inducted.*

No person, without his consent, shall be inducted for training and service under this title, except as otherwise provided herein, after he has attained the twenty-sixth anniversary of the day of his birth.

(b) Each person inducted under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall serve [in the armed forces for a period of twenty-one consecutive months, unless sooner discharged in accordance with standards and procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Treasury.] *on active training and service in the Armed Forces for a period of twenty-six consecutive months, unless sooner released, transferred, or discharged in accordance with standards and procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the United States Coast Guard) or as otherwise prescribed by subsection (d) of section 4 or by subsection (d) of section 6 of this title.*

(c) [(1) Under the provisions of applicable laws and regulations any person between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six shall be offered an opportunity to enlist in the Regular Army for a period of service equal to that prescribed in subsection (b) of this section.]

(2) Any enlisted member of any reserve component of the Armed Forces may, during the effective period of this Act, apply for a period of service equal to that prescribed in subsection (b) of this section and his application shall be accepted: *Provided*, That his services can be effectively utilized and that his physical and mental fitness for such service meet the standards prescribed by the head of department concerned: *And provided further*, That active service performed pursuant to this section shall not prejudice his status as such member of such reserve component.

(3) The passing requirement for the General Classification Test shall be fixed at seventy points.

(4) Within the limits of the quota determined under section 5 (b) for the subdivision in which he resides, any person, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, shall be afforded an opportunity to volunteer for induction into the armed forces of the United States for the training and service prescribed in subsection (b), but no person who so volunteers shall be inducted for such training and service so long as he is deferred after classification.

(d) (1) Each person who hereafter and prior to the enactment of the 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act is inducted, enlisted, or appointed (except a person enlisted under subsection (g) of this section) and serves for a period of less than three years in one of the armed forces and meets the qualifications for enlistment or appointment in a reserve component of the armed force in which he serves, shall be transferred to a reserve component of such armed force, and until the expiration of a period of five years after such transfer, or until he is discharged from such reserve component, whichever occurs first, shall be deemed to be a member of such reserve component and shall be subject to such additional training and service as may now or hereafter and prior to the enactment of the 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act be prescribed by law for such reserve component: *Provided*, That any such person who completes at least twenty-one months of service in the armed forces and who thereafter serves satisfactorily (1) on active duty in the armed forces under a voluntary extension for a period of at least one year, which extension is hereby authorized, or (2) in an organized unit of any reserve component of any of the armed forces for a period of at least thirty-six consecutive months, shall, except in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, be relieved from any further liability under this subsection to serve in any reserve component of the armed forces of the United States, but nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any such person, while in a reserve component of such forces, from being ordered or called to active duty in such forces.

(2) Each person who hereafter and prior to the enactment of the 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act is enlisted under the provisions

of subsection (g) of this section and who meets the qualifications for enlistment or appointment in a reserve component of the armed forces shall, upon discharge from such enlistment under honorable conditions, be transferred to a reserve component of the armed forces of the United States and shall serve therein for a period of six years or until sooner discharged. Each such person shall, so long as he is a member of such reserve component, be liable to be ordered to active duty, but except in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress no such person shall be ordered to active duty, without his consent and except as herein-after provided, for more than one month in any year. In case the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force determines that enlistment, enrollment, or appointment in, or assignment to, an organized unit of a reserve component or an officers' training program of the armed force in which he served is available to, and can without undue hardship be filled by, any such person, it shall be the duty of such person to enlist, enroll, or accept appointment in, or accept assignment to, such organized unit or officers' training program and to serve satisfactorily therein for a period of four years. Any such person who fails or refuses to perform such duty may be ordered to active duty, without his consent, for an additional period of not more than twelve consecutive months. Any such person who enlists or accepts appointment in any such organized unit and serves satisfactorily therein for a period of four years shall, except in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, be relieved from any further liability under this subsection to serve in any reserve component of the armed forces of the United States, but nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any such person, while in a reserve component of such forces, from being ordered or called to active duty in such forces. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to prescribe regulations governing the transfer of such persons within and between reserve components of the armed forces and determining, for the purpose of the requirements of the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, the credit to be allowed any person so transferring for his previous service in one or more reserve components.

(3) *Each person who, subsequent to the enactment of this paragraph, is inducted, enlisted, or appointed in an armed force of the United States prior to attaining the twenty-sixth anniversary of his birth shall be obligated to serve on active training and service and in a Reserve component for a total period of eight years, unless sooner discharged, in accordance with regulations and standards prescribed by the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the United States Coast Guard). Each such person, on release from active training and service, shall, if physically and mentally qualified, be transferred to a Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and shall serve therein for the remainder of the period which he is obligated to serve under this paragraph and shall be deemed to be a member of such Reserve component during such period. In case the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force (or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the United States Coast Guard), determines that enlistment, enrollment, or appointment in, or assignment to, an organized unit of a Reserve component or an officers' training program of the armed force in which he served is available to, and can, without undue hardship, be filled by any such person, it shall be the duty of such person to enlist, enroll, or accept appointment in, or accept assignment to, such organized unit or officers' training program, and to serve satisfactorily therein. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the United States Coast Guard), may provide, by regulations which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable, for the release from active duty prior to serving the periods required by subsection (b) of this section of individuals who volunteer for and are accepted into organized units of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard and other Reserve components. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any person, while in a Reserve component of the Armed Forces, from being ordered or called to active duty in such armed force.*

(e) With respect to the persons inducted into the Armed Forces for training and service under this title, there shall be paid, allowed, and extended, for training and service, the same pay, allowances, pensions, disability and death compensation, and other benefits as are provided by law in the case of other [enlisted men] members of the uniformed services of like grades and length of service of that component of the [armed forces] Armed Forces to which they are assigned, except that whenever the period of service required under this title of persons who have not attained the nineteenth anniversary of the day of their birth has been eliminated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (k) of this section, each trainee shall, during his initial period of basic training, be compensated at the monthly rate

of \$30 in lieu of the basic pay that would otherwise be payable to him under this section. During such period in which the pay of trainees is \$30 a month, each such person, having a dependent or dependents as such terms are defined in the Career Compensation Act of 1949, shall be entitled to receive a dependency allowance equal to the sum of the basic allowance for quarters provided for persons in pay grade E-1 by section 302 (f) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended by section 3 of the Dependents' Assistance Act of 1950, plus \$40 so long as the trainee has in effect an allotment equal to the amount of such dependency allowance for the support of the dependent or dependents on whose account the allowance is claimed. Section 3 of the Act of July 25, 1947 (Public Law 239, Eightieth Congress), is hereby amended by deleting therefrom the following: "Act of March 7, 1942 (56 Stat. 143-148, ch. 166), as amended". The Act of March 7, 1942 (56 Stat. 143-148), as amended, is hereby made applicable to persons inducted into the Armed Forces pursuant to this title.

(f) Nothing contained in this or any other Act shall be construed as forbidding the payment of compensation by any person, firm, or corporation to persons inducted into the armed forces of the United States for training and service under this title, or to members of reserve components of such forces now or hereafter on any type of active duty, who, prior to their induction or order to active duty, were receiving compensation from such person, firm, or corporation.

[(g) Subject to the authorized one-year enlistee active duty personnel strengths established by section 2 of this title for the respective armed forces, the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are authorized and directed to accept enlistments for periods of one year in the Army of the United States, the United States Navy or the United States Marine Corps, and the Air Force of the United States, respectively, from among qualified male persons between the ages of eighteen and nineteen.

(h) No person who is enlisted in the Army of the United States under the provisions of subsection (g) shall be permanently assigned to duty at any place outside of the continental limits of the United States; and no person who is enlisted under the provisions of such subsection in the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, or the Air Force of the United States shall be assigned to duty at any naval or air force installation which is located on land outside of the continental limits of the United States.]

(i) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, except subsections 6 (j) and 6 (o), the President is authorized to require special registration of and, on the basis of requisitions submitted by the Department of Defense and approved by him, to make special calls for male persons qualified in needed—

(A) medical and allied specialist categories who have not yet reached the age of fifty at the time of registration, and

(B) dental and allied specialist categories who have not yet reached the age of fifty at the time of registration.

Persons called hereunder shall be liable for induction for not to exceed [twenty-one] *twenty-six* months of service in the Armed Forces. No such person who is a member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces shall, so long as he remains a member thereof, be liable for registration or induction under this subsection, but nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the authority of the President under any other provision of law to call to active duty members and units of the reserve components. No person in the medical, dental, and allied specialist categories shall be inducted under the provisions of this subsection after he has attained the fifty-first anniversary of the date of his birth.

(2) In registering and inducting persons pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, the President shall, to the extent that he considers practicable and desirable, register and induct in the following order of priority:

First. Those persons who participated as students in the Army specialized training program or similar programs administered by the Navy, and those persons who were deferred from service during World War II for the purpose of pursuing a course of instruction leading to education in one of the categories referred to in clauses (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) of this subsection, who have had less than ninety days of active duty in the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, or the Public Health Service subsequent to the completion of or release from the program or course of instruction (exclusive of the time spent in postgraduate training).

Second. Those persons who participated as students in the Army specialized training program or similar programs administered by the Navy, and those persons who were deferred from service during World War II for the purpose of pursuing a course of instruction leading to education in one of the above categories, who have had ninety days or more but less than twenty-one

months of active duty in the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, or the Public Health Service subsequent to the completion of or release from the program or course of instruction (exclusive of the time spent in postgraduate training).

Third. Those who did not have active service in the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, or the Public Health Service subsequent to September 16, 1940.

Fourth. Those not included in the first and second priority who have had active service in the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, or the Public Health Service subsequent to September 16, 1940. Inductions of persons in this priority shall be made in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President which may provide for the classification of such persons into groups according to the number of full months of such service which they have had and for the induction of the members of any such group after the induction of the members of any other such group having a lesser number of full months of such service.

In the selection of individuals from among the categories established by subsection (i) for induction, the President is authorized, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to provide for the deferment of any individual whose deferment is found to be equitable and in the national interest, taking into consideration the length of his previous service in the Armed Forces (including the Coast Guard and the Public Health Service) of the United States, the extent of his participation in the Army specialized training program or similar program administered by the Navy, reasons of hardship or dependency, and the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest.

(3) It is the sense of the Congress that the President shall provide for the annual deferment from training and service under this title of numbers of optometry students and premedical, preosteopathic, preveterinary, preoptometry, and pre dental students at least equal to the numbers of male optometry, premedical, preosteopathic, preveterinary, preoptometry, and pre dental students in attendance at colleges and universities in the United States at the present levels, as determined by the Director.

(j) The President shall establish a National Advisory Committee which shall advise the Selective Service System and shall coordinate the work of such State and local volunteer advisory committees as may be established to cooperate with the National Advisory Committee, with respect to the selection of needed medical and dental and allied specialist categories of persons as referred to in subsection (i). The members of the National Advisory Committee shall be selected from among individuals who are outstanding in medicine, dentistry, and the sciences allied thereto, but except for the professions of medicine and dentistry, it shall not be mandatory that all such fields of endeavor be represented on the committee.

In the performance of their functions, the National Advisory Committee and the State and local volunteer advisory committees shall give appropriate consideration to the respective needs of the Armed Forces and of the civilian population for the services of medical, dental, and allied specialist personnel; and, in determining the medical, dental, and allied specialist personnel available to serve the needs of any community, such committees shall give appropriate consideration to the availability in such community of medical, dental, and allied specialist personnel who have attained the fifty-first anniversary of their birth.

(k) (1) *Upon a finding by him that such action is justified by the strength of the Armed Forces in the light of international conditions, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Defense, is authorized, by Executive order, which shall be uniform in its application to all persons inducted under this title but which may vary as to age groups, to provide for: (A) increasing the periods of initial basic training to not to exceed six months, (B) changing or modifying the initial basic training given thereunder, (C) decreasing periods of active service under this title but in no case to a lesser period of time than can be economically utilized, or (D) eliminating periods of active service required under this title. Whenever the Congress shall by concurrent resolution declare—*

(A) that the period of initial basic training for any age group or groups of persons inducted under this title should be increased to any period in excess of four months but not in excess of six months which may be designated in such resolution;

(B) that the period of active service required of any age group or groups of persons inducted under this title should be decreased to any period less than twenty-six months which may be designated in such resolution; or

(C) that the period of active service required of any age group or groups of persons inducted under this title should be eliminated,

the period of initial basic training or of active service of the age group or groups designated in any such resolution shall be so increased, decreased, or eliminated, as the case may be. Whenever the period of service required under this title of persons who have not attained the nineteenth anniversary of the day of their birth has been eliminated in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section, all individuals then or thereafter registered under section 3 of this title who on that date have not attained the nineteenth anniversary of the day of their birth and have not been inducted into the Armed Forces shall be liable, effective on such date, for induction into the National Security Training Corps for initial basic military training for a period of not less than four months.

(2) Effective at such time as the President may deem appropriate in advance of his issuance of an Executive order eliminating periods of active service under this title or effective whenever the Congress shall have adopted a concurrent resolution pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the President is authorized to establish a National Security Training Commission to be composed of five members, three of whom shall be civilians and two of whom shall be active or retired members of the Regular components of any of the Armed Forces, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Effective at such time as periods of active service required under this title are eliminated pursuant to the preceding paragraph of this subsection, there shall be established a National Security Training Corps, whose membership shall be composed of all persons inducted therein for initial basic training. The National Security Training Commission shall, subject to the direction of the President, establish such policies and standards with respect to the conduct of initial basic training (including the moral, religious, recreational, informational, and educational phases of such training) of members of the National Security Training Corps as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, and shall, subject to the direction of the President, designate the Federal departments and agencies to carry out such training. All departments and agencies so designated shall carry out such training in accordance with the policies and standards of the Commission.

SELECTION

SEC. 5. (a) (1) The selection of persons for training and service under section 4 shall be made in an impartial manner, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, from the persons who are liable for such training and service and who at the time of selection are registered and classified, but not deferred or exempted: *Provided*, That in the selection of persons for training and service under this title, and in the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this title, there shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color: *Provided further*, That in the classification of registrants within the jurisdiction of any local board, the registrants of any particular registration may be classified, in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the President, before, together with, or after the registrants of any prior registration or registrations; and in the selection for induction of persons within the jurisdiction of any local board and within any particular classification, persons who were registered at any particular registration may be selected, in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the President, before, together with, or after persons who were registered at any prior registration or registrations: *And provided further*, That nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the selection or induction of persons by age groups under rules and regulations prescribed by the President.

(2) Until such time as the period of service required under this title of persons who have not attained the nineteenth anniversary of the day of their birth has been eliminated in accordance with the provisions of section 4 (k) of this title—

(A) no local board shall order for induction any person who has not attained the age of nineteen unless there is not within the jurisdiction of such local board a sufficient number of persons who are deemed by such local board to be available for induction and who have attained the age of nineteen to enable such local board to meet a call for men which it has been ordered to furnish for induction; and

(B) no local board shall order for induction any person who has not attained the age of nineteen, if there is any person within the jurisdiction of such local board who (i) is as much as ninety days older, (ii) has not attained the age of nineteen, and (iii) is deemed by the local board to be available for induction.

(b) Quotas of men to be inducted for training and service under this title shall be determined for each State, Territory, possession, and the District of Columbia, and for subdivisions thereof, on the basis of the actual number of men in the several States, Territories, possessions, and the District of Columbia, and the sub-

divisions thereof, who are liable for such training and service but who are not deferred after classification, except that credits shall be given in fixing such quotas for residents of such subdivisions who are in the armed forces of the United States on the date fixed for determining such quotas. After such quotas are fixed, credits shall be given in filling such quotas for residents of such subdivisions who subsequently become members of such forces. Until the actual numbers necessary for determining the quotas are known, the quotas may be based on estimates, and subsequent adjustments therein shall be made when such actual numbers are known. All computations under this subsection shall be made in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe.

DEFERMENT AND EXEMPTIONS

SEC. 6. (a) Commissioned officers, warrant officers, pay clerks, enlisted men, and aviation cadets of the Regular Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Public Health Service; cadets, United States Military Academy; midshipmen, United States Navy; cadets, United States Coast Guard Academy; *midshipmen, Merchant Marine Reserve, United States Naval Reserve; students enrolled in an officer procurement program at military colleges the curriculum of which is approved by the Secretary of Defense*; members of the reserve components of the armed forces, the Coast Guard, and the Public Health Service, while on active duty; and foreign diplomatic representatives, technical attachés of foreign embassies and legations, consuls general, consuls, vice consuls, and other consular agents of foreign countries who are not citizens of the United States, and members of their families, and persons in other categories to be specified by the President, residing in the United States, and who have not declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, shall not be required to be registered under section 3 and shall be relieved from liability for training and service under section 4 (b).

(b) (1) No person who served honorably on active duty between September 16, 1940, and the date of enactment of this title for a period of twelve months or more, or between December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, for a period in excess of ninety days, in the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Public Health Service, or the armed forces of any country allied with the United States in World War II prior to September 2, 1945, shall be liable for induction for training and service under this title, except after a declaration of war or national emergency made by the Congress subsequent to the date of enactment of this title.

(2) No person who served honorably on active duty between September 16, 1940, and the date of enactment of this title for a period of ninety days or more but less than twelve months in the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Public Health Service, or the armed forces of any country allied with the United States in World War II prior to September 2, 1945, shall be liable for induction for training and service under this title, except after a declaration of war or national emergency made by the Congress subsequent to the date of enactment of this title, if—

(A) the local board determines that he is regularly enlisted or commissioned in any organized unit of a reserve component of the armed force in which he served, provided such unit is reasonably accessible to such person without unduly interrupting his normal pursuits and activities (including attendance at a college or university in which he is regularly enrolled), or in a reserve component (other than in an organized unit) of such armed force in any case in which enlistment or commission in an organized unit of a reserve component of such armed force is not available to him; or

(B) the local board determines that enlistment or commission in a reserve component of such armed force is not available to him or that he has voluntarily enlisted or accepted appointment in an organized unit of a reserve component of an armed force other than the armed force in which he served. Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to be applicable to any person to whom paragraph (1) of this subsection is applicable.

(3) No person who after the date of enactment of this title is honorably discharged upon the completion of a period of three years or more of active duty in the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, or the Public Health Service, shall be liable for induction for training and service under this title, except after a declaration of war or national emergency made by the Congress subsequent to the date of enactment of this title.

(4) No person who is honorably discharged upon the completion of an enlistment pursuant to section 4 (c) or section 4 (g) shall be liable for induction for

training and service under this title, except after a declaration of war or national emergency made by the Congress subsequent to the date of enactment of this title.

(5) For the purposes of computation of the periods of active duty referred to in paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection, no credit shall be allowed for—

(A) periods of active-duty training performed as a member of a reserve component pursuant to an order or call to active duty solely for training purposes;

(B) periods of active duty in which the service consisted solely of training under the Army specialized-training program, the Army Air Force college-training program, or any similar program under the jurisdiction of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard;

(C) periods of active duty as a cadet at the United States Military Academy or United States Coast Guard Academy, or as a midshipman at the United States Naval Academy, or in a preparatory school after nomination as a principal, alternate, or candidate for admission to any of such academies; or

(D) periods of active duty in any of the armed forces while being processed for entry into or separation from any educational program or institution referred to in paragraphs (B) or (C).

(c) (1) Persons who, on [the effective date of this title,] *February 1, 1951*, were members of organized units of the federally recognized National Guard, the federally recognized Air National Guard, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Regular Army Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Coast Guard Reserve, or the Public Health Service Reserve, shall, so long as they continue to be such members and satisfactorily participate in scheduled drills and training periods as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, be exempt from training and service by induction under the provisions of this title, but shall not be exempt from registration unless on active duty.

(2) (A) In any case in which the Governor of any State determines and issues a proclamation to the effect that the authorized strength of any organized unit of the National Guard of his State cannot be maintained by the enlistment or appointment of persons referred to in subsection 6 (b) (2) or persons who are not liable for training and service under this title, any person who prior to attaining the age of eighteen years and six months, *prior to the determination by the Secretary of Defense that adequate trained personnel are available to the National Guard to enable it to maintain its authorized strength, and prior to the receipt of orders to report for induction*, enlists or accepts appointment in any such organized unit shall be deferred from training and service under this title so long as he continues to serve satisfactorily as a member of such organized unit.

(B) Except as provided in subsection (b), *paragraph (1) of this subsection*, or clause (A) of this paragraph, no person who shall become a member of a reserve component after the effective date of this title shall thereby be exempt from registration or training and service by induction under the provisions of this title.

[(d) (1) Any person who, on the effective date of this title, is enrolled in the advanced course, senior division, Reserve Officers' Training Corps or the Air Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or is a member of the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps and has entered upon the junior or senior year, or is a midshipman, United States Naval Reserve, shall be deferred from induction for training and service under this title until the completion or termination of the course of instruction and so long as he continues in a regular or reserve status upon being commissioned, but shall not be exempt from registration.

(2) Within such number as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense any person who, (A) on or after the effective date of this title, is selected for enrollment or continuance in the senior division, Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or the Air Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or who, on or after the effective date of this title, is appointed a midshipman, United States Naval Reserve, and (B) agrees, in writing, to accept a commission if tendered and to serve, subject to call by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, or the Secretary of the Navy, respectively, not less than two years on active duty after receipt of a commission, shall be deferred from induction for training and service under this title until after completion or termination of the course of instruction and so long as he continues in a regular or reserve status upon being commissioned, but shall not be exempt from registration.]

(d) (1) *The President is authorized, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, (A) until June 30, 1954, to provide for the temporary removal from active*

training and service upon completion of their initial periods of basic training in the Armed Forces of not to exceed seventy-five thousand persons annually in order to permit such persons to engage in study or research in medicine, dentistry, osteopathy, the sciences, engineering, the humanities, and other fields determined by him to be in the national interest and while so engaged such persons shall not be deemed to be in military service (active or inactive) for any purpose; (B) to suspend for such persons the obligation to complete the period of military service required under subsection (b) of section 4 of this title until the completion of such study or research, or until any such person ceases satisfactorily to pursue such study or research, whichever is the earlier; and (C) upon termination of such period of suspension, or at any time within not more than ten years thereafter, to reorder or induct such a person into active service in the same or another armed force for the unserved part of the period of service required under subsection (b) of section 4 of this title, unless such person performs other military or civilian service in the national interest for a period equivalent to such period of service in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President. The persons temporarily removed from active training and service to engage in study or research under the provisions of this paragraph shall be selected by a civilian commission to be composed of five members to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three of the members of the Commission shall be members of the same political party. The persons selected by the Commission to engage in study or research shall be selected upon a competitive basis in accordance with standards and procedures prescribed by the Commission. The President is authorized to provide for payment of such portion of the costs of tuition, books, laboratory fees, subsistence, travel, and other necessary expenses of any person selected to engage in such study and research as the Commission finds that such person is unable to defray without undue hardship.

(2) Within such numbers as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense any person who, (A) has been or may hereafter be selected for enrollment or continuance in the senior division, Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or the Air Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or the naval and Marine Corps officer candidate training program established by the Act of August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1057), as amended, or the Reserve officers' candidate program of the Navy, or the platoon leaders' class of the Marine Corps, or the officer procurement programs of the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard Reserve, or has been or may hereafter be appointed an ensign, United States Naval Reserve, and is undergoing professional training; (B) agrees, in writing, to accept a commission, if tendered, and to serve, subject to order of the Secretary of the military department having jurisdiction over him (or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the United States Coast Guard), not less than two years on active duty after receipt of a commission, and (C) agrees to remain a member of a Regular or Reserve component until the eighth anniversary of the receipt of a commission in accordance with his obligation under subsection (d) of section 4 of this title, shall be deferred from induction for training and service under this title until after completion or termination of the course of instruction and so long as he continues in a Regular or Reserve status upon being commissioned, but shall not be exempt from registration. Such persons except those persons who have previously completed an initial period of basic training or an equivalent period of active military training and service shall be required while enrolled in such programs to complete a period of training equal (as determined under regulations approved by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the United States Coast Guard) in duration and type of training to an initial period of basic training. There shall be added to the obligated active commissioned service of any person who has agreed to perform such obligatory service in return for financial assistance while attending a civilian college under any such training program a period of not to exceed one year.

(3) In addition to the training programs enumerated in paragraph (2) of this subsection, and under such regulations as the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the United States Coast Guard) may approve, the Secretaries of the military departments and the Secretary of the Treasury are authorized to establish officer candidate programs leading to the commissioning of persons on active duty.

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to preclude the President from providing, by regulations prescribed under subsection (h) of this section, for the deferment from training and service of any category or categories of students for such periods of time as he may deem appropriate.

(e) Fully qualified and accepted aviation cadet applicants of the Army, Navy, or Air Force who have signed an agreement of service shall, in such numbers as may be designated by the Secretary of Defense, be deferred, during the period

covered by the agreement but not to exceed four months, from induction for training and service under this title but shall not be exempt from registration.

(f) The Vice President of the United States; the governors of the several States, Territories, and possessions, and all other officials chosen by the voters of the entire State, Territory, or possession; members of the legislative bodies of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and possessions; judges of the courts of record of the United States and of the several States, Territories, possessions, and the District of Columbia shall, while holding such offices, be deferred from training and service under this title in the armed forces of the United States.

(g) Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, as defined in this title, and students preparing for the ministry under the direction of recognized churches or religious organizations, who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses of instruction in recognized theological or divinity schools, or who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses of instruction leading to their entrance into recognized theological or divinity schools in which they have been preenrolled, shall be exempt from training and service (but not from registration) under this title.

(h) The President is authorized, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to provide for the deferment from training and service under this title in the armed forces of the United States of any or all categories of persons whose employment in industry, agriculture, or other occupations or employment, or whose continued service in an office (other than an office described in subsection (f) under the United States or any State, Territory, or possession, or the District of Columbia, or whose activity in study, research, or medical, scientific, or other endeavors is found to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest: *Provided*, That no person within any such category shall be deferred except upon the basis of his individual status. The President is also authorized, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to provide for the deferment from training and service under this title in the armed forces of the United States (1) of any or all categories of persons in a status with respect to persons (*other than wives alone*) dependent upon them for support which renders their deferment advisable, and (2) of any or all categories of those persons found to be physically, mentally, or morally deficient or defective. For the purpose of determining whether or not the deferment of any person is advisable, because of his status with respect to persons dependent upon him for support, any payments of allowances which are payable by the United States to the dependents of persons serving in the armed forces of the United States shall be taken into consideration, but the fact that such payments of allowances are payable shall not be deemed conclusively to remove the grounds for deferment when the dependency is based upon financial considerations and shall not be deemed to remove the ground for deferment when the dependency is based upon other than financial considerations and cannot be eliminated by financial assistance to the dependents. The President is also authorized, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to provide for the deferment from training and service under this title in the armed forces of the United States of any or all categories of persons who have [wives or] children, or wives and children, with whom they maintain a bona fide family relationship in their homes. No deferment from such training and service shall be made in the case of any individual except upon the basis of the status of such individual. There shall be posted in a conspicuous place at the office of each local board a list setting forth the names and classifications of those persons who have been classified by such local board.

(i) (1) Any person who, while satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a high school or similar institution of learning, [is ordered to report for induction under this title prior to his graduation from such school or institution,] shall, upon the facts being presented to the local board, [have his induction under this title postponed] *be deferred* (A) until the time of his graduation therefrom, or (B) until he attains the [twentieth] *nineteenth* anniversary of his birth, or (C) until he ceases satisfactorily to pursue such course of instruction, whichever is the earliest. [The induction of any such person shall not be postponed under this paragraph beyond the date so determined.]

(2) Any person who, while satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college, university, or similar institution, [of learning, is ordered to report for induction under this title,] shall, upon the facts being presented to the local board, [have his induction under this title postponed] *be deferred* (A) until the end of [such] the academic year, or (B) until he ceases satisfactorily to pursue such course of instruction, whichever is the earlier. Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to preclude the President from providing, by regulations prescribed

under subsection (h) of this section, for the deferment from training and service of any category or categories of students for such periods of time as he may deem appropriate.

(j) Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces under this title, be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, *be deferred in lieu of such induction, be assigned, for a period equal to the period of training and service prescribed by section 4 (b), to work of national importance under civilian direction.* Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections shall, if such claim is not sustained by the local board, be entitled to an appeal to the appropriate appeal board. Upon the filing of such appeal, the appeal board shall refer any such claim to the Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing. The Department of Justice, after appropriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect to the character and good faith of the objections of the person concerned, and such person shall be notified of the time and place of such hearing. The Department of Justice shall, after such hearing, if the objections are found to be sustained, recommend to the appeal board that (1) if the objector is inducted into the armed forces under this title, he shall be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or (2) if the objector is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, *he shall be deferred; he shall in lieu of such induction be assigned, for a period equal to the period of training and service prescribed by section 4 (b), to work of national importance under civilian direction.* If after such hearing the Department of Justice finds that his objections are not sustained, it shall recommend to the appeal board that such objections be not sustained. The appeal board shall, in making its decision, give consideration to, but shall not be bound to follow, the recommendation of the Department of Justice together with the record on appeal from the local board. Each person whose claim for exemption from combatant training and service because of conscientious objections is sustained shall be listed by the local board on a register of conscientious objectors.

(k) No exception from registration, or exemption or deferment from training and service, under this title, shall continue after the cause therefor ceases to exist.

(l) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, no person between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one shall be discharged from service in the armed forces of the United States while this title is in effect because such person entered such service without the consent of his parent or guardian.

(m) No person shall be relieved from training and service under this title by reason of conviction of a criminal offense, except where the offense of which he has been convicted may be punished by death, or by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

(n) In the case of any registrant whose principal place of employment is located outside the appeal board area in which the local board having jurisdiction over the registrant is located, any occupational deferment made under subsection (h) of this section may, within five days after such deferment is made, be submitted for review and decision to the appeal board having jurisdiction over the area in which is located the principal place of employment of the registrant. Such decision of the appeal board shall be final unless modified or changed by the President, and such decision shall be made public.

(o) Where one or more sons or daughters of a family were killed in action or died in line of duty while serving in the armed forces of the United States, or subsequently died as a result of injuries received or disease incurred during such service, the sole surviving son of such family shall not be inducted for service under the terms of this title.

[ACTIVE DUTY FOR CERTAIN MEMBERS OF RESERVE COMPONENTS]

[SEC. 7. Notwithstanding any other provision of law or of this title, the President is hereby authorized to order into the active service of the armed forces of the United States, without their consent and for a period not to exceed twenty-one

consecutive months each, members (other than those exempted or deferred from training and service under the provisions of section 6 (c)) of any or all reserve components of the armed forces of the United States who shall have had less than ninety days' continuous active service in the armed forces of the United States, exclusive of periods of active training duty. No member of the National Guard of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia shall be ordered into the active service of the armed forces of the United States under this section unless the governor of such State or Territory, or the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard in the case of a member of the District of Columbia National Guard, has consented to the ordering into active service of the armed forces of the United States of members of the National Guard of his State, Territory, or District, as the case may be, in accordance with such program or programs as may have been mutually agreed upon. Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal or abridge any existing law which authorizes the ordering of members of reserve components of the armed forces into active service.]

BOUNTIES; SUBSTITUTES; PURCHASES OF RELEASE

SEC. 8. No bounty shall be paid to induce any person to enlist in or be inducted into the armed forces of the United States: *Provided*, That the clothing or enlistment allowances authorized by law shall not be regarded as bounties within the meaning of this section. No person liable for training and service in such forces shall be permitted or allowed to furnish a substitute for such training and service; no substitute as such shall be received, enlisted, enrolled, or inducted into the armed forces of the United States; and no person liable for training and service in such forces under section 4 shall be permitted to escape such training and service or be discharged therefrom prior to the expiration of his period of such training and service by the payment of money or any other valuable thing whatsoever as consideration for his release from such training and service or liability therefor.

SEPARATION FROM SERVICE; REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

SEC. 9. (a) Any person inducted into the armed forces under this title for training and service, who, in the judgment of those in authority over him, satisfactorily completes his period of training and service under section 4 (b) shall be entitled to a certificate to that effect upon the completion of such period of training and service, which shall include a record of any special proficiency or merit attained. In addition, each such person who is inducted into the armed forces under this title for training and service shall be given a physical examination at the beginning of such training and service, and upon the completion of his period of training and service under this title, each such person shall be given another physical examination and, upon his written request, shall be given a statement of physical condition by the Secretary concerned: *Provided*, That such statement shall not contain any reference to mental or other conditions which in the judgment of the Secretary concerned would prove injurious to the physical or mental health of the person to whom it pertains.

(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and service, has left or leaves a position (other than a temporary position) in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate, and (2) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such training and service or from hospitalization continuing after discharge for a period of not more than one year—

(A) if such position was in the employ of the United States Government, its Territories, or possessions, or political subdivisions thereof, or the District of Columbia, such person shall—

(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position be restored to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay; or

(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such position by reason of disability sustained during such service but qualified to perform the duties of any other position in employ of the employer, be restored to such other position the duties of which he is qualified to perform as will provide him like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation thereof consistent with the circumstances in his case;

(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such person shall—

(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored by such employer or his successor in interest to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay; or

(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such position by reason of disability sustained during such service but qualified to perform the duties of any other position in the employ of such employer or his successor in interest, be restored by such employer or his successor in interest to such other position the duties of which he is qualified to perform as will provide him like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation thereof consistent with the circumstances in his case,

unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so;

(C) if such position was in the employ of any State or political subdivision thereof, it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress that such person should—

(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay; or

(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such position by reason of disability sustained during such service but qualified to perform the duties of any other position in the employ of the employer, be restored to such other position the duties of which he is qualified to perform as will provide him like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation thereof consistent with the circumstances in his case.

(c) (1) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service in the armed forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.

(2) It is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress that any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) should be so restored in such manner as to give him such status in his employment as he would have enjoyed if he had continued in such employment continuously from the time of his entering the armed forces until the time of his restoration to such employment.

(d) In case any private employer fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of subsection (b) or subsection (c) (1), the district court of the United States for the district in which such private employer maintains a place of business shall have power, upon the filing of a motion, petition, or other appropriate pleading by the person entitled to the benefits of such provisions, specifically to require such employer to comply with such provisions and to compensate such person for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by reason of such employer's unlawful action: *Provided*, That any such compensation shall be in addition to and shall not be deemed to diminish any of the benefits of such provisions. The court shall order speedy hearing in any such case and shall advance it on the calendar. Upon application to the United States district attorney or comparable official for the district in which such private employer maintains a place of business, by any person claiming to be entitled to the benefits of such provisions, such United States district attorney or official, if reasonably satisfied that the person so applying is entitled to such benefits, shall appear and act as attorney for such person in the amicable adjustment of the claim or in the filing of any motion, petition, or other appropriate pleading and the prosecution thereof specifically to require such employer to comply with such provisions: *Provided*, That no fees or court costs shall be taxed against any person who may apply for such benefits: *Provided further*, That only the employer shall be deemed a necessary party respondent to any such action.

(e) (1) Any person who is entitled to be restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) of subsection (b) and who was employed, immediately before entering the armed forces, by any agency in the executive branch of the Government or by any Territory or possession, or political subdivision thereof, or by the District of Columbia, shall be so restored by such agency or the successor to its functions, or by such Territory, possession, political subdivision, or the District of Columbia. In any case in which, upon appeal of any person who was employed immediately before entering the armed forces by any agency in the executive branch of the Government or by the District of Columbia, the United States Civil Service Commission finds that—

(A) such agency is no longer in existence and its functions have not been transferred to any other agency; or

(B) for any reason it is not feasible for such person to be restored to employment by such agency or by the District of Columbia, the Commission shall determine whether or not there is a position in any other agency in the executive branch of the Government or in the government of the District of Columbia for which such person is qualified and which is either vacant or held by a person having a temporary appointment thereto. In any case in which the Commission determines that there is such a position, such person shall be restored to such position by the agency in which such position exists or by the government of the District of Columbia, as the case may be. The Commission is authorized and directed to issue regulations giving full force and effect to the provisions of this section insofar as they relate to persons entitled to be restored to positions in the executive branch of the Government or in the government of the District of Columbia, including persons entitled to be restored under the last sentence of paragraph (2) of this subsection. The agencies in the executive branch of the Government and the government of the District of Columbia shall comply with such rules and regulations and orders issued by the Commission pursuant to this subsection. The Commission is authorized and directed whenever it finds, upon appeal of the person concerned, that any agency in the executive branch of the Government or the government of the District of Columbia has failed or refuses to comply with the provisions of this section, to issue an order specifically requiring such agency or the government of the District of Columbia to comply with such provisions and to compensate such person for any loss of salary or wages suffered by reason of failure to comply with such provisions, less any amounts received by him through other employment, unemployment compensation, or readjustment allowances: *Provided*, That any such compensation ordered to be paid by the Commission shall be in addition to and shall not be deemed to diminish any of the benefits of such provisions, and shall be paid by the head of the agency concerned or by the government of the District of Columbia out of appropriations currently available for salary and expenses of such agency or government, and such appropriations shall be available for such purpose. As used in this paragraph, the term "agency in the executive branch of the Government" means any department, independent establishment, agency, or corporation in the executive branch of the United States Government.

(2) Any person who is entitled to be restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) of subsection (b) and who was employed, immediately before entering the armed forces, in the legislative branch of the Government, shall be so restored by the officer who appointed him to the position which he held immediately before entering the armed forces. In any case in which it is not possible for any such person to be restored to a position in the legislative branch of the Government and he is otherwise eligible to acquire a status for transfer to a position in the classified (competitive) civil service in accordance with section 2 (b) of the Act of November 26, 1940 (54 Stat. 1212), the United States Civil Service Commission shall, upon appeal of such person, determine whether or not there is a position in the executive branch of the Government for which he is qualified and which is either vacant or held by a person having a temporary appointment thereto. In any case in which the Commission determines that there is such a position such person shall be restored to such position by the agency in which such position exists.

(3) Any person who is entitled to be restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) of subsection (b) and who was employed, immediately before entering the armed forces, in the judicial branch of the Government, shall be so restored by the officer who appointed him to the position which he held immediately before entering the armed forces.

(f) In any case in which two or more persons who are entitled to be restored to a position under the provisions of this section or of any other law relating to similar reemployment benefits left the same position in order to enter the armed forces, the person who left such position first shall have the prior right to be restored thereto, without prejudice to the reemployment rights of the other person or persons to be restored.

(g) (1) Any person who, subsequent to [the date of enactment of this title and while it is in effect,] *June 24, 1948*, enlists in the [armed forces] *Armed Forces of the United States* (other than in a [reserve] *Reserve* component) and who serves for not more than [three] *four* years (plus any period of additional service imposed pursuant to law) shall [if such enlistment is his first enlistment in the armed forces subsequent to the date of enactment of this title,] be entitled upon [the expiration of his enlistment (including any extension thereof by law but not including any voluntary extension thereof) or upon his discharge] *release*

from service under honorable conditions [prior to the expiration thereof,] to all the reemployment rights and other benefits provided for by this section in the case of inductees.

(2) Any person who, subsequent to [the effective date of this title and while it is in effect,] June 24, 1948, enters upon active duty (other than for the purpose of determining his physical fitness), whether or not voluntarily, in the [armed forces] Armed Forces of the United States or the Public Health Service in response to an order or call to active duty shall, upon his relief from active duty under honorable conditions, be entitled to all of the reemployment rights and benefits provided by this section in the case of inductees, if he is relieved from active duty not later than [three] four years after the date of entering upon active duty or as soon after the expiration of such [three] four years as he is able to obtain orders relieving him from active duty.

(3) Any employee who holds a position described in paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) of this section shall be granted a leave of absence by his employer for the purpose of being inducted into, entering, determining his physical fitness to enter, or performing training duty in, the Armed Forces of the United States. Upon his release from training duty or upon his rejection, such employee shall, if he makes prompt application for reinstatement, be reinstated in his position without reduction in his seniority, status, or pay except as such reduction may be made for all employees similarly situated.

(h) The Secretary of Labor, through the Bureau of Veterans' Reemployment Rights, shall render aid in the replacement in their former positions of persons who have satisfactorily completed any period of active duty in the armed forces of the United States or the Public Health Service. In rendering such aid, the Secretary shall use the then existing Federal and State agencies engaged in similar or related activities and shall utilize the assistance of volunteers.

(i) Any person inducted into the armed forces for training and service under this title shall, during the period of such service, be permitted to vote in person or by absentee ballot in any general, special, or primary election occurring in the State of which he is a resident, whether he is within or outside such State at the time of such election, if under the laws of such State he is otherwise entitled so to vote in such election; but nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require granting to any such person a leave of absence or furlough for longer than one day in order to permit him to vote in person in any such election. No person inducted into, or enlisted in, the armed forces for training and service under this title shall, during the period of such service, as a condition of voting in any election for President, Vice President, electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Member of the House of Representatives, be required to pay any poll tax or other tax or make any other payment to any State or political subdivision thereof.

(j) The Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air Force, or Treasury shall furnish to the Selective Service System hereafter established a report of separation for each person separated from active duty.

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM; CONSTRUCTION; CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

SEC. 10. (a) (1) There is hereby established in the executive branch of the Government an agency to be known as the Selective Service System, and a Director of Selective Service who shall be the head thereof.

(2) The Selective Service System shall include a national headquarters, at least one State headquarters in each State, Territory, and possession of the United States, and in the District of Columbia, and the local boards, appeal boards, and other agencies provided for in subsection (b) (3) of this section.

(3) The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$12,500 per year.

(4) The functions of the Office of Selective Service Records (established by the Act of March 31, 1947) and of the Director of the Office of Selective Service Records are hereby transferred to the Selective Service System and the Director of Selective Service, respectively. The personnel, property, records, and unexpended balances (available or to be made available) of appropriations, allocations, and other funds of the Office of Selective Service Records are hereby transferred to the Selective Service System. The Office of Selective Service Records shall cease to exist upon the taking of effect of the provisions of this title: *Provided*, That, effective upon the termination of this title and notwithstanding such termination in other respects, (A) the said Office of Selective Service Records is hereby re-established on the same basis and with the same functions as obtained prior to the

effective date of this title, (B) said reestablished Office shall be responsible for liquidating any other outstanding affairs of the Selective Service System, and (C) the personnel, property, records, and unexpended balances (available or to be made available) of appropriations, allocations, and other funds of the Selective Service System shall be transferred to such reestablished Office of Selective Service Records.

(b) The President is authorized—

(1) to prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this title;

(2) to appoint, upon recommendation of the respective governor or comparable executive official, a State director of the Selective Service System for each headquarters in each State, Territory, and possession of the United States and for the District of Columbia, who shall represent the governor and be in immediate charge of the State headquarters of the Selective Service System; to employ such number of civilians, and to order to active duty with their consent and to assign to the Selective Service System such officers of the selective-service section of the State headquarters and headquarters detachments and such other officers of the federally recognized National Guard of the United States or other armed forces personnel (including personnel of the reserve components thereof), as may be necessary for the administration of the national and of the several State headquarters of the Selective Service System;

(3) to create and establish within the Selective Service System civilian local boards, civilian appeal boards, and such other civilian agencies, including agencies of appeal, as may be necessary to carry out its functions with respect to the registration, examination, classification, selection, assignment, delivery for induction, and maintenance of records of persons registered under this title, together with such other duties as may be assigned under this title. He shall create and establish one or more local boards in each county or political subdivision corresponding thereto of each State, Territory, and possession of the United States, and in the District of Columbia. Each local board shall consist of three or more members to be appointed by the President from recommendations made by the respective governors or comparable executive officials: *Provided*, That an intercounty local board consisting of at least one member from each component county or corresponding subdivision may be established for an area not exceeding five counties or political subdivisions corresponding thereto within a State or comparable jurisdiction when the President determines, after considering the public interest involved and the recommendation of the governor or comparable executive official or officials, that the establishment of such local board area will result in a more efficient and economical operation. Any such intercounty local board shall have within its area the same power and jurisdiction as a local board has in its area. No member of any local board shall be a member of the armed forces of the United States, but each member of any local board shall be a civilian who is a citizen of the United States residing in the county or political subdivision corresponding thereto in which such local board has jurisdiction, and each intercounty local board shall have at least one member from each county or political subdivision corresponding thereto included within the intercounty local board area. Such local boards, or separate panels thereof each consisting of three or more members, shall, under rules and regulations prescribed by the President, have the power within the respective jurisdictions of such local boards to hear and determine, subject to the right of appeal to the appeal boards herein authorized, all questions or claims with respect to inclusion for, or exemption or deferment from, training and service under this title, of all individuals within the jurisdiction of such local boards. The decisions of such local board shall be final, except where an appeal is authorized and is taken in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe. There shall be at least one appeal board for each State. Appeal boards within the Selective Service System shall be composed of civilians who are citizens of the United States and who are not members of the armed forces. The decision of such appeal boards shall be final in cases before them on appeal unless modified or changed by the President. The President, upon appeal or upon his own motion, shall have power to determine all claims or questions with respect to inclusion for, or exemption or deferment from training and service under this title, and the determination of the President shall be final. No person who is a civilian officer, member, agent, or employee of the Office of Selective Service Records

or the Selective Service System, or of any local board or appeal board or other agency of such Office or System, shall be excepted from registration or deferred or exempted from training and service, as provided for in this title by reason of his status as such civilian officer, member, agent, or employee;

(4) to appoint, and to fix, in accordance with the Classification Act of 1949, the compensation of such officers, agents, and employees as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this title: *Provided*, That the compensation of employees of local boards and appeal boards may be fixed without regard to the Classification Act of 1949: *Provided further*, That any officer on the active or retired list of the armed forces, or any reserve component thereof with his consent, or any officer or employee of any department or agency of the United States who may be assigned or detailed to any office or position to carry out the provisions of this title (except to offices or positions on local boards or appeal boards established or created pursuant to section 10 (b) (3)) may serve in and perform the functions of such office or position without loss of or prejudice to his status as such officer in the armed forces or reserve component thereof, or as such officer or employee in any department or agency of the United States;

(5) to utilize the services of any or all departments and any and all officers or agents of the United States, and to accept the services of all officers and agents of the several States, Territories, and possessions, and subdivisions thereof, and the District of Columbia, and of private welfare organizations, in the execution of this title;

(6) to purchase such printing, binding, and blank-book work from public, commercial, or private printing establishments or binderies upon orders placed by the Public Printer or upon waivers issued in accordance with section 12 of the Printing Act approved January 12, 1895, as amended, and to obtain by purchase, loan, or gift such equipment and supplies for the Selective Service System, as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this title, with or without advertising or formal contract;

(7) to prescribe eligibility, rules, and regulations governing the parole for service in the armed forces, or for any other special service established pursuant to this title, of any person convicted of a violation of any of the provisions of this title;

(8) subject to the availability of funds appropriated for such purpose, to procure such space as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this title and Public Law 26, Eightieth Congress, approved March 31, 1947, by lease pursuant to existing statutes, except that the provisions of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 412), as amended by section 15 of the Act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1517; 40 U. S. C. 278a), shall not apply to any lease entered into under the authority of this title;

(9) subject to the availability of funds appropriated for such purposes, to determine the location of such additional temporary installations as he may deem essential; to utilize and enlarge such existing installations; to construct, install, and equip, and to complete the construction, installation, and equipment of such buildings, structures, utilities, and appurtenances (including the necessary grading and removal, repair or remodeling of existing structures and installations), as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title; and, in order to accomplish the purpose of this title, to acquire lands, and rights pertaining thereto, or other interests therein, for temporary use thereof, by donation or lease, and to prosecute construction thereon prior to the approval of the title by the Attorney General as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended;

(10) subject to the availability of funds appropriated for such purposes, to utilize, in order to provide and furnish such services as may be deemed necessary or expedient to accomplish the purposes of this title, such personnel of the armed forces and of Reserve components thereof with their consent, and such civilian personnel, as may be necessary. For the purposes of this title, the provisions of section 14 of the Federal Employees' Pay Act of 1946 (Public Law 390, Seventy-ninth Congress) with respect to the maximum limitations as to the number of civilian employees shall not be applicable to the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force.

(c) The President is authorized to delegate any authority vested in him under this title, and to provide for the subdelegation of any such authority.

(d) In the administration of this title, gifts of supplies, equipment, and voluntary services may be accepted.

(e) The Chief of Finance, United States Army, is authorized to act as the fiscal, disbursing, and accounting agent of the Director in carrying out the provisions of this title.

(f) The Director is authorized to make final settlement of individual claims, for amounts not exceeding \$50, for travel and other expenses of uncompensated personnel of the Office of Selective Service Records, or the Selective Service System, incurred while in the performance of official duties, without regard to other provisions of law governing the travel of civilian employees of the Federal Government.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE

SEC. 11. Under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the President, funds available to carry out the provisions of this title shall also be available for the payment of actual and reasonable expenses of emergency medical care, including hospitalization, of registrants who suffer illness or injury, and the transportation, and burial, of the remains of registrants who suffer death, while acting under orders issued under the provisions of this title, but such burial expenses shall not exceed \$150 in any one case.

PENALTIES

SEC. 12. (a) Any member of the Selective Service System or any other person charged as herein provided with the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of this title, or the rules or regulations made or directions given thereunder, who shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duty, and any person charged with such duty, or having and exercising any authority under said title, rules, regulations, or directions who shall knowingly make, or be a party to the making of any false, improper, or incorrect registration, classification, physical or mental examination, deferment, induction, enrollment, or muster, and any person who shall knowingly make, or be a party to the making of, any false statement or certificate regarding or bearing upon a classification or in support of any request for a particular classification, for service under the provisions of this title, or rules, regulations, or directions made pursuant thereto, or who otherwise evades or refuses registration or service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this title, or who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this title, or of said rules, regulations, or directions, or who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title, or rules, regulations, or directions made pursuant to this title, or any person or persons who shall knowingly hinder or interfere or attempt to do so in any way, by force or violence or otherwise, with the administration of this title or the rules or regulations made pursuant thereto, or who conspires to commit any one or more of such offenses, shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than \$10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment, or if subject to military or naval law may be tried by court martial, and, on conviction, shall suffer such punishment as a court martial may direct. No person shall be tried by court martial in any case arising under this title unless such person has been actually inducted for the training and service prescribed under this title or unless he is subject to trial by court martial under laws in force prior to the enactment of this title. Precedence shall be given by courts to the trial of cases arising under this title, and such cases shall, upon request of the Attorney General, be advanced on the docket for immediate hearing.

(b) Any person (1) who knowingly transfers or delivers to another, for the purpose of aiding or abetting the making of any false identification or representation, any registration certificate, alien's certificate of nonresidence, or any other certificate issued pursuant to or prescribed by the provisions of this title, or rules or regulations promulgated hereunder; or (2) who, with intent that it be used for any purpose of false identification or representation, has in his possession any such certificate not duly issued to him; or (3) who forges, alters, or in any manner changes any such certificate or any notation duly and validly inscribed thereon; or (4) who, with intent that it be used for any purpose of false identification or representation, photographs, prints, or in any manner makes or executes any engraving, photograph, print, or impression in the likeness of any such certificate, or any colorable imitation thereof; or (5) who has in his possession any certificate purporting to be a certificate issued pursuant to this title, or rules and regulations promulgated hereunder, which he knows to be falsely made, reproduced, forged, counterfeited, or altered; or (6) who knowingly violates or evades any of the provisions of this title or rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto relating

to the issuance, transfer, or possession of such certificate, shall, upon conviction, be fined not to exceed \$10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of any certificate not duly issued to him, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to establish an intent to use such certificate for purposes of false identification or representation, unless the defendant explains such possession to the satisfaction of the jury.

NONAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN LAWS

SEC. 13. (a) Nothing in section 109 or 113 of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., title 18, secs. 198 and 203), in section 190 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. C., title 5, sec. 99), in section 19 (e) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 (U. S. C., title 41, sec. 119 (e)), or in the second sentence of subsection (a) of section 9 of the Act of August 2, 1939 (53 Stat. 1148), entitled "An Act to prevent pernicious political activities," as amended, shall be deemed to apply to any person because of his appointment under authority of this title or the regulations made pursuant thereto, as an uncompensated official of the Selective Service System, or as an individual to conduct hearings on appeals of persons claiming exemption from combatant or noncombatant training because of conscientious objections or persons appointed to or serving on the National Selective Service Appeal Board.

(b) All functions performed under this title shall be excluded from the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237) except as to the requirements of section 3 of such Act.

(c) In computing the lump-sum payments made to Air Force reserve officers under the provisions of section 2 of the Act of June 16, 1936, as amended (U. S. C., title 10, sec. 300a), and to reserve officers of the Navy or to their beneficiaries under section 12 of the Act of August 4, 1942, as amended (U. S. C., title 34, sec. 850k), no credit shall be allowed for any period of active service performed from the effective date of this title to the date on which this title shall cease to be effective. Each such lump-sum payment shall be prorated for a fractional part of a year of active service in the case of any reserve officer subject to the provisions of either such section, if such reserve officer performs continuous active service for one or more years (inclusive of such service performed during the period in which this title is effective) and such active service includes a fractional part of a year immediately prior to the effective date of this title, or immediately following the date on which this title shall cease to be effective, or both.

CIVIL RELIEF

SEC. 14. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 604 of the Act of October 17, 1940 (54 Stat. 1191), and the provisions of section 4 of the Act of July 25, 1947 (Public Law 239, Eightieth Congress), all of the provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, including specifically article IV thereof, shall be applicable to all persons in the armed forces of the United States, including all persons inducted into the armed forces pursuant to this title or the Public Health Service, until such time as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, is repealed or otherwise terminated by subsequent Act of the Congress: *Provided*, That, with respect to persons inducted into the armed forces while this title is in effect, wherever under any section or provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, a proceeding, remedy, privilege, stay, limitation, accounting, or other transaction has been authorized or provided with respect to military service performed while such Act is in force, such section or provision shall be deemed to continue in full force and effect so long as may be necessary to the exercise or enjoyment of such proceeding, remedy, privilege, stay, limitation, accounting, or other transaction.

NOTICE OF TITLE; VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENTS

SEC. 15. (a) Every person shall be deemed to have notice of the requirements of this title upon publication by the President of a proclamation or other public notice fixing a time for any registration under section 3.

(b) It shall be the duty of every registrant to keep his local board informed as to his current address and changes in status as required by such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the President.

(c) If any provision of this title, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the title, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.

(d) Except as provided in section 4 (c) or section 4 (g), nothing contained in this title shall be construed to repeal, amend, or suspend the laws now in force authorizing voluntary enlistment or reenlistment in the armed forces of the United States, including the reserve components thereof, except that no person shall be accepted for enlistment after he has received orders to report for induction and except that, whenever the Congress or the President has declared that the national interest is imperiled, voluntary enlistment or reenlistment in such forces, and their reserve components, may be suspended by the President to such extent as he may deem necessary in the interest of national defense.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 16. When used in this title—

(a) The term "between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six" shall refer to men who have attained the eighteenth anniversary of the day of their birth and who have not attained the twenty-sixth anniversary of the day of their birth; and other terms designating different age groups shall be construed in a similar manner.

(b) The term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, shall be deemed to mean the several States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

(c) The term "armed forces" shall be deemed to include the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard.

(d) The term "district court of the United States" shall be deemed to include the courts of the United States for the Territories and possessions of the United States.

(e) The term "local board" shall be deemed to include an intercounty local board in the case of any registrant who is subject to the jurisdiction of an intercounty local board.

(f) The term "Director" shall be deemed to mean the Director of the Selective Service System.

(g) (1) The term "duly ordained minister of religion" means a person who has been ordained, in accordance with the ceremonial, ritual, or discipline of a church, religious sect, or organization established on the basis of a community of faith and belief, doctrines and practices of a religious character, to preach and to teach the doctrines of such church, sect, or organization and to administer the rites and ceremonies thereof in public worship, and who as his regular and customary vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion and administers the ordinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or principles of such church, sect, or organization.

(2) The term "regular minister of religion" means one who as his customary vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a church, a religious sect, or organization of which he is a member, without having been formally ordained as a minister of religion, and who is recognized by such church, sect, or organization as a regular minister.

(3) The term "regular or duly ordained minister of religion" does not include a person who irregularly or incidentally preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a church, religious sect, or organization and does not include any person who may have been duly ordained a minister in accordance with the ceremonial, rite, or discipline of a church, religious sect, or organization, but who does not regularly, as a vocation, teach and preach the principles of religion and administer the ordinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or principles of his church, sect, or organization.

(h) The term "organized unit," when used with respect to a reserve component, shall be deemed to mean a unit in which the members thereof are required satisfactorily to participate in scheduled drills and training periods as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

(i) The term "reserve components of the armed forces" shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be deemed to include the federally recognized National Guard of the United States, the federally recognized Air National Guard of the United States, the Officers Reserve Corps, the Regular Army Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve, and shall include, in addition to the foregoing the Public Health Service Reserve when serving with the armed forces.

(j) The terms "active training and service" shall be deemed to mean any military service in the active Armed Forces; "trainee" shall be deemed to mean a person inducted into the Armed Forces under this title prior to attaining the nineteenth anni-

versary of his birth who is undergoing an initial period of basic training in the active Armed Forces; "initial period of basic training" or "initial basic training" shall mean that period of four months (or not to exceed six months when so increased pursuant to section 4 (k) of this title) immediately following induction; "inductee" shall mean any person inducted into the active Armed Forces under this title for active training and service.

TERMINATION OF TITLE

SEC. 17. (a) Except as provided in this title, all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this title are hereby [suspended] *repealed* to the extent of such conflict. [for the period in which this title shall be in force.]

[(b) All of the provisions of this title, except the provisions of section 2, the second sentence of section 4 (a), section 4 (b), sections 4 (d), 4 (e), 4 (f), 9, 10 (a) (4), 10 (b) (10), 13 (c), 14, and 17 (b), shall become inoperative and cease to apply on July 9, 1951, or on such earlier date as may be specified in a joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress for that purpose, except as to offenses committed prior to such date.]

(b) *There are hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title. All funds appropriated for the administrative expenses of the National Security Training Commission shall be appropriated directly to the Commission and all funds appropriated to pay the expenses of training carried out by Departments and agencies designated by the Commission shall be appropriated directly to the designated Departments and agencies.*

[(c) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.]

UTILIZATION OF INDUSTRY

SEC. 18. (a) Whenever the President after consultation with and receiving advice from the National Security Resources Board determines that it is in the interest of the national security for the Government to obtain prompt delivery of any articles or materials the procurement of which has been authorized by the Congress exclusively for the use of the armed forces of the United States, or for the use of the Atomic Energy Commission, he is authorized, through the head of any Government agency, to place with any person operating a plant, mine, or other facility capable of producing such articles or materials an order for such quantity of such articles or materials as the President deems appropriate. Any person with whom an order is placed pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be advised that such order is placed pursuant to the provisions of this section. Under any such program of national procurement, the President shall recognize the valid claim of American small business to participate in such contracts, in such manufactures, and in such distribution of materials, and small business shall be granted a fair share of the orders placed, exclusively for the use of the armed forces or for other Federal agencies now or hereafter designated in this section. For the purposes of this section, a business enterprise shall be determined to be "small business" if (1) its position in the trade or industry of which it is a part is not dominant, (2) the number of its employees does not exceed 500, and (3) it is independently owned and operated.

(b) It shall be the duty of any person with whom an order is placed pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a), (1) to give such order such precedence with respect to all other orders (Government or private) theretofore or thereafter placed with such person as the President may prescribe, and (2) to fill such order within the period of time prescribed by the President or as soon thereafter as possible.

(c) In case any person with whom an order is placed pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) refuses or fails—

(1) to give such order such precedence with respect to all other orders (Government or private) theretofore or thereafter placed with such person as the President may have prescribed;

(2) to fill such order within the period of time prescribed by the President or as soon thereafter as possible as determined by the President;

(3) to produce the kind or quality of articles or materials ordered; or

(4) to furnish the quantity, kind, and quality of articles or materials ordered at such price as shall be negotiated between such person and the Government agency concerned; or in the event of failure to negotiate a price, to furnish the quantity, kind, and quality of articles or materials ordered at such price as

he may subsequently be determined to be entitled to receive under subsection (d);

the President is authorized to take immediate possession of any plant, mine, or other facility of such person and to operate it, through any Government agency, for the production of such articles or materials as may be required by the Government.

(d) Fair and just compensation shall be paid by the United States (1) for any articles or materials furnished pursuant to an order placed under subsection (a), or (2) as rental for any plant, mine, or other facility of which possession is taken under subsection (c).

(e) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to render inapplicable to any plant, mine, or facility of which possession is taken pursuant to subsection (c) any State or Federal laws concerning the health, safety, security, or employment standards of employees.

(f) Any person, or any officer of any person as defined in this section, who willfully fails or refuses to carry out any duty imposed upon him by subsection (b) of this section shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years, or by a fine of not more than \$50,000, or by both such imprisonment and fine.

(g) (1) As used in this section—

(A) The term "person" means any individual, firm, company, association, corporation, or other form of business organization.

(B) The term "Government agency" means any department, agency, independent establishment, or corporation in the Executive branch of the United States Government.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a plant, mine, or other facility shall be deemed capable of producing any articles or materials if it is then producing or furnishing such articles or materials or if the President after consultation with and receiving advice from the National Security Resources Board determines that it can be readily converted to the production or furnishing of such articles or materials.

(h) (1) The President is empowered, through the Secretary of Defense, to require all producers of steel in the United States to make available, to individuals, firms, associations, companies, corporations, or organized manufacturing industries having orders for steel products or steel materials required by the armed forces, such percentages of the steel production of such producers, in equal proportion deemed necessary for the expeditious execution of orders for such products or materials. Compliance with such requirement shall be obligatory on all such producers of steel and such requirement shall take precedence over all orders and contracts theretofore placed with such producers. If any such producer of steel or the responsible head or heads thereof refuses to comply with such requirement, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to take immediate possession of the plant or plants of such producer and, through the appropriate branch, bureau, or department of the armed forces, to insure compliance with such requirement. Any such producer of steel or the responsible head or heads thereof refusing to comply with such requirement shall be deemed guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine not exceeding \$50,000.

(2) The President shall report to the Congress on the final day of each six-month period following the date of enactment of this Act the percentage figure, or if such information is not available, the approximate percentage figure, of the total steel production in the United States required to be made available during such period for the execution of orders for steel products and steel materials required by the Armed Forces, if such percentage figure is in excess of 10 per centum.

SAVING PROVISION

SEC. 19. Nothing in this title shall be deemed to amend any provision of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495).

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 20. This title shall become effective immediately; except that unless the President, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, declares a national emergency after the date of enactment of this Act, no person shall be inducted or ordered into active service without his consent under this title within ninety days after the date of its enactment. The Secretary of the Army, for the Army and the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, for the Navy and Marine Corps, and the Secretary of the Treasury, for the Coast Guard, are hereby authorized and directed

to initiate and carry forward an intensified voluntary enlistment campaign in an effort to obtain the required personnel strengths.

AUTHORITY TO ORDER RESERVE COMPONENTS TO ACTIVE FEDERAL SERVICE

Sec. 21. Until [July 9, 1951, and subject to the limitations imposed by section 2 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, as amended,] *July 1, 1953*, the President shall be authorized to order into the active military or naval service of the United States for a period of not to exceed [twenty-one] *twenty-six* consecutive months, with or without their consent, any or all members and units of any or all Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States and retired personnel of the Regular Armed Forces.

Act of July 27, 1950 (authorizing the President to extend enlistments in the Armed Forces):

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That until [July 9, 1951] July 9, 1953, the President shall be authorized to extend all enlistments in any component of the Army of the United States, the United States Navy, and the United States Marine Corps, including the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve, and in any component of the Air Force of the United States for a period of not to exceed twelve months: Provided, That all persons whose terms of enlistments are extended in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall continue during such extensions to be subject in all respects to the laws and regulations for the government of their respective service. No person whose enlistment has been extended heretofore or hereafter for twelve months pursuant to this Act shall have his enlistment extended for any additional period of time under this Act.

Act of September 9, 1950 (authorizing induction of certain medical, dental, and allied specialist categories):

Sec. 7. This Act, except for section 2 and section 5, shall terminate on [July 9, 1951] *July 1, 1953*.

Act of August 3, 1950 (suspending restrictions on personnel strength of the Armed Forces):

That provisions of law imposing restrictions on the authorized personnel strength of any component of the Armed Forces, including sections 102, 202, 213, and 302 of the *Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948* (62 Stat. 357, 363, 369, and 371), section 2 of the Act of April 18, 1946 (60 Stat. 92), and section 2, title I, of the Selective Service Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 605), as amended, and sections 102 and 202 of the Act of July 10, 1950 (Public Law 604, Eighty-first Congress), are hereby suspended until July 31, 1954.

Act of June 30, 1950 (providing for enlistment of aliens in the Regular Army):

That, with the approval of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army, under such regulations as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe, is authorized [until June 30, 1953, to accept original enlistments or reenlistments in the Regular Army for periods of not less than five years of not to exceed two thousand five hundred] *until June 30, 1955, to accept, during each calendar year, original enlistments or reenlistments in the Regular Army for periods of not less than five years of not to exceed twenty-five thousand* qualified unmarried male aliens (without dependents as defined in section 4 of the Act of June 16, 1942 (56 Stat. 361), as amended), who are not less than eighteen years of age or more than thirty-five years of age; and, with the approval of the Secretary of State to accept reenlistment of any such alien upon the expiration of his original term of enlistment for such period or periods as the Secretary of the Army may determine: *Provided, That persons enlisted under the provisions of this Act shall be integrated into established units with citizen soldiers and not segregated into separate organizations for aliens.*

Sec. 3. So much of section 2 of the Act approved August 1, 1894 (28 Stat., ch. 179, 216; 10 U. S. C. 625), as amended, as reads “; and in time of peace no person (except an Indian) who is not a citizen of the United States or who has not made legal declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, shall be enlisted for the first enlistment in the Army” is hereby suspended until [June 30, 1953] *June 30, 1955*, with respect to enlistments made under section 1 of this Act.

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